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 i 
Abstract 
 
The U.S. War on Drugs has been underway for several decades. Since it was declared by the 
Nixon Administration narcotics have been understood as a growing security threat to the 
American public, their health, economy and society. Illicit drugs have gradually become a 
securitised issue. From the Nixon Administration onward, the law enforcement and 
eventually military assets of the United States government were increasingly deployed in an 
effort to counter this drug threat. 
 
While initially regarded as a minor issue, as the potency and addictive qualities of illicit 
drugs increased during the 20th Century, so too did the concerns of influential actors from the 
political and public spheres. Nixon's actions did not represent the high-water mark of U.S. 
counter-narcotics. There was growing violence on American streets linked to the drug 
trafficking cartels out of Colombia, especially in Southern Florida where traffickers battled 
each other for lucrative drug markets. In response to this national security threat, the Reagan 
Administration – followed by the successor Bush and Clinton Administrations – gradually 
increased the involvement of the U.S. military in counter-narcotics policy. This occurred both 
at home in the form of greater militarisation of police forces, and abroad in support of several 
Latin American countries’ security forces. In 2000, drug-related instability in Colombia 
resulted in the launch of the Plan Colombia initiative, a dedicated package of American 
financial and security assistance, with counter-narcotics the primary purpose. In 2008, as 
drug-related violence in Mexico reached epidemic proportions and threatened to spillover 
across the American border, the U.S. launched the Merida Initiative in an attempt to aid 
Mexican counter-narcotics efforts. 
 
This thesis uses qualitative research methods to examine the militarisation of U.S. foreign 
counter-narcotics policy by analysing the case studies of Colombia and Mexico and their 
American-backed efforts. It also examines domestic policy, by considering the historical 
development of U.S. counter-narcotics, the progressive militarisation of law enforcement as a 
consequence of the drug war, and the security situation on the southern border with Mexico. 
This empirical research is facilitated by the development of a militarisation analytical 
framework, which builds upon the securitisation framework. Based on the findings of the 
case studies, the processes that drive militarisation are explored, and the framework itself is 
further developed and refined. The research possibilities for counter-narcotics policy and 
future direction for militarisation research are also explored in the Conclusion. 
 
Ultimately, this thesis offers a detailed analysis of militarisation in U.S. foreign and domestic 
counter-narcotics policy, the processes behind this, and develops a militarisation framework 
applicable to any security situation, contributing to the overall securitisation debate. 
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Chapter 1 
 Drug Warriors: Militarisation and U.S. Counter-narcotics 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The U.S. led War on Drugs has been underway for several decades. In President Richard 
Nixon’s Special Message to Congress on June 17th 1971, he stated that illicit narcotic drugs 
represented a grave threat to the United States of America by negatively impacting the 
economy, crime rates, public health and morality (Nixon 1971). By so undermining 
American society and way of life, narcotics came to be regarded as posing a substantial 
threat, one in need of being met, challenged and eventually overcome. 
 In the years since its inception, the War on Drugs has grown to international 
proportions, with American counter-narcotics policy reaching into countries around the 
world. This thesis concerns the relations between the United States and two of its regional 
neighbours, Colombia and Mexico, in the fight against narcotics. It is a story that began 
domestically in the United States. Public and political attitudes towards illicit drugs gradually 
hardened as such substances and their damaging impact came to be seen as a threat to 
America, its people and society. Greater law enforcement measures within the U.S. were 
eventually complimented and ultimately influenced by military resources and practices. 
Meanwhile, U.S. counter-narcotics policy in foreign countries – especially in Latin America 
– progressively involved greater roles for the American military, either directly or in support 
of partner security forces and militaries in combatting drug trafficking. This thesis focuses on 
the processes that lay behind this policy. It also looks at the levels of U.S. military 
involvement in Colombia, Mexico and domestically on the U.S. Southern border. Ultimately, 
the thesis analyses how the notionally law enforcement and public health issue of illegal 
drugs became such a potent security concern so as to involve the strongest armed forces in 
history as part of a solution to the problem. 
 This process of militarisation cannot be studied, however, without a framework to 
underpin it. This thesis develops, utilises in the case studies, and then refines a militarisation 
analytical framework, designed to establish when a security situation has been militarised by 
identifying the presence of constituent elements. This framework development means that the 
thesis also contributes to the wider debate on securitisation, the process by which issues 
become the subject of security concern and eventual action. Without securitisation there can 
be no militarisation, the latter being an extension of the former, as this thesis demonstrates. 
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1.2 From Securitisation to Militarisation 
 
The theory and process of securitisation is a major factor in explaining the development of 
the American attitude towards narcotics as a social and, ultimately, security threat to the U.S. 
Broadly, securitisation, according to Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde in their 
seminal text, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, “offers a constructivist operational 
method for distinguishing the process of securitisation from that of politicisation – for 
understanding who can securitise what and under what conditions” (1998, p.vii). Part of 
securitisation theory posits that an issue can gradually progress along a security spectrum, 
from being non-politicised, to becoming politicised, to eventually achieving a securitised 
status (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.23-24). 
 In this thesis, the security issue causing concern would be the social, moral, economic 
and public safety threats to American society posed by illicit narcotics. Whatever the exact 
circumstances, the general message often conveyed concerning securitisation is that, if left 
unchallenged, such security issues would eventually pose an existential threat, and thus it is 
imperative that action be taken to combat such threats. 
Such a progression can be observed in the changing American attitude to narcotics 
during the 20th Century, which gradually evolved into a security issue as such substances 
become more addictive and illicit. At the turn of the century it was not unusual for what are 
today regarded as serious drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, to be freely available in 
pharmacies and mail-order catalogues, albeit in less potent form compared to modern 
variations (Feiling 2009, p.17). There was no real ‘drug threat’, hence it was a non-politicised 
issue. Yet, as the strength of such substances increased, and physical and mental drug 
addictions became increasingly common, American society, influenced by religious, political 
and civic security actors and their campaigns, began to take notice and concern grew around 
the potentially serious consequences (Epstein 1977; Behr 1998). Thus the drug issue 
gradually became politicised. Ultimately, it expanded beyond issues of morality and began to 
intrude into the social and economic realms. Concerns were expressed in the United Nations 
(1961), and stoked domestically in the U.S. by fears that narcotics were corrupting America’s 
youth, undermining wealth creation through loss of productivity, and lowering quality of life 
by increasing crime and turning working-class neighbourhoods into ghettos for addicts 
(Epstein 1977; Maier 1989). 
The fear surrounding drug abuse as an activity that encouraged deviant or non-
conforming behaviour, in contrast to the ‘correct’ state of mind (Van Duyne and Levi 2005, 
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p.3), caused narcotics to be considered an existential threat to the fabric of American society. 
Increasingly, politicians and law enforcement agencies – the security actors – sought to 
counter this perceived threat in response to public unease. This unease was itself promoted by 
the speech acts of public figures, such as President Richard Nixon, continuously pointing out 
what a threat drugs were (Johnson and Wanta 1996, p.189). Thus a self-reinforcing cycle 
developed – policy responses and rhetoric designed to counter a threat that itself caused such 
fear and anxiety, in turn encouraged even more fear, which led to calls for greater responses. 
This in turn prompted the decisive securitisation of the drug issue in America. Political 
leaders at local, state and federal levels gradually changed policy. They moved from viewing 
the issue as predominantly a public health and social/moral problem that could be dealt with 
through treatment and education, albeit with some enforcement, towards emphasising a far 
tougher enforcement and interdiction-based solution to the threat. 
The principal line of defence against this threat was one of tougher law enforcement 
(though drug treatment programs were never completely discounted), in an effort to address 
the problem through social as well as enforcement measures. The tone for the War on Drugs 
was largely set by the Nixon Administration. In the election of 1968, the Nixon campaign had 
promised to cut supposedly high-levels of crime across the country, and upon victory needed 
to boast of a record of delivery (Epstein 1977, p.64). Upon entering office, however, it 
became apparent that the federal government was limited in what it could do to impact crime 
statistics, given that law enforcement was reserved for local and state authorities. In an effort 
to meet its election promise, the Nixon Administration decided to try and tackle the issue 
from an alternative direction. By taking a greater role in drug enforcement (which was 
subject to federal support and involvement) overall criminality could in turn be reduced, such 
was the argument that narcotic addiction promoted criminality to fund users’ habits – users 
whose sense of morality had already been eroded by drugs, it was thought. Domestic policy 
efforts, including expanded treatment programmes, eventually focused on enforcement-based 
measures as the flow of drugs into the U.S. showed no signs of abating. International 
partnerships were launched between the U.S. and Turkey and Mexico, to clamp down on 
narcotics production and transit in those respective countries (Epstein 1977). Both domestic 
and international efforts were strengthened by the establishment of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. It was a ‘super agency’ that was created by amalgamating all other federal-
level entities involved in drug enforcement. It was show of force, so to speak, intended to 
demonstrate how serious the drug threat was being taken by the U.S. government (Drug 
Enforcement Administration Museum 2014). 
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During the 1970s and early 1980s, as the flow of narcotics from South America and 
Central and South East Asia continued unabated, the levels of drug-related violence in 
American cities rose. The Southern Florida region, and Miami in particular, were witness to 
escalating murder rates as Latin American drug traffickers fought over the financial spoils 
that came with control of the smuggling routes into the U.S. (Posner 2009). With the security 
threat caused by drugs moving from mainly moral and socio-economic concerns, into the 
more immediately threatening realms of street violence and high body counts, increasingly 
forceful tactics to address the threat were advocated, above ordinary law enforcement. Firstly, 
the Reagan Administration sought to utilise the resources of the national security 
establishment, i.e. the military and intelligence agencies, in an effort to erode the narcotics 
threat posed to the U.S. The 1981 Military Cooperation and Law Enforcement Act – which 
allowed extensive cooperation between the Pentagon and federal, state and local police 
departments – provided the legislative foundation for this process to develop over subsequent 
years (Balko 2006, p.7). An initial effort involved attempts to boost interdiction by allowing 
limited military involvement in drug interception patrols, especially in the coastal waters off 
Southern Florida (DEA Museum 2014). Also, as per the 1981 Act provisions, the beginnings 
of military-grade training, weaponry and equipment provision to domestic police departments 
and law enforcement agencies were apparent (White House 1986; Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library 2014). Later effort was also put into militarily supporting the counter-
narcotics efforts of drug-producing countries, such as the availability of U.S. helicopter 
transport and Special Forces advisors to Bolivian security forces during raids on drug labs 
under Operation Blast Furnace (Abbott 1988, p.95). 
 The successor Bush Administration continued attempts at disrupting narcotics 
trafficking in source countries, predominantly in Latin America, where the cocaine and 
marijuana consumed in America was largely produced (White House 1989). The approach of 
utilising military assets in the drug war continued, as this period coincided with the end of the 
Cold War. The military-intelligence establishment, which had until then been occupied with 
traditional geopolitical and strategic matters, came to embrace the new challenge of assisting 
foreign security forces in tackling drug traffickers instead of communist insurgents, and 
received multi-billion dollar funding increases to this end (Burke 1990). U.S. Special Forces 
discreetly advised Colombian security forces on counter-narcotics/counter-cartel operations, 
and used sophisticated surveillance technology to aid the Colombians in the pursuit and 
killing of drug lord Pablo Escobar (Smith 2006, p.165-168). 
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 Foreign counter-narcotics support – as pursued by Bush – and the use of military 
support and assets in domestic drug enforcement – as piloted by Reagan – were both boosted 
during the Clinton Administration. Its policy sought to shift emphasis from drug transit zones 
towards source countries. It aimed to improve their native counter-narcotics efforts by 
strengthening their security institutions, and partnered this with social and economic 
development, cumulatively aiming to reduce the viability and appeal of drug trafficking 
(White House 1993). Domestically, the 1997 National Defence Authorisation Security Act 
amplified Reagan’s earlier 1981 Act. It created the Law Enforcement Support Program, an 
agency that organised transfer of excess or unwanted equipment from the military to civilian 
police forces to assist with counter-narcotics enforcement in their jurisdictions (Balko 2006, 
p.8). Between January 1997 and December 1999, the Program handled 3.4 million orders of 
Pentagon equipment from 11,000 police forces across all 50 U.S. states (Balko 2006, p.8). 
This led to a huge rise in the availability of battlefield weaponry, equipment and vehicles at 
the disposal of domestic law enforcement. Thus, over three successive presidential 
administrations did U.S. counter-narcotics policy, both foreign and domestic, take on a more 
militarised dimension from an initially securitised posture during the Nixon years. 
 
1.3 Aims of the Research 
 
From Nixon through to Clinton, U.S. counter-narcotics policy had seen increasing levels of 
military involvement. This has been in cooperation with American law enforcement in terms 
of provision of weaponry, equipment, intelligence and tactical training. The same type of 
assistance has also been lent to foreign governments, plus substantial financial support to 
develop the proficiency of their own security forces. This trend has gradually become a 
significant part of domestic American law enforcement and has been recognised as cause for 
concern. 2016 presidential candidate and United States Senator, Rand Paul, observed that: 
 
“Washington has incentivized the militarization of local police precincts by using 
federal dollars to help municipal governments build what are essentially small armies 
– where police departments compete to acquire military gear that goes far beyond 
what most of Americans think of as law enforcement […] The militarization of our 
law enforcement is due to an unprecedented expansion of government power in this 
realm.” (Paul 2014) 
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Evan Bernick, of The Heritage Foundation, notes that the War on Drugs helped prompt such 
an expansion of military assets in the hands of notionally civilian institutions, with less than 
positive implications: 
 
“As crime skyrocketed during the mid-1960s and early-1970s and became 
increasingly associated with drugs, drug crimes became seen as a threat to national 
security. Democratic and Republican Administrations provided federal block grants to 
state and local law enforcement to fight drug crime, and state and local officials 
frequently used those funds to purchase military hardware […] However, when 
federal money and military hardware is available in bushels, many agencies and 
departments seek to acquire more than they need […] The resulting over-
militarisation has inflicted a great deal of unnecessary harm.” (Bernick 2013) 
 
While there may be concern over this trend in the U.S., opinions regarding American military 
involvement in foreign counter-narcotics operations, either directly or in cooperation with 
partner countries, are divided. Mackenzie Eaglen, of the American Enterprise Institute, 
suggests that: 
 
“America’s involvement in Colombia is a positive example of how military forces 
and aid can secure U.S. interests and improve the lives of local citizens […] American 
aid and advisers, mostly special operations forces, helped Colombian forces fight 
FARC rebels and their drug trafficking allies [… but] America’s military actions in 
Latin America and in counter-narcotics operations should be thought of as ancillary 
and in support of law enforcement.” (Eaglen 2012) 
 
On the other hand, Eaglen’s peer, Vanda Felbab-Brown, a fellow at the Brookings Institution, 
takes the completely opposite view, commenting that: 
 
“The U.S. military should rarely be used to fight crime and drug-smuggling […] 
Instead, a determined and systematic effort to develop police forces capable of 
tackling street crime via community policing (as opposed to merely setting up Special 
Interdiction Unit's to decapitate organized crime) and establishing capable 
intelligence systems would greatly enhance the effectiveness of American assistance.” 
(Felbab-Brown 2012) 
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For all their varying viewpoints, what unites these lawmakers, analysts and commentators is 
the acknowledgment that, in domestic and foreign counter-narcotics enforcement, the U.S. 
military plays a role, and thus the term ‘militarisation’ is also frequently employed. That the 
American military is, to one degree or another, actively involved in the prosecution of the 
War on Drugs, is not contestable. 
However, while there seems to be broad agreement that militarisation exists and is 
ongoing within counter-narcotics, what does this actually mean, both in theoretical and 
practical terms? For instance, how has domestic drug enforcement in the U.S. been 
influenced by the employment of military assets, such as weaponry and equipment, as well as 
practices, such as training and tactics potentially ill-suited to a civilian environment? 
Likewise, what levels of direct involvement or material support provided by the U.S. military 
are observable in American foreign counter-narcotics policy in source and transition 
countries, such as Colombia and Mexico? These questions and the issues they raise merit 
exploration of the phenomenon of counter-narcotics militarisation in far greater detail, and 
this constitutes the principal aim of this thesis. 
Just as the securitisation of the narcotics issue has its basis in securitisation theory, so 
too do deliberations on counter-narcotics militarisation require a framework of analysis. 
While exploring counter-narcotics militarisation adds to the empirical knowledge of U.S. 
policy more generally, the development of a militarisation framework contributes to the 
broader security discourse. There are three primary elements to the militarisation framework, 
as will be developed in the thesis. These can determine whether a security situation can be 
said to be militarised or not (the alternatives being a situation remaining essentially 
securitised, or having escalated into violisation, i.e. warfare). 
The first component is making military, whereby an emergency measure brought on 
by securitisation takes on a decidedly militarised quality. This can be through the direct 
involvement of a military, or the gradual militarisation of a civilian institution, where the type 
and standard of the equipment and resources used, the training and tactics employed, and the 
institutional culture espoused, are subject to significant military involvement. The second 
component is institutionalisation, when such militarisation as described above has persisted 
for so long that it has moved on from being an – in theory, temporary – emergency measure 
into becoming institutionalised practice. The third and final component is the criteria of 
violence, whereby a security threat prompts militarisation as described in the two previous 
elements, but where any resulting violence is neither absent nor excessive. If the balance of 
violence remains like this – i.e. not so minimal that it conforms to most securitised situations, 
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but not so prevalent that is becomes a war-like, violised situation as suggested by Iver 
Neumann (1998) – then a security situation would be regarded as being militarised, placed 
between securitised and violised on the security spectrum. Each of these terms and elements 
is explored in Chapter 2, but the point of key importance is that, in developing the 
militarisation framework to use as an analytical tool in the empirical research, it builds upon 
the foundations laid by securitisation theory, expands the security spectrum and suggests 
potential avenues for future research. 
The thesis as a whole contributes to the literature involving counter-narcotics, U.S. 
foreign policy and security theory. For counter-narcotics, this thesis thoroughly analyses the 
process by which American policy, both domestic and foreign, gradually became more 
militarised as a deliberate response to the threat posed by illicit narcotics. In the field of U.S. 
foreign policy, the thesis demonstrates how certain national security issues – in this case 
narcotics – can dominate diplomatic and security relations between states (such as between 
the U.S. and Colombia, where drug policy and bilateral foreign policy became virtually 
synonymous). It also demonstrates how the overall influence of the Department of Defence in 
American foreign policy matters has either matched, or in some cases eclipsed the traditional 
primary role of the State Department. Finally, in the area of security theory, this thesis has 
contributed to the securitisation literature by proposing and developing a militarisation 
analytical framework for the assessment of how militarised a security situation has become. 
This has provided security scholars with a new analytical tool for conducting future research, 
as well as adding a distinct militarisation section to the security spectrum, allowing greater 
flexibility in classifying the status of security situations. 
 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
 
The thesis is comprised of six further chapters. Chapter 2 examines in detail the securitisation 
framework according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s foundation text, Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis (1998). It also considers supplementary arguments and points made 
by other scholars in the field, who suggest that context and the cultural disposition of 
audiences have a role in play in why and how issues become securitised (McDonald 2008; 
Balzacq 2011), as well as how ‘security’ can mean different things to different groups 
depending on local usages (Stritzel 2011). This provides a broad overview of securitisation 
before going on to systematically analyse its main elements as set out by Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde, namely the speech act; existential threats and referent objects; security actors; and 
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emergency measures. Following this, the concept of militarisation is explored. This is 
required to make the case that militarisation, and the associated analytical framework 
developed in this thesis, advance the securitisation debate. Beginning with the essential 
definitions of the term and how it has been discussed in academia, this is followed by 
exploring militarisation in the context of language and imagery. Finally, the possibilities for a 
broadly applicable militarisation framework are discussed, whereby, in theory, it is possible 
to militarise any security issue, providing the emergency measures intended to address a 
security threat remain within the parameters set out in the framework. Having covered 
securitisation and militarisation, the focus is then placed on their utility in the real-world 
study of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia, Mexico and domestically. 
 Chapter 3 explores the research design involved in analysing the development of U.S. 
counter-narcotics strategy in Colombia, Mexico and the U.S. Southern Border, and the extent 
of any related militarisation. The justification for applying predominantly qualitative 
methodology to the thesis is set out. While statistics and quantitative material played an 
important role, determining how militarised U.S. counter-narcotics policy has become made 
it necessary to study the qualities of the entities and processes involved above all. The topic 
and the research question that direct this study are then considered in greater detail. The 
former was primarily driven by a gap in the knowledge in terms of the attention paid to 
militarisation as an extension of securitisation. Additional reasons also included the way 
militarisation has been addressed in security studies literature so far, its place as an important 
segment of the security spectrum, and above all how it plays into the historical and current 
development of U.S. counter-narcotics policy. The research question that emerges from these 
considerations is to what extent has U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia, Mexico and, 
to a smaller degree, domestically, become militarised? The reasoning behind the choice of a 
case study model and the rationale behind the selection of the cases is detailed. Finally, the 
research methods employed are examined, as are the reasons for utilising them. 
 Chapter 4 delves into the history of the prohibitive regime towards illicit narcotics in 
the U.S., beginning in the early 20th Century, where elements of the securitisation process 
can be clearly observed. Noted throughout are examples of the promotion of securitisation of 
the drug issue through encouraging fear of the perceived threat presented by narcotics. This 
trend started with religiously influenced temperance groups, who protested what they 
regarded as the moral peril posed by alcohol consumption and sexual promiscuity. As the 
potency of narcotics increased as the 19th Century gave way to the 20th and addiction rates 
grew, so did the previously de-politicised issue of drugs move up the political agenda. Social 
 10 
concern increased, encouraged by the temperance groups and political actors seeking votes or 
attention, or acting out of genuine social and moral concern and being in a position to 
influence policy. By the mid-point of the century, narcotics had become a firmly politicised 
issue on the security spectrum. This early perspective serves to establish historical and 
cultural context for the main sections of the chapter, where this politicised narcotics issue 
became securitised and eventually militarised. These sections cover the beginning of the drug 
war under Nixon with regards to institutions created and policies pursued, and then the 
furthering of counter-narcotics policy into the realm of militarisation under the Reagan, Bush 
Sr. and Clinton Administrations. The result is a chronicle of relevant institutional and policy 
developments prior to the 21st Century counter-narcotics initiatives seen in Colombia and 
Mexico, as well as paving the way for the militarisation of U.S. Southern Border security. 
 Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the principal case studies of the thesis, that is U.S. counter-
narcotics policy in Colombia and Mexico (with a closely related section on the U.S. Southern 
Border in the latter) respectively. In an effort to analyse the extent of militarisation involved 
in these efforts, and thus address the research question, the main elements of the 
militarisation framework – making military, institutionalisation and criteria of violence – are 
applied. The first case study focuses on the build-up to Plan Colombia, the principal U.S. 
counter-narcotics initiative in that country that commenced in 2000. It begins with a 
historical review of Colombia’s long-standing military ties with the U.S., and how this 
dovetailed into the development, deployment and evolution of Plan Colombia. It was an 
initiative designed to boost native security forces and stabilise the country in the face of drug 
cartel criminality, civil insurgency by leftist guerrillas and violence perpetrated by right-wing 
paramilitaries, the latter two groups also being heavily involved in the drug trade. Limiting 
the study to the current operational lifetime of Plan Colombia provides a set and focused time 
frame, and one which allows enough scope to analyse how militarisation developed in the 
U.S. counter-narcotics policy approach. The second case study focuses on the counter-
narcotics relationship between Mexico and the U.S., both before and during the launch of the 
so-called Merida Initiative. This is a programme of American financial and training support. 
It is intended to help the Mexican government and – primarily civilian – security forces deal 
with the violent drug-related conflict that plague areas of Mexico, especially the U.S. border 
region with its smuggling routes. The study firstly details what counter-narcotics support the 
U.S. lent to Mexico prior to the Merida Initiative, followed by the origins and development of 
the Initiative itself and how initial military support quickly gave way to far more significant 
economic, social and law enforcement development goals. Given its huge importance within 
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the overall case study, the militarisation of the U.S.-Mexico border from the perspective of 
American domestic policy is also explored. This section reveals that the employment of 
military weaponry, equipment and expertise is as prevalent by U.S. domestic authorities as by 
their Mexican counterparts. This is ironic given that U.S. foreign counter-narcotics policy 
towards its southern neighbour has been to encourage more civil-security solutions above 
militarised ones. 
 Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with an overall summation. The research question 
concerning the extent of militarisation in U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia and 
Mexico/U.S. border is addressed, as are the potential impacts on overall U.S. foreign counter-
narcotics policy. This is not least due to the increased military role arguably allowing an 
empowered and influential Department of Defence to eclipse the reach and effectiveness of 
the State Department in conducting U.S. counter-narcotics and foreign policy in general. This 
chapter also details how the militarisation framework that has been developed contributes to 
the broader securitisation debate, and suggests potential avenues for future research into 
militarisation as a broader phenomenon. However, this section also includes substantial post-
case study reflexivity, taking on-board lessons learnt from the research process to refine and 
add several elements, which ultimately further enhances the militarisation framework for use 
as an analytical tool going forward into the future. 
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Chapter 2 
The Utility of Securitisation and Militarisation 
Frameworks in U.S. Counter-Narcotics Policy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Securitisation is one of the most significant concepts in contemporary security analysis. At 
heart it is a framework for analysis intended to judge what constitutes a security issue, born 
out of concern that there “are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word 
security onto an ever wider range of issues” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.1, 
emphasis in the original). It can be said to represent the fusion of two significant theoretical 
and conceptual innovations in the realm of security studies, that of Barry Buzan’s notion of 
different sectors of security (military, environmental, etc.) and Ole Wæver's concept of 
securitisation, both of which would later come together to form the securitisation framework 
(Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, p.76). 
What constitutes ‘security’ has gradually broadened and widened, from climate 
change issues to economic security. This has led to the inclusion of Transnational Organised 
Crime into the security discourse, given the negative implications it can have on various 
aspects of global security. In 1994, the World Ministerial Conference on Organised 
Transnational Crime was convened by the United Nations in Naples. This significantly raised 
the threat it presented in the international and foreign policy agendas of Western countries, 
with both the U.S. and EU member states having already begun to forge security agendas 
concerning this issue (Edwards and Gill 2002, p.8).  
One major subset of Transnational Organised Crime is illicit narcotics, be it their 
production, trafficking and distribution. It is an illegal global industry worth billions of 
dollars, which can have social, economic and public health consequences, as well as direct 
security impacts through associated violence, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime estimating 183,000 drug-related deaths globally in 2012 (UNODC 2014, p.4). This is 
in turn met by the counter-narcotics efforts of national governments and international 
organisations, who also spend billions in an effort to mitigate and thwart the drug trade. 
This is an issue that has become securitised, and to an extent militarised over time. In 
this chapter the securitisation framework that underpins the former is fully explored, along 
with the concept of militarisation. An analytical framework for the latter is then advanced. 
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With regards to securitisation, I explore the basic contentions, as well as the supplementary 
contributions made by other scholars in the field. This provides a necessary overview of the 
securitisation framework before systematic analysis of its main elements, namely; the speech 
act; security actors and their audiences; referent objects and threats to their survival; and 
emergency measures. Following this section, the concept of militarisation is addressed, 
beginning with the essential definitions of the term and how it has been discussed in 
academia, including the language and imagery of militarisation. Finally, the possibilities for a 
broadly applicable militarisation framework are discussed. 
 
2.2 The Securitisation Framework 
 
In 1995, Ole Wæver set the securitisation debate in motion with his piece, Securitisation and 
Desecuritisation, which offered discussion and reflection on the topic. He defined security as 
a ‘speech act’, whereby an actor uttering the word ‘security’ in relation to an issue would 
move that issue out of normal politics and into an area where the state could take control in 
an effort to deal with the issue, thus securitising it (Wæver 1995) 1 . In 1998, Wæver 
collaborated with two other scholars, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, to produce Security: A 
New Framework for Analysis. This is the principal text from which this thesis draws the 
securitisation framework and lays the conceptual foundations upon which the later 
militarisation framework is built. For Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), the main question 
at stake was how to define what is and what is not a security issue given the increasingly 
broadening understanding of security as a concept, and the widening of the security agenda as 
a whole (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, p.76). The securitisation framework was 
developed in an attempt to provide an answer. Buzan foreshadowed the issue that he, Wæver 
and de Wilde would ultimately try and address when he argued that: 
 
“The hazards of a weakly conceptualised, ambiguously defined, but politically 
powerful concept like […] security have not gone unnoticed. The concept has come to 
be dominated in use by the idea of national security, and many authors have criticised 
the excessively narrow, hollow and militarised interpretation of security to which this 
approach can easily […] give rise.” (Buzan 1983, p.4). 
 
                                                 
1 This principle is an important component of this thesis. American security actors moved the illicit drug issue 
out of the previous political discourse it had occupied, and progressively securitised it as drugs came to be 
presented as an existential threat, one that required the security resources of the state to effectively deal with. 
 14 
Such a traditionalist approach was hardly surprising given that security studies at the time 
was often equated with strategic studies, which had a fundamental military and defence 
policy orientation. This was much to Buzan’s frustration when he expressed that “security is 
about much more than military capability and relations and this […] has made Strategic 
Studies an infertile seedbed for the further growth of the concept” (1983, p.9). Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde in their 1998 framework rejected the traditionalist’s case for restricting security 
to one sector. They argued the case for a wider agenda and proposed that security is a 
particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues (1998, p.vii): 
 
“Security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security 
means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential 
threat is not the same across different sectors.” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 
p.27) 
 
Thus their conception of security was broadened beyond conventional strategic studies (while 
admittedly not excluding traditional military/strategic aspects) with the introduction of five 
sectors: military, political, economic, environmental and societal. Their logic was that: 
 
“If we place the survival of collective units and principles – the politics of existential 
threat – as the defining core of security studies, we have the basis for applying 
security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of the 
concept. This is the answer to those who hold that security cannot expand its agenda 
beyond the traditional military-political one without debasing the concept of security 
itself.” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.27) 
 
They posit that any public issue can be located on a spectrum. This ranges from non-
politicised (neither the state nor public exhibit concern), through politicised (the issue 
becomes part of public policy requiring government action, or at least commands attention), 
to securitised (the issue is regarded as a threat beyond the ability of normal political action to 
remedy and requires emergency measures to tackle) (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 
p.23-24). As Didier Bigo suggests of the process: 
 
“The modalities of the securitisation process are related to emergency procedures 
beyond the normal realm of politics. Securitisation may thus be seen […] as a more 
extreme version of politicisation where the move of securitisation takes democratic 
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politics beyond the established rules of the game […] It reframes the options for 
solution by moving the scope towards quick and coercive options, often police and 
military options, and by delegitimising long-term solutions and negotiations. So in 
many cases what is needed is a ‘desecuritisation’ in order to come back to normal life 
and not to ‘suspend’ life into a time of exception.” (2008, p.126, emphasis added) 
 
This is in-keeping with the sentiments of Buzan and his colleagues, who claim that: 
 
“Our belief […] is not “the more security the better.” Basically, security should be 
seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics […] Because of 
its prioritising imperative, securitisation […] has tactical attractions […] But 
desecuritisation is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues 
phrased as “threats against which we have countermeasures”, but to move them out of 
this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere.” (1998, p.29)  
 
The placement of an issue on the security spectrum is, in principle, open, but in practice 
placement varies from state to state depending on indigenous priorities (Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde 1998, p.24), often dictated by history, culture, religion, political ideology, and so 
on. But how does an issue come to be seen as a security threat, and so become subject to 
transition from politicisation to securitisation on the spectrum? According to Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde: 
 
“Security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential 
threat to a designated referent object […] The special nature of security threats 
justifies the use of [emergency] measures to handle them. Invocation of security has 
been key to legitimising the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for 
the state to mobilise, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats.” (1998, 
p.21, emphasis added) 
 
The three terms emphasised above are key elements of securitisation. They are explored 
below along with other elements – namely the speech act, referent objects and existential 
threats to their survival, and security actors and emergency measures – in doing so analysing 
how the process unfolds. 
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2.2.1 The Speech Act: Securitising Moves and Intersubjectivity 
 
The key to securitisation is in the transference of an issue from the political (desecuritised) to 
the securitised. A securitising actor (an individual or a group) with sufficient political and 
social capital may highlight to an audience (the collective to which the securitisation act is 
directed) an issue deemed to present an existential threat to a referent object of 
intersubjective importance. To counter this threat requires emergency measures outside of the 
usual political mechanisms, the acceptance of which completes the securitisation process. 
Taken as a whole this “process of securitisation is what in language theory is called a speech 
act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that 
is the act. By saying the words, something is done” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 
p.26). 
As Buzan and his colleagues concede, this can mean that “‘security’ is thus a self-
referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not 
necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a 
threat” (1998, p.24). Self-referential or not, speech acts constitute what the authors deem to 
be securitising moves, in that a move has been made to securitise an issue but that the process 
is not completed until the audience accepts the argument presented, whether voluntarily or by 
coercion (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.25). A securitising move does not have to 
result in the adoption of an emergency measure, only that: 
 
“The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform 
to be made from which it is possible to legitimise emergency measures or other steps 
that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential 
threats, point of no return and necessity. If no signs of such acceptance exist, we can 
talk only of a securitising move, not of an object actually being securitised.” (Buzan, 
Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.25) 
 
The concepts of speech acts and securitising moves are important to securitisation, in that it is 
principally about the process and not about considering a threat in objective terms. After all, 
defining an objective threat would make the supposedly impartial analyst resemble a 
securitising actor themselves. This is not an incorrect position of course, as Buzan, Wæver 
and de Wilde rightly point out that security is determined by actors and so is of course 
subjective. They also admit however that: 
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“The label subjective […] is not fully adequate. Whether an issue is a security issue is 
not something individuals decide alone. Securitisation is intersubjective and socially 
constructed. Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that should 
survive […]? This quality is not held in subjective or isolated minds; it is a social 
quality, a part of a discursive, socially constituted, intersubjective realm […] 
Successful securitisation is not decided by the securitiser but by the audience of the 
security speech act: Does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to 
a shared value?” 
(Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.31, emphasis in the original) 
 
In other words, security actors alone, even the most powerful individuals, cannot simply 
deem a security issue to constitute an existential threat by the force of their will or power of 
degree. To be fully securitised, a security issue has to be similarly recognised and accepted as 
posing a threat by a wider, intersubjective audience. 
Intersubjectivity then is an important characteristic of securitisation. If an objective 
threat is neither possible due to inherent subjectivity (because what one side may see as a 
threat may not be viewed as such by another), nor desirable should the analyst wish to retain 
impartiality, then an intersubjective understanding of a threat by both the securitising actor 
and audience is the most logical outcome. Didier Bigo also highlights this quality of 
securitisation by observing that: 
 
“The definition of what is security in relation to what is insecurity is a political 
struggle between the actors who have the capacity to declare with some authority 
whose security is important, whose security can be sacrificed, and why their own 
violence may be read as a form of protection when the violence of others is seen as a 
form of aggression and sign of insecurity.” (2008, p.123) 
 
2.2.2 Securitising Actors and Audiences 
 
One driver of an issue from occupying a politicised status to becoming securitised is the 
security actor, who Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde describe as “someone, or a group, who 
performs the security speech act” once a threat to a referent object – i.e. that whose survival 
needs to be defended – is identified (1998, p.40). They usually come in the form of political 
leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, pressure groups, and so on. Ultimately, they 
could be deemed to be the upper echelons of a society with the ability to enact policy, or at 
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least influence its implementation, due to the power, knowledge and influence (i.e. social 
capital) they possess to speak on behalf of the referent object2. Securitising actors nearly 
always speak security in terms of defending something broader, such as a society, a nation, 
defining principles, etc. (all three of which, it could be suggested, intertwine in the case of 
America). 
 Thierry Balzacq writes that in order to persuade an audience of the need to securitise 
an issue, the speaker has to tune their language to the audience’s experience, so that the 
speaker’s argument resonates appropriately (2005, p.184). It is important that efforts at 
persuasion also go hand in hand with credibility and maintaining a relationship with an 
audience, increasing the chance of acceptance. Balzacq notes that: 
 
“Securitising agents always strive to convince as broad an audience as possible 
because they need to maintain a social relationship with the target individual group. In 
common with the desire to transmit information, political officials are responsive to 
the fact that winning formal support while breaking social bonds can wreck 
credibility. That explains why, while seeking formal acquiescence, political officials 
also cloak security arrangements in the semantic repertoire of the national audience in 
order to win support.” (Balzacq 2005, p.185) 
 
With the possibility that an audience could be failed to be persuaded by a speaker lacking a 
suitably persuasive argument, of dubious credibility, or possessing a poor relationship with 
the audience, the power relationship between the two is not one-sided (Balzacq, Léonard and 
Ruzicka 2015, p.6). An audience must be engaged with and convinced, not simply spoken at. 
Balzacq et al. object that placing an emphasis on the role of the leader, and 
approaching the securitisation process through the speech acts of agents, creates a focus 
which is far too oriented towards the discursive practices of these professionals (2010, p.2). 
The focus has logically been on them, since they possess the social capital to make credible 
securitising moves. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde do make the point however that the notion 
                                                 
2 It is important that a security actor possess suitable credibility in order to make a convincing enough case to an 
audience. They cannot simply declare an issue to be a threat and expect to be taken seriously if they do not have 
the social or political capital, and thus traction with an audience, to back it up. Didier Bigo, for example, notes 
that, “a security statement, even if articulated within a specific discourse, does not in itself have illocutionary 
power. Delivered by any citizen or by a militant or even a politician in an individual capacity, the securitisation 
of an object will have no force” (2000, p.195). The earlier example of Rick Santorum is applicable to this point, 
for though he was not alone in his opinions, his was still a minority position, insufficient to gain support with 
other audiences beyond the conservative base. This highlights Holger Stritzel’s observation (2007, p.363), 
detailed later in this chapter, about how having multiple potential audiences can raise questions as to which one 
is relevant, and why, and how this can complicate attempts at securitising an issue. 
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of ‘actor’ can be problematic, in the sense of being able to precisely identify the actor 
responsible for an act because it is possible to disaggregate any collective into subunits and 
on down to an individual level (1998, p.40). For instance, in the context of this thesis, who 
can be said to be the actor responsible for securitising drugs? On a broad level it can be said 
that the American nation is the actor responsible, but this would be reifying an abstract unit. 
The nation itself can be disaggregated between the temperance movements who lobby against 
drugs, to the state and federal assemblies that legislate against narcotics (or decriminalise 
their sale and possession in a growing number of states). There are the executives (governors 
up to the U.S. President) who rail against the drug threat from their bully pulpits, and the 
various bureaucracies and agencies responsible for enforcing counter-narcotics laws. 
Regarding the matter of the securitisation and militarisation of drugs, authority to 
pursue those agendas lies with the American federal executive, i.e. the President, as 
demonstrated by the historical analysis in Chapter 4. Yet it is equally true that presidential 
policy and opinion is not formed in a vacuum, and is subject to checks and balances by the 
Congress3. It can also be collectively influenced by the aforementioned lobbying groups 
representing different national, ethnic and even moral interests4. The influence brought about 
by the political and ideological concerns of members of the U.S. Congress can have an 
impact, as they seek to highlight the concerns or advance the interests of their constituents 
and themselves (Johnson 2013). Additionally, the (arguably self-interested) recommendations 
of law enforcement and counter-narcotics agencies – as reflected in their evidence presented 
to Congressional committees on foreign and national security policy (U.S. Senate 1988) – can 
play a role in influencing Congress and presidents. At various times during the War on 
Drugs, presidents, Congress and agencies have either played the role of actor attempting to 
                                                 
3 The U.S. Constitution divides power between the three branches of the federal government: the legislative, the 
executive and the judicial, each intended to check the power of the other. Consequently “the Constitution has 
been described as an “invitation to struggle” between the President and Congress over the making of foreign 
policy” (Foreign Policy Association 2016). In the Constitution, the President takes the lead in making foreign 
policy. Article II, Section 2 bestows responsibility for the negotiation of foreign treaties and ambassadorial 
appointments (U.S. National Archives 2016), though national security powers have also grown since the 
framing of the Constitution. However, in accordance with the system of checks and balances, the Senate has the 
power of ‘Advice and Consent’ on foreign policy matters, holding the President to account, while the House of 
Representatives holds the “power of the purse and [an] ability to command the spotlight, plays a role in 
expressing public sentiments on foreign policy, and thus hold[s] the President to account” (Spring 2016). While 
the judiciary is duty-bound to assess the constitutionality of congressional or presidential actions, the occupants 
of the Presidency, Senate and House are politicians. They are thus subject to personal agendas, ambitions and 
legacy-seeking, as well as inter and intra political party alliances and feuds. They have equal motivations to lead 
or follow public opinion for political gain, or out of genuine social or national security concern. This mixture of 
motivations and agendas is demonstrated in the historical study of drug policy development in Chapter 4. 
4 Examples include the analysis by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt of the influence of the Israeli lobby in 
U.S. Middle East policy (2006), as well as the role of various ethnic interest groups lobbying on U.S. foreign 
policy, not least the Cuban-American community (Haney and Vanderbush 1999).  
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convince an audience (whether in the quest for more resources, efforts at political gain, or 
genuine concerns over the drug threat), or have been audiences themselves, subject to 
attempts at convincing and influencing them to allocate resources towards certain policies. 
It is because of this issue in identifying a primary actor and audience in the 
securitisation and militarisation of counter-narcotics, that the main concern of this thesis is 
with analysing the process by which this phenomenon came about, not the specifics of which 
actors drove it and which audiences accepted it. 
Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka suggest that a securitising actor is sensitive to two 
kinds of support from an audience – formal and moral (2015, p.7) – which while linked, 
should not be conflated. Formal support may be required at an institutional level to allow 
permission for emergency measures to be implemented, but moral support can condition this 
formal backing to bestow suitable approval and legitimacy on an act (Balzacq 2005, p.184).  
If a speech act needs to be audience-focused to solicit such moral, and thus formal, support 
for securitising an issue, then it should be recognised as being context-dependent, not 
context-absent, in order to be as widely appealing as possible. As Matt McDonald indicates 
later in this chapter, such a view is not given enough consideration by Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde. They write “By saying the words, something is done” (1998, p.26), implying that it is 
the speech actor who modifies the context, rather than them being responsive to that context 
in order to solicit the support they need from the audience. 
 Holger Stritzel argues that the actor/audience relationship has not been conceptualised 
as clearly as it should be. In theoretical terms this relationship is straightforward. However, 
Stritzel points out that in empirical reality it is not always completely clear which audience is 
most relevant and why. This can have implications when there are several different audiences 
(such as within the broader public, or the multiple players at U.S. government level), and 
indeed Stritzel questions when it can be confirmed that an audience has been ‘persuaded’ 
(2007, p.363). These are valid points, for real audiences are not abstract masses, especially in 
democracies where they can vary in their interests, and thus what they regard as worthy of 
being deemed a security threat. Additionally, as highlighted below, some audiences can also 
be the securitising actors from whom formal support is required, as well as moral. This can 
influence the answers to the questions Stritzel raises regarding which audience, why and its 
relevance. For instance, if emergency measures can only be enacted with approval from a 
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legislature, then it could be argued that that body is the only relevant audience requiring 
convincing of an issue’s ‘securityness’, regardless of what the general public may think5. 
Stritzel’s concern regarding confirmation that an audience has been persuaded is also 
interesting, especially in light of the multiple-audiences issue. One could argue that detailed 
polling could indicate whether enough support has been gained to declare an audience 
sufficiently ‘persuaded’. Failing that, the absence of mass public demonstrations or media 
outcry against an issue could indicate that, even if an audience/s are not wholly persuaded, 
they are not dissuaded enough to attempt to deter the securitising actor to any great effect. 
This action would only really be viable in a democracy tolerant of free-speech however, and 
rarely in an authoritarian climate. This ties into Stritzel’s concern about the idea that a 
proposal can be intersubjectively held by both actor and audience, which implies that it is 
voluntary held. Again, this is fine for democracies, but does not address a situation of violent 
coercion soliciting ‘silent’ approval, predominantly in dictatorships (Stritzel 2007, p.363). 
While Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde concede that security is very much a structured 
field in which some actors have the power to define security by virtue of their position of 
power, they argue that this power is never absolute and that no one is guaranteed the ability 
to make people accept a claim for securitisation or emergency measures, at least on a 
consistent basis (1998, p.31). Decades of subjugation by Communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe, leading to eventual audience disillusionment and collapse (Kuran 1991; Stokes 
1993), as well as defiance of authority and outright revolutions during the so-called Arab 
Spring (Gause 2011; Bellin 2012), lend empirical credibility to this claim. On the other hand, 
simply because an audience lives under an authoritarian regime does not necessarily mean it 
will disagree with the securitising actor, and indeed may well lend its full support, especially 
in matters of a moral nature. For instance, an Arab audience may strongly object to a 
government’s curtailing of civic freedoms, but be in moral sync with it on matters relating to 
alcohol prohibition or sexual morality (Arab Barometer 2013). 
Whether in a democratic or authoritarian context, an executive will often appeal in 
populist terms for moral support against a security threat, but if both actor and audience are in 
moral sync, then the process of convincing the latter becomes an easier task. It should be 
noted though that blurred lines can exist between an audience and securitising actor. One 
obvious example is when the executive tries to convince the legislature to authorise 
                                                 
5  As was the case in the build-up to the Iraq War (See Roe 2008). Likewise the Eurozone crisis, where 
legislative bodies in debt-stricken countries on the periphery have had to agree to the requests of their 
leaderships to vote through painful emergency financial measures to qualify for international and EU assistance, 
despite opposition from their general publics. 
 22 
emergency security measures or permission to make war. The president or prime minister 
must not only make the case to the general public, but to the members of the legislature who 
will consider the validity of the securitising move before deciding to act. Those members 
who opt to participate in the securitising move then transition from being part of the audience 
into becoming securitising actors themselves (Balzacq 2005, p.184-185). 
With regards to functional actors, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde define them as “an 
actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security […] without being the 
referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object” (1998, p.36). 
Examples include law enforcement, security and military bodies, which have a significant 
stake when an issue is securitised, as it then becomes their role to counter the threat, and the 
strategies employed to do so may change based on their influence (Cabinet Office 2014). 
However, they themselves could not be classed as being existentially threatened, nor taking 
an active role in seeing an issue securitised (with the exception of a national emergency such 
as a military invasion). The same could also be said of the media. It has the ability to 
influence public opinion regarding a security issue, but is – in theory – a neutral observer, 
again neither directly threatened nor agitating for action (though this latter point is debatable 
concerning tabloid or overtly ideological media outlets) (Johnson 1994). The later section 
that addresses the cultural aspects of militarisation, specifically the effects of language and 
imagery, offers a prime example of how the media in its various forms – from the news to 
cinema to videogames – can fulfil such a functional actor role. 
 
2.2.3 Referent Objects and their survival 
 
Referent objects are entities seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate 
claim to survival. They can be anything from individuals, to societies, to states, to humankind 
itself. In the context of security, such objects have traditionally been the state, when 
sovereignty is threatened and, in a more abstract sense, the nation, when identity could be 
considered to be at stake. The utility of the securitisation framework allows for a broadening 
beyond traditional strategic areas as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde intended. However, as 
mentioned above, they still wished to employ sensible checks on what could and could not be 
securitised, and to that end size or scale is a crucial variable in determining what constitutes a 
successful referent object of security (1998, p.36). At the same time, Laustsen and Wæver 
observe that “survival means something different to different referent objects and an appeal 
to a defence of something triggers different dynamics dependent on the constitution of the 
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referent object” (2000, p.706). In other words, an issue may or may not present an actual 
security or existential threat, but as long as an audience has been convinced that is does, then 
securitisation can follow, as has been the case with narcotics in the U.S. since the mid-20th 
Century. 
On one end of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s size and scale variable, individuals or 
small groups can rarely establish wider security legitimacy. This, if nothing else, is because 
they may possess a minority view and do not have the social capital to be listened to, as 
evidenced by the mainstream dismissal of conspiracy theorists or extremist political parties. 
On the other end, at a system level, the entirety of humankind can be invoked as a security 
referent, but this often occurs in an abstract macrosecuritisation environment 6 . 
Macrosecuritisations are defined by the same basic rules that apply to other securitisations, 
namely that an existential threat to a reference object is identified and exceptional measures 
are required to deal with it (Buzan and Wæver 2009, p.257). 
However, Buzan and Wæver introduced the concept of macrosecuritisation in order to 
cover securitisations that speak to referent objects higher than those at a middle level, such as 
nation states for example, but which also aim to incorporate multiple lower level 
securitisations (2009, p.237). For instance, the Cold War or ‘Global’ War on Terror were and 
are subject to macrosecuritsation above the nation state level, and can be grasped as 
presenting a threat to humanity in general (Vuori 2010, p.258-259). Even then though, these 
conflicts can be considered as a series of separate local or regional events with their own 
unique characteristics, even if they can be linked together by connecting them to the 
‘narrative’ of their parent conflicts7. 
Scott Watson (2011) has attempted to portray the ‘human’ as a referent object through 
the prism of viewing humanitarianism as securitisation, in the sense that humanitarian 
concerns have demonstrably resulted in the implementation of emergency measures, be they 
                                                 
6 It is important that the lower-level, local securitisations that are part of any macrosecuritisation are 
successfully managed, however, to ensure that the linkage between the lower and higher level is stable and 
maintained. If the links between the two begin to erode, it could contribute to undermining the broader 
macrosecuritisation itself (Buzan and Wæver 2009, p.258). A good real world example is the gradual 
decriminalisation of the sale of cannabis in various American states (and therefore a lower level securitisation 
beneath the middle level of the nation state). It could increasingly cause questions to be asked about the logic of 
prosecuting the War on Drugs on a macrosecuritisation level, given that one of the supposed security threats it is 
attempting to address is legally on sale in many localities, even if highly regulated (Dart 2015; Ferner 2015).  
7 For instance the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the black ops of Central American guerrilla wars, and the anti-
Soviet jihad in Afghanistan all formed part of the Cold War macrosecuritisation. Yet these were also security 
challenges that took place at the middle level of nation states, just as Iraq, Afghanistan and drone warfare in 
Pakistan and Yemen do in the macrosecuritisation of the Global War on Terror. These multiple low-to-middle 
level securitisations were able to be ‘bundled’ together, in some cases with a hierarchy imposed, such as with 
the Cold War where everything was viewed against the ultimate East vs West conflict. 
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invited civil-military responses, as with the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, or 
imposed military intervention as with the Balkans or Libya. Human life and dignity is 
presented as being just as valid a referent object in humanitarian security as is state 
sovereignty or national identity in standard securitisation (King and Murray 2001; United 
Nations 2015). 
However, even support for human life and dignity can be considered on a case by 
case basis rather than universally applied8. It is often difficult to apply a true system level 
referent such as ‘humanity’ other than in the most extreme security situations, such as a lethal 
pandemic or environmental catastrophe, due to being too subtle a referent to attract mass 
audience identification. The issue lies with the problem that “the absence of an Other makes 
it difficult to securitise the total collective Self of humankind” (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 
p.256). Buzan argues that if humanitarian/human security presents its referent object as the 
individual or humankind, then it does so by sacrificing analytical purchase on collective 
actors (state and/or nation) as both the main agents of security provision and as possessors of 
a claim to survival in their own right, for even individuals take their meaning from the 
societies in which they operate (Buzan 2004, p.369-370). 
This leaves the middle scale of ‘limited collectivities’ (i.e. states and nations) as the 
most amenable to securitisation as durable referent objects (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 
1998, p.36). There is a relationship of identity and loyalty between states/nations and the 
audiences who wish to see these objects survive against a perceived security threat, and are 
thus willing to accept securitisation. As Roxanna Sjöstedt admits, the “analytical focus [of 
securitisation] is […] on national security, as the state is still the institution holding the power 
and capabilities necessary to handle all types of threat images” (2013, p.145, emphasis in the 
original). 
Ultimately, a referent object has to be something that the audience of a speech act 
needs to feel suitably invested in, so that measures employed outside of normal politics to 
counter the threat are accepted and even embraced. This goes to the heart of the role that 
                                                 
8 If it were universally applied, then in theory every dictatorship or human rights-abusing regime on the planet 
would be subject to imposed emergency measures against it. Scott Watson acknowledges this by claiming that: 
 
“This ongoing debate between the different approaches to humanitarian relief is not a debate over the 
referent object of security (human life/dignity), but rather over what developments qualify as 
sufficiently existentially threatening to warrant emergency action (armed conflict, disease, poverty, 
large-scale human rights violations), what types of emergency measures are appropriate (relief, 
development, intervention, nation- and state-building), how these measures should be implemented 
(independently and neutrally, pragmatically), and by whom (NGOs, states, local communities)” (2011, 
p.7). 
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identity and context can play in determining what may constitute a threat to that society. 
They can influence the intersubjectivity between an audience and a securitising actor, for if 
they both hold the referent object in high regard, then even though minor differences may 
exist, they will still agree on securitisation and any subsequent course of action. 
An issue becomes a candidate for securitisation once it has emerged as an existential 
threat requiring emergency action or special measures, and there has been acceptance of that 
designation by a significant audience (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.27). According to 
Buzan and his colleagues, however, existential threats can only be understood in relation to 
the particular character of the referent object in question, for the “essential quality of 
existence will vary greatly across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will 
the nature of existential threats” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.21). In other words, 
the level of a threat is in the eye of the beholder, and this can help determine whether a 
referent object, such as American society (the audience being one and the same as the 
referent object in this instance), can be convinced that an issue – e.g. addictive, illicit 
narcotics – poses an existential threat. The extent of that threat may be contestable, however 
the ‘particular character of the referent object in question’ – i.e. American society, the 
audience who make it up, and the securitising actors who represent it – may feel that drugs do 
indeed present such a threat. They could do enough social harm that, left unchecked, the 
conceptual idea of American society could be irreparably eroded to the extent that, for all 
intents and purposes, it will have ceased to exist in the form that the audience and actors 
originally felt to be worth saving. 
 
2.2.4 Emergency Measures 
 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde state that once a securitising actor has gained approval from an 
audience to protect a referent object from an existential threat, they “thereby generate 
endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (1998, p.5). 
This entails an issue being removed “from the normal haggling of politics [… to] be dealt 
with decisively by top leaders” outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan, 
Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.29). In the opinion of Maria Trombetta, “security implies a 
‘decisionist’ attitude which emphasizes the importance of reactive, emergency measures. 
This set of practices is not necessarily codified nor can it be identified by specific rules. 
Instead it is more a form of rationality, a way of framing and dealing with an issue” (2009, 
p.558). Even when an issue is securitised, Rita Abrahamsen argues that there exists almost a 
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‘mini-spectrum’ in terms of response to a threat 9 . It ranges from the more mundane 
management of risk, to launching straight into emergency measures, for “security issues can 
be seen to move along a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and to 
existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy” (2005, p.59). 
This perspective bears some relation to the contention of Paul Roe that securitisation 
can itself be broken down into two distinct stages, namely the stage of identification and the 
stage of mobilisation (2008, p.616). In the former, a given audience may come to an 
intersubjective agreement with the securitising actor with regards to identifying the 
‘securityness’ of an issue, and therefore rhetorical securitisation is reached. In the latter stage, 
agreement must be reached regarding the nature of emergency measures to be mobilised, 
thereby achieving active securitisation. Roe contends, however, that acceptance of the 
‘securityness’ of an issue does not automatically imply acceptance of the proposed 
emergency measures to deal with that situation. His main example is the public acceptance 
that Iraq’s supposed WMDs represented a threat, but this was contrasted with the significant 
opposition to the proposed solution of militarily-imposed regime change. 
Roe accepts that such a situation falls between two stools, since it is not an example 
of failed securitisation, as the audience did not reject the ‘securityness’ of the issue, but nor 
can it be regarded as a successful securitisation, as the proposed means to deal with the issue 
were not also intersubjectively established (2008, p.616). However, this is still compatible 
with Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s conceptualisation of securitisation, which requires the 
acceptance of an issue’s ‘securityness’, but does not, however, also require the actual 
employment of ‘extraordinaryness’, i.e. that emergency measures are thereby taken (Roe 
2008, p.622; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, p.25). 
The distinction between rhetorical and active securitisation implies that the actual 
employment of emergency measures – and their type – can go a long way in determining the 
ultimate nature of a security issue. This is to say that a security issue can be intersubjectively 
accepted and thus rhetorically securitised, but that the nature of the emergency measures 
employed can heavily influence how that issue is then subsequently perceived. For example, 
the emergency measures employed against the ‘threat’ of alcohol were legislative and law-
enforcement-based and led to Prohibition in the U.S. in 1919. By comparison the coercive, 
militarised emergency measures gradually employed against illicit narcotics constitute not 
just a struggle, nor a prohibition, but a war on drugs, suitably complimenting the kind of 
                                                 
9 This is to say a spectrum in and of itself, located within the confines of the securitisation section of the much 
wider security spectrum. 
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rhetoric employed by securitising actors in their speech acts on this issue. As Nicole Jackson 
argues, the definition of securitisation by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde and similarly minded 
colleagues: 
 
“Does not include the impact of rhetoric on policy output […] Once an issue is 
rhetorically adopted, it must affect the development of policy for it to be effective in 
practice. Otherwise, the activities have only been rhetorically securitised with no 
practical result.” (2006, p.313) 
 
If one declares a ‘war’ on a threat, rhetorically or otherwise, it should not be surprising if the 
policy outcomes (i.e. the emergency measures employed) ultimately end up complimenting a 
militarised policy approach. 
While rhetoric is important though, it can also be suggested that the scale of the 
referent object (as discussed above) also plays a role in determining audience acceptance of 
emergency measures. For example, based on Roe’s argument, climate change has become a 
rhetorically securitised issue, in that there is general acceptance that – regardless of cause – it 
presents a security issue to ‘humankind’, precipitating national and international debate and 
legislation (Trombetta 2009, p.598). Yet the referent object of humanity is too abstract to 
achieve suitable identification, which has hindered national dedication to, or even initial 
application of, policies designed to attempt to mitigate climate change. For example, 
residents of the Maldives may be existentially threatened by rising sea levels and British 
homeowners may be concerned about that. However, the priority of the latter will be the high 
cost of energy due to climate change legislation, i.e. their own economic security, not the 
environmental security of people on the other side of the planet whom they have never met. 
As Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde point out, “different states and nations have different 
thresholds for defining a threat” (1998, p.30). 
This evidences that limited scale collectivities suggest themselves as the dominant 
referent object, and that the type of emergency measures employed will be determined by 
what each unit deems to be the most effective method of dealing with a security issue. 
States/nations will prioritise their own security issues above the system level, as highlighted 
above in an environmental context. They will also put their interests above those of the 
individual, as demonstrated by increased data, communications and personal surveillance, of 
heightened asylum, immigration and border controls, and reframing the balance between 
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security, individual liberty and human rights in the age of the War on Terror (see Tsoukala 
2006; Coaffee and Wood 2006; Salter and Piché 2011). 
It therefore stands to reason that if a referent object under threat is a state or 
society/nation – which is often the case based on the middle scale model of limited 
collectivities – then the instruments designed to protect them on that level – i.e. law 
enforcement, intelligence agencies and a military – would be mobilised to counter the 
perceived existential threat. The involvement of police forces is primarily domestic, while 
other law-enforcement and intelligence agencies can exist in either the domestic or foreign 
theatres, or both, depending on the nature of the agency (and so prevalent are such agencies 
in the American system it is little wonder that so many cross domestic and foreign operating 
lines). The military, however, is – in theory – the organisation with a solely foreign remit, 
designed to deal with threats posed outside a state’s borders. True, military personnel can be 
deployed domestically to assist in disaster relief or large scale social unrest, but these are the 
extreme examples that prove the rule. This is to say that, domestically, the military involves 
itself in exceptional rather than mundane security matters, the risk management of which fall 
under the responsibility of civilian law enforcement and appropriate intelligence agencies. 
 
2.3 Advancing the securitisation debate 
 
This thesis does not intend to identify gaps in securitisation discourse, but to suggest that two 
significant areas have not been awarded the levels of attention they merit. The first is how 
context, which is to say historical and cultural considerations, can determine how and 
whether a society comes to view a certain issue as a security threat in the first place and, if so, 
what scale of response this may demand to confront. For instance, Matt McDonald points out 
that, in the securitisation framework: 
 
“The context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus on the moment of 
intervention only. The potential for security to be constructed over time through a 
range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed, and the question 
of why particular representations resonate with relevant constituencies is under-
theorized.” (2008, p.564) 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Additionally, Thierry Balzacq has noted the importance of considering context: 
 
“The sociological view argues […] that securitisation is better understood as a 
strategic (pragmatic) process that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of 
circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, 
and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.” (2011, p.1-2, 
emphasis added) 
 
Audience acceptance of moves by securitising actors is a necessary requirement for an issue 
to be securitised. Context, based on social identity informed by historical and cultural 
experience, can provide the basis for why audiences may be willing to be convinced that a 
certain issue represents a threat, and indeed why securitising actors could be prompted to 
advance their claims in the first place, out of populist or genuine motives. Roxanna Sjöstedt, 
for instance, posits that “ideas and identity are employed as explanatory factors for the 
concept of a securitising move” (2013, p.146). Additionally, “identity can be the source of a 
threat image, affecting or even constructing the idea [… and] can also serve as a catalyst or a 
gate-keeper in the idea diffusion process” (Sjöstedt 2013, p.148-149). 
However, context in securitisation can be regarded as problematic because it is not 
fixed and always changes10. This is empirically demonstrated by the growth over time in 
negative attitudes towards narcotics in Western society, from easily buying cocaine across the 
pharmacy counter at the turn of the 19th/20th century, to being imprisoned for selling it today. 
Yet this is a specific example of a changing context that does not necessarily invalidate the 
premise that fundamental societal attitudes can remain fixed, or at least only minimally 
changed. One of the reasons that narcotics became the subject of ire in the United States was 
because the nation’s culture, morals, sense of identity, etc. has remained largely fixed in 
macro rather than micro terms. In other words, tolerance or intolerance to certain specific 
issues rise and fall, but the big picture – the overall context – remains the same. That is why, 
for example, attachment to the concept of family and marriage has seen same-sex unions 
increasingly accepted as compatible with those values, rather than counter to them11 (Pew 
                                                 
10 Rita Taureck highlights Jacques Derrida’s contribution to this thinking in her 2006 CEEISA convention 
presentation ‘Securitisation – The Story So Far’. According to Derrida, fixed context is impossible, because 
every utterance and every context is subject to a diffusion of meaning, a process in which the original context 
changes. Thus context can never be fixed, but is always in flux. 
11 In this instance moral opposition was framed in terms of societal threat, as Rick Santorum, a member of the 
U.S. Senate and presidential candidate at the time, and thus a potentially influential securitising actor, trumpeted 
his belief that gay marriage “threatens my marriage. It threatens all marriages. It threatens the traditional values 
of this country.” See (Sokolove 2005). 
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Research 2013). Thus attitudes to a specific issue/s change over time, but the key elements of 
a society’s identity are constant. Therefore, more relevantly to this thesis, it can be argued 
that where once the perceived ‘threats’ against American society lay in sexual promiscuity or 
alcohol12, these former taboos have been replaced as targets of moral concern by the threat of 
illicit narcotics. 
This theme is explored further in Chapter 4, with a historical analysis of the 
development of the narcotics threat highlighting the overlooked importance of the role of 
history and cultural identity in securitisation. For instance, Wæver makes the point that “the 
securitisation approach points to the inherently political nature of any designation of security 
issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of analysts, decision-makers and activists 
alike: why do you call this a security issue?” (2011, p.468). Culture and identity, as 
encouraged by the movements of history, can and should enter the securitisation debate as a 
potential answer to this question of why. Identity developed over decades, even centuries, 
and tied to historical experience can play a role in determining the level of audience 
acceptance of the transition from a politicised issue into a securitised one. 
The second area subject to under-appreciation is that militarisation is not just an 
emergency measure brought about by securitisation, but is significant enough to warrant a 
place on the security spectrum in its own right. As this thesis demonstrates, securitisation of 
an issue needs to occur before it can be militarised, and so the two frameworks are indeed 
linked, with the former gradually morphing into the latter under the right circumstances, i.e. 
the verifiable presence of the elements of the militarisation framework. Rather than a 
politicised issue becoming securitised, and arguably having nowhere else to go except to 
become de-securitised again, it can continue along the security spectrum into becoming a 
militarised issue. Such a process helps us explain the gradual militarisation of U.S. counter-
narcotics policy on its southern border and in Colombia and Mexico. 
A great deal of literature, from analysis of the discourse in environmental security and 
climate change (Trombetta 2009), to discussion about the securitisation of the Ebola 
epidemic (Huang 2014), still refer to the involvement of a military response as a form of 
emergency measure. As Iver Neumann (1998) has demonstrated with his violisation proposal 
(where he distinguishes between the securitised spoken declaration of war, and the actual 
                                                 
12 Possessing an underlying social bedrock of strong Christian values - on a fundamentalist level in many cases - 
it is not surprising that the U.S. proved to be such a fertile environment for the growth of various movements in 
the later 19th Century. Whether out of a sense of righteousness or social conscience, groups such as the Anti-
Saloon League and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union substantially influenced the political process and 
policy thinking of the American government. See (Behr 1998, p.45-47 & 55-56). 
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large-scale violent prosecution of it as being separate on the spectrum) what we may have 
assumed would fall under the broad umbrella of securitisation (at least if it was to lead to a 
war-like situation) can merit a legitimate section of its own on the security spectrum, i.e. 
‘violised’. I would contend that militarisation is a contender for the same recognition. Yes, it 
can be considered one of the emergency measures available, but when introduced it can also 
be regarded as representing a security status of its own. 
Social identity and the related context behind it can play a role in a security issue 
becoming militarised, just as it does in seeing that issue become securitised in the first place. 
The militarisation of language and imagery in culture can both reflect and influence social 
identity, and thus a society (i.e. audience) historically and/or culturally comfortable with 
militarised attitudes may more readily accept militarised policy options and/or a militarised 
environment. Domestic examples of this phenomenon in the U.S., such as the militarisation 
of policing and civilian law enforcement agencies, is an important area to consider in order to 
demonstrate that the increased militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics efforts home and 
abroad have not simply materialised from nowhere. It has been an observable – and accepted 
– trend in American military-intelligence-law enforcement circles domestically since the 
early-1980s. Ultimately, if one of the premises of securitisation is that a security threat must 
be dealt with by emergency measures, or at least measures that fall outside of normal politics, 
then there is a case to be made that militarisation can count among such measures. This can 
be underlined by a culture and social identity – which is to say context – supportive of, or at 
least conductive to, militarisation. 
It is a curious observation that Americans have taken a far more aggressive 
prohibitionist stance towards illicit drugs and immoral behaviour of various kinds at times in 
their history compared to other cultures, who either enact their own prohibitions by largely 
following America’s lead, or can just as easily take a more laissez faire approach to certain 
issues. If Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde are correct that existential threats can only be 
understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question, then it is 
logical that the American historical experience and cultural development has shaped the 
nation’s character. This has made securitisation of the drug issue more likely and, with that 
context in mind, that militarisation of the issue as an emergency measure response would be 
more likely than not. 
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The above exploration of securitisation has detailed how an issue can be seen as a security 
threat by being presented as such by security actors with sufficient influence and credibility 
to successfully convince an audience of the immediacy and severity of that threat. If 
successful, then a security issue transitions from being something that raises a politicised 
concern to becoming securitised by the employment of emergency measures. These measures 
attempt to remedy the security issue and relieve the existential threat posed to the survival of 
a referent object, a threat that has so exercised the concern of security actors and audience 
alike. Emergency measures could extend from introducing heavy numbers of police for a 
limited time, to general curfews, all the way to the imposition of martial law. All technically 
fall outside the realm of ‘normal politics’, but do so to varying degrees of severity. This 
relates to Rita Abrahamsen’s concept of a mini-spectrum of responses (2005, p.59), with 
gradual escalation until the situation crosses a certain point and transitions from a securitised-
level of emergency response (i.e. all measures that do not feature military involvement), to a 
militarised state of affairs (where a military element has been introduced to one degree or 
another). It is the nature of emergency measures that is the vital bridge between securitisation 
and militarisation of a security situation. Yet it is not sufficient to simply declare a situation 
has been militarised. A set of conditions must be met for this to be legitimate. Therefore 
development of an analytical framework is the next logical step in identifying and exploring 
the necessary elements that comprise such a framework. The next section examines 
militarisation as a potential emergency measure, its location on the broader security 
spectrum, and the elements of the militarisation framework. 
 
2.4 The Militarisation Framework 
 
This section explores the academic concept of militarisation, how it has become part of 
everyday language and culture to varying extents, and proposes a basic militarisation 
framework designed to be applicable to any security issue. 
The militarisation of a securitised issue can be classed as an emergency measure, but 
is located towards the further end of the ‘severity’ scale. Militarisation warrants placement on 
the security spectrum, for just as securitisation can be seen by the likes of Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde as an extreme form of politicisation, so too can militarisation be viewed as an 
extreme form of securitisation. Iver Neumann makes a similar proposal when he advances the 
concept of ‘violisation’. Similar to Paul Roe’s distinction between identification/rhetorical 
securitisation and mobilisation/active securitisation, Neumann suggests that:  
 33 
“The waging of war […] adds something more to the speech act of declaring war, and 
the crucial thing added is the use of force – that is, a violisation of politics. Waging 
war is by definition not only a question of speech acts, but also of actions. A crucial 
role is played by the action of killing, and more generally, by acts of violence.” 
(1998) 
 
Neumann makes his argument in the context of the difference between declaring and actually 
making war (or, in the absence of official declarations of war, for cases where large-scale 
violence is evident). He advocates reserving ‘securitisation’ for the speech acts which 
perform the tasks that Buzan and his colleagues have defined it as performing, and 
consequently suggests adding the category of ‘violised’ to the following spectrum (Neumann 
1998): 
Non-Politicised – Politicised – Securitised – Violised 
 
Neumann concedes that adding a violence-specific category at the end of the continuum 
highlights the war and force aspects of security studies. However, this does not unbalance 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s conceptualisation, for they did not seek to expunge these 
traditional interests of strategic studies, just to make them no longer the sole priority. Simply 
because Neumann highlights war and force does not mean that they become dominant again. 
Any event or security situation that Neumann would justify as being violised would likely 
involve militarisation to some extent. However, as argued below, the conceptualisation of the 
latter should not automatically be considered equal to Neumann’s violisation – it is possible 
to have a militarised security situation without automatically involving large scale violence. 
Before making that argument however, what is meant conceptually by 
‘militarisation’? Firstly, let us consider what the word ‘military’ itself actually means, for its 
linguistic use is important to consider due to the subtle but important differences between 
words that incorporate it. 
Military is most often associated with its use as a noun, identifying the armed services 
of a state and those personnel or institutions associated with them. As an adjective though, its 
use broadly relates to warfare or defence, as distinct from normal civilian activity (Oxford 
English Dictionary 2013). Thus, use of the phrase ‘making military’ does not seem so 
grammatically strange when we consider that it is intended to describe an action that 
contextually relates to the involvement of warfare or defence in some capacity. If we consider 
the family of words associated with ‘military’, many commonalities can be found: 
 
 34 
Militarisation: The action of making military in character or style; spec. 
transformation to military methods or status, esp. by the provision or expansion of 
military forces and other resources. (Oxford English Dictionary 2013) 
 
Militarism: Military attitudes or ideals, esp. the belief or policy that a country should 
maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend 
or promote national interests. Also: a political condition characterized by the 
predominance of the military in government or administration or a reliance on 
military force in political or diplomatic matters. (Oxford English Dictionary 2013) 
 
Militarise: To make military in character or style; to convert to military methods. 
Also: to equip with military resources or training. (Oxford English Dictionary 2013) 
 
Given how interrelated each term is, it should not be surprising that they can be conflated 
with each other to virtually all take on the same meaning when used in everyday language. 
Context, as has been implied, is important in such matters however, no more so than the use 
of language in describing such a process or phenomenon as militarisation. It is possible to 
take elements from each of these definitions and apply them to the way that this thesis 
employs the term. For instance, “transformation to military methods or status, esp. by the 
provision or expansion of military forces and other resources” can apply to a situation where 
there is a prevalence of military equipment and resources, with consequent impact on the 
tactics and approaches of the groups or institutions possessing those assets. “Military 
attitudes or ideals”, “to make military in character or style”, and “to equip with military 
resources or training” can be applied in circumstances where essentially civilian bodies, who 
have traditionally relied on minimal use of violence, are observed implementing a more 
violent posture and procedure, supported by the necessary resources to enable such moves 
towards a military mind-set. 
In short, it is possible to selectively take the pieces one requires from these linguistic 
definitions and meld them into an acceptable understanding of militarisation that best suits 
this thesis's intentions. In the sense of its place in security studies, when ‘militarisation’ is 
referred to, it is done so in reference to that section of the security spectrum between the 
‘securitisation’ of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, and the ‘violisation’ of Iver Neumann. On a 
functional level, it is also a term used in reference to the role that the U.S. military plays in 
foreign drug enforcement, as well as the militarisation of native counter-narcotics strategy in 
Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Mexico and the U.S. border. It is also used in reference to 
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the militarisation of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in prosecuting 
the War on Drugs, such as the increased paramilitary activities of American police forces 
(Balko 2006), the U.S. Border Patrol’s own special forces units (U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 2014a), and the growth of paramilitary units in the CIA13, along with its own 
drone warfare programme (Miller 2012),  
 However, this is still not conceptually satisfactory, for questions still remain as to how 
we distinguish between militarisation and non-militarisation in order to determine whether or 
not a security situation merits the term. In much of the literature, militarisation is used 
primarily in the context of resource allocation to military infrastructure or endeavours, often 
partnered with militaristic outlooks by societies and/or their elites. Chalmers Johnson 
criticises the phenomenal growth of U.S. military assets and bases around the world, coupled 
with institutional secrecy and the militaristic ideology of some leaders determined to seem 
strong and decisive, that all together generates an irreversible militarism (2004, pp.11-12 & 
60-65). More broadly, Van Tuyll views the matter through the prism of militarism as a term, 
under which militarisation alludes to the quantity and proportion of resources devoted to 
military affairs, though he also makes reference to militaristic ‘cultural behaviour’ of 
individuals, groups and organisations and to ‘national policy’ of treaties and armed 
interventions (1994, p.519). Similarly, Ross found that militarisation could be viewed in the 
narrow political and internalised sense, meaning the rise of repressive regimes of a 
militaristic nature, or of the assumption of power by a military itself (1987, p.562). 
Alternatively, a broader strategic interpretation of militarisation is as a steady growth of the 
military potential of a state, usually accompanied by an increasing role for military 
institutions in the economic, social and political spheres of national affairs, as well as 
involvement in international affairs (Ross 1987, p.562). Also, a similarly strategic, albeit 
more diplomatic/foreign policy focused interpretation, sees militarisation as “including 
international justification for war, alliances, military trade and aid, and militance; dominance 
of militaristic elites and militaristic behaviour in domestic government, economy, society and 
culture” (Beer 1981, quoted in Ross 1987, p.562). 
 The strategic and foreign policy interpretations of militarisation are more applicable 
to this thesis, and there are clear means of assessing them. The growth of military 
expenditure, manpower and technological sophistication can be quantified and analysed and 
thus can indicate the level of militarisation in a strategic and military-capability context. 
                                                 
13 The CIA is perfectly open about this, as demonstrated by an open job advertisement for a Paramilitary 
Operations Officer. See (Central Intelligence Agency 2013) 
 36 
Likewise, analysis of policy approaches, alliances and levels of military aid and support can 
determine the extent of militarisation at a foreign policy level. This is especially if such 
material and diplomatic support sustains military elites in partner states, or supports the 
growth in size, sophistication and professionalism of their security forces in pursing security 
objectives considered important to the donor and receiver states. 
 Considering militarisation in terms of the political, the strategic and the diplomatic 
helps compartmentalise it into these convenient descriptive ‘boxes’. Yet, like the application 
of securitisation, the meaning behind militarisation is entirely dependent on the context of its 
use in relation to an issue, i.e. it is intersubjective. There is validity to be found in the 
strategic interpretation, for as has been observed since 1981, the U.S. military has operated 
on annually increasing defence budgets, resulting in increased size, sophistication and 
strategic reach due to the strategic requirements of the Cold War and subsequent War on 
Terror (SIPRI 2013). Such a vast military and security infrastructure cannot help but be 
involved in America’s economic, social and political spheres, and though concerns over the 
extent of this penetration are often raised, constitutional checks and balances minimise fears 
of any possible extreme outcomes. The diplomatic interpretation also has validity based on 
the clear historical precedent and openly declared foreign-policy of lending American 
security aid to Latin American countries within an informal regional alliance under the 
international justification of counter-narcotics (USAID 2013). In-keeping with that same 
interpretation, however, it cannot be denied that past support has inadvertently (or 
deliberately, depending on Cold War priorities of the time) encouraged militancy and 
dominance of militaristic elites and militaristic behaviour in certain partner countries. 
However, standards are far more stringent these days in order to receive American aid and 
Latin America has essentially democratised to varying degrees of solidity. 
 
2.4.1 Cultural Militarisation 
 
Amid these geo-strategic interpretations, the cultural interpretation of militarisation via 
language and imagery should not be discounted. Militarised terms have crept into everyday 
language, despite their predominantly metaphorical use. The phrase ‘go to war’ can be used 
in the conventional sense of referring to countries engaging in conflict, but can just as easily 
feature in hyperbolic sports commentary between rival teams, especially in masculine and 
combative contact sports, where other phrases such as ‘blitzing’, ‘sudden death’ and 
‘destroying the opposition’ are also employed among many others (Thorne 2006, p.2 & 12). 
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Such language can amplify an ‘Us and Them’ narrative, tapping into fear of, or 
hostility toward, ‘the other’ that is different from society or poses a threat to it. This may 
seem comparatively harmless in competitive sports. However, if we assign the same principle 
to actual conflicts or security issues, then the employment of such language can blur the lines 
between metaphorical and descriptive use, with the possibility that it can impact social 
attitudes and behaviour. Murray Edelman asserts that “language forms are a critical element 
in the shaping of beliefs; they do so in ways we do not consciously experience and so are 
nonobvious” and that the political significance of metaphor is as an “instrument for shaping 
political support and opposition and the premises upon which decisions are made” (Edelman 
1971 p.67-68, quoted in Chilton 1996, p.194). 
Additional analysis of metaphor comes from Carol Cohn (1987). Observing how 
defence specialists and military personnel would often use benign sounding terms and 
nicknames to describe nuclear warfare, atomic bombs and delivery missiles, she suggests that 
“these words serve to domesticate, to tame the wild and uncontrolled forces of nuclear 
destruction. The metaphors minimise; they are a way to make phenomena that are beyond 
what the mind can encompass smaller and safer” (Cohn 1987, p.689). If such metaphors and 
terminology can be used to tone down overt and threatening militaristic reality, then it would 
be logical to suggest that the opposite can also apply. Use of militaristic metaphors in 
everyday language can act to normalise the employment of coercive and potentially violent 
methods against security threats in place of prior peaceful civilian procedure (in other words 
generating support, or at least tacit approval, to take a far tougher line in place of a perceived 
‘soft’ approach). 
Deborah Tannen suggests that “military metaphors train us to think about – and see – 
everything in terms of fighting, conflict, and war. This perspective then limits our 
imaginations when we consider what we can do about situations we would like to understand 
or change” (Tannen 2008, quoted in Thorne 2006, p.13). Given that U.S. counter-narcotics 
policymakers and those bodies charged with implementing those policies are either part of, or 
influenced by, political-military institutions and their inherent militarised culture, it is hardly 
surprising that the militarised option has gained traction in the drug war, an example of a 
situation they ‘would like to understand or change’. 
Alongside language, imagery can be just as effective in promoting the securitisation 
and militarisation of an issue. Michael Williams raises the interesting question as to whether 
a securitisation framework so closely tied to language (i.e. the speech act) for its explanatory 
and ethical position is capable of addressing the dynamics of security “in a world where 
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political communication is increasingly bound with images and in which televisual 
communication is an essential element of communicative action” (2003, p.524). A picture is 
worth a thousand words, and the right imagery need not necessarily be accompanied by 
language to facilitate securitisation (the destruction of the World Trade Centre announcing 
the War on Terror in the loudest way possible), or indeed to prompt debate as to whether an 
issue should be demilitarised or desecuritised (the iconic image of the napalm-burned girl in 
Vietnam raising additional questions as to the wisdom of that war). 
Further to this, Lene Hansen posits that visuals can challenge the traditional discourse 
of the Self and the threatening Other in two respects. Firstly, a visual’s potential for 
circulation and ambiguity make possible the range of ‘actors’ that may constitute themselves 
capable of speaking security to an equally expanded range of ‘audiences’ (2011, p.58-59). 
Secondly, that this produces an accelerated level of ‘security interaction’ where visual 
representations that originate in one locale become the subject of securitisations in another 
(Hansen 2011, p.58-59). Again, the image of the burned Vietnamese child – indeed visual 
coverage of that conflict in general – provides a good example of Hansen’s points, in that 
wider circulation of horrific imagery originating in a difficult locale prompted security 
interactions between a wider range of actors and audiences. That example applies to the 
beginnings of the de-escalation of a securitised issue, but certain imagery can encourage the 
reverse, where images of famine, genocide or attacks on fellow nationals, for example, can 
precipitate demands that those situations be securitised, or even militarised should a case 
exist for deploying military assets for humanitarian, interventionist or retaliatory purposes14. 
Both aspects of security imagery are evident in the drug war, where on one side images of 
gang violence, dilapidated estates and hopeless addicts solicit calls that ‘something must be 
done’. On the other side however, imagery of herbicide-damaged environments, mass 
incarcerations and innocents caught in the crossfire between traffickers and authorities, may 
prompt the question ‘we are doing something, but is it the right thing?’ 
The nature of popular culture, where language and imagery can combine to dramatic 
effect, has an important role in establishing the necessary conditions for audience acceptance 
of the employment of military methods and resources as emergency measures in countering 
security threats. This could be especially argued when the institutionalisation of such 
emergency measures – due to their presence for a prolonged period of time – means that, in 
reality, there is no longer a need to seek support from an audience for adoption of those 
                                                 
14 Hansen explores such ‘strategies of depiction’ further on p.59 of her article. 
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methods. Yet the desire to at least maintain audience permission, if not outright support, can 
mean efforts are made to ‘co-opt’ them, to make an audience feel a part of something greater. 
In this context there is, according to Jochen and Linda Schulte-Sasse: 
 
“An interest in engineering consent not so much through public debates as through the 
staging of events that permit the state's constituents to experience themselves as an 
imaginary community or unified body [… via recourse to] ahistorical images of unity 
and superiority, such as the flag, the war hero as point of identification, or TV images 
of technological, and thus national, superiority, as in shots of "smart bombs" and 
other forms of "surgical strike." Media images become the postmodern heirs to 
narratively constructed utopias.” (1991, p.69-70) 
 
World War II propaganda films and newsreels, for example, had an appropriate time and 
purpose, with opinion polling of the day finding that Allied troops who watched certain 
newsreels were more aggressively pro-war than those who had not seen them (Bourke 1999, 
p.24-25). 
 In general, militarisation themes woven through imagery and language can have a 
cultural impact and perhaps make acceptance of militarised policy solutions to security 
threats seem more attractive or natural courses of action. This trend in relation to American 
popular culture specifically, and the subsequent gradual militarisation of U.S. counter-
narcotics policy in the later 20th Century, is further explored in Chapter 4. 
 
2.4.2 The primary elements of the militarisation framework 
 
If the securitisation framework seeks to help determine what is and what is not a security 
issue, then the task of the militarisation framework is to determine whether a recognised 
security situation has or has not become subject to militarisation. The notions of 
militarisation, as detailed above, along with the securitisation framework, translate into what 
can be considered as this militarisation framework. It can be applied to the case studies of this 
thesis and consists of the following elements: 
 
Making Military 
 
The first key element of the militarisation framework is when an emergency measure brought 
on by securitisation takes on a decidedly militarised quality. This can be through the direct 
involvement of a military itself, or the gradual militarisation of what officially is a civilian 
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body, such as a police force or similar law-enforcement agency, in terms of the type and 
standard of the equipment and resources at its disposal, the tactics it employs in its 
operations, and the institutional culture it espouses. This generally means that more forceful 
or coercive attitudes emerge over time instead of prior restraint, and an emphasis on keeping 
the peace and pursuing a civilian strategy is eclipsed by seeing crime, or a specific threat, as 
something to be ‘fought against’ or have a figurative ‘war’ declared upon it. It is this 
heightened ‘militarised quality’ that means a security situation has become subject to making 
military. Heightened security measures exist as options alongside military involvement, and 
are markedly devoid of the latter, such as far greater electronic surveillance and monitoring 
than would normally be the case. More intensive and technologically sophisticated security 
scanning at airports and public buildings might feature, as would greater numbers of visibly 
deployed police officers, armoured vehicles, and so on. Yet these measures still fall within 
the general remit of a securitised situation, even if they could be still regarded as emergency 
measures. The direct or ancillary involvement of the military is the pre-condition for making 
military, and thus moving a security situation from a securitised response into a militarised 
one. 
 
Institutionalisation 
 
We can determine that an issue has moved from the ‘securitised’ part of Buzan, Wæver and 
de Wilde’s security spectrum into the ‘militarised’ area when such militarisation as described 
above has persisted for so long that it has moved on from being an – in theory, temporary – 
emergency measure into becoming institutionalised practice. By institutionalised practice, I 
refer to security situations whereby a set of actions, code of behaviour, accepted priorities, 
ways of thinking, and so on, have been underway for such a prolonged period of time that 
they have become entrenched15. This is consistent with the institutionalisation of security as 
proposed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, who state that “if a given type of threat is 
persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and the sense of urgency 
become institutionalised” (1998, p.27-28). The use of the military directly, or in conjunction 
with civilian assets, constitutes one of these emergency responses. Therefore, if ‘making 
military’, as detailed above, is observable in the policy actions and thus operational practice 
                                                 
15 The Global War on Terror is a good example in this case, where security-related entities in the U.S. – from 
police, to airport security to national law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the Bush Administration – 
introduced counter-terror measures that were to become permanent features of the post-9/11 world (Howell and 
Lind 2010; Fowler and Sen 2010). They were not temporary emergency measures withdrawn after the 
immediate security threat was dealt with, such as with the ending of internment of Japanese-Americans during 
WWII until Imperial Japan was defeated (Hayashi 2004). 
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of institutions for a prolonged period of time, then they could be said to have become 
institutionalised, and thus indicative of the militarisation of a security issue. Such embedded 
practices are accepted as, at best, legitimate and worthy, or, at worst, a necessary evil to deter 
something far less preferable. In other words, what were once ‘emergency’ measures have 
become so routine that they essentially constitute ‘the new normal’ in security measures. 
Once institutionalised and subject to vested interests, it is difficult to subject such measures to 
any de-securitisation unless the security issue in question can clearly be seen to no longer 
constitute a threat16. Didier Bigo, for instance, asserts that since securitisation emerges from 
‘security professionals’, it is natural that their administrative practices would be, if not 
designed for, then at least complimentary to the management of fear in order to justify their 
continued existence and allocation of resources (2002, p.65). 
 A conventional war has a limited time and scope to it, and whether the result is 
victory or defeat, a climax is reached, whereby the existential threat is resolved in one way or 
another and an issue can be desecuritised. In the case of conflicts against abstract concepts 
however, such as the wars on terror, drugs, crime, etc., it is impossible to realise a definitive 
and clear-cut end result. Victory can of course be arbitrarily declared to save face should one 
wish to be extracted from an intractable or unpopular conflict. However, if a ‘war’ is against 
something seen to constitute an existential threat, then it cannot be ended without either 
admitting ‘defeat’, or until a change in attitudes demotes the threat to a manageable risk or 
even eventually a minor issue. As a result of institutional and cultural absorption of 
militarisation – and subsequent transformation of institutions and society as such 
militarisation becomes ingrained – it is significantly more difficult to transition from a 
militarised situation back to a conventional securitised status, never mind a desecuritised, 
political position17. 
It was possible for this to occur following the end of U.S. alcohol prohibition because 
the security threat was only subject to stringent law enforcement emergency measures, not 
military ones. The threat never transitioned out of the securitised sector of the security 
spectrum and so could return to the politicised sector with relative ease. Cultural attitudes 
towards alcohol also made this possible, for the majority of the audience came to accept that 
alcohol did not pose an existential threat if properly managed. The War on Terror has also 
                                                 
16 Even then it is possible for such measures to find a new ‘emergency’ to address, such as the shift of military 
resources from the Cold War to the War on Drugs, and then to the War on Terror. 
17 In North Korea, for example, the ‘military-first’ policy has seen the locus of political power shift from the 
ruling party to the military in the ideological pursuit of Juche (self-reliance) and gangseongdaeguk (a powerful 
and prosperous nation), as well as for the protection of the ruling elite itself. Such a policy is justified by a near-
constant war footing, bolstered by propaganda and manufactured crises. See (Woo 2014). 
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been deescalated, though not desecuritised. This is due to public fatigue of foreign 
entanglements by the U.S. military and, also, while terror attacks on the American mainland 
have occurred in recent years, none have been on the scale of the 9/11 atrocities in 2001. 
 
Criteria of violence and resulting security spectrum location 
 
Where an issue calls for emergency measures involving the military as an institution, use of 
its assets, or for other bodies to ‘make military’ in their operational culture or practices, but 
where the situation does not escalate to the level of large-scale violence as supposed by 
Neumann, then this is the location on the security continuum that militarisation occupies. It 
applies when initial emergency measures settle into normalised, institutional practice, where 
military assets are employed in pursuit of addressing a security issue, but never to the extent 
that events cross into a full-scale war-like situation, in which case matters would have 
progressed along the security spectrum into violisation. Consequently the proposed spectrum 
can be represented thusly: 
 
Non-Politicised – Politicised – Securitised – Militarised – Violised 
 
As per Roe’s contention, a rhetorical drug ‘war’ may have been declared, and assets may 
have been mobilised, but it has not been fought in the manner of a true war to the extent that 
Neumann’s classification of ‘violisation’ suggests. Officially-sanctioned violence features in 
the War on Drugs, but is limited to interdiction engagements or counter-narcotics operations, 
at least by the U.S. if not its Colombian and Mexican partners. This is not to dismiss the 
carnage in certain areas, but objectively speaking this is targeted violence, not mass violence. 
Neumann (1998) makes the valid point that the number of people killed is almost always 
made a defining trait of what war is. However, the War on Drugs is essentially a counter-
criminal action despite the use of the term ‘war’, where success is measured not by enemy 
killed or territory conquered, but by the tonnage of drugs seized, traffickers imprisoned or 
cartels broken up. 
 Militarisation as defined is the presence, even embracing, of military personnel, 
assets, or culture by outside bodies, or indeed all three in combination, but without automatic 
recourse to the use of violence on a mass scale. Limited, targeted violence is acceptable, for 
even civilian organisations can employ it without sanction in certain circumstances. If mass-
violence and the full force of a military institution, assets or militaristic culture were 
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unleashed on a significant scale however, then an issue would cross into Neumann’s 
violisation. 
If we follow the framework it is, in theory, possible to militarise any issue providing 
the emergency measures intended to address a security issue remain within these parameters. 
So, for example, military assets could be employed to oversee endangered species, protect 
threatened natural environments, keep the peace in urban or rural settlements, monitor 
elections, and so on. Non-lethal military assets such as surveillance aircraft, transport 
helicopters or peacekeeping troops could all be utilised in these endeavours. Targeted 
violence could be employed, but this does not necessarily mean lethal force, as poachers 
could be apprehended, or polluting ships towed away or sunk after evacuation, for instance. 
The employment of military personnel, assets or operational culture, even of non-violent 
natures, is still enough to consider a security issue as being militarised. It is only if violence 
orchestrated on a significant scale occurs that an issue could then be considered to have been 
violised. 
 
2.5 The Research Questions 
 
The thesis topic concerns the progressive militarisation of American counter-narcotics policy, 
both domestically and towards Latin America, specifically Colombia and Mexico, employing 
the militarisation framework developed above. According to Alexander George and Andrew 
Bennett, “working with a specified subclass of a general phenomenon is also an effective 
strategy for theory development” (2005, p.78), though in this instance the purpose is not 
theory but framework development, through the process of abduction, as explored in the next 
chapter on methodology. It is in following this strategy that the decision was made to analyse 
the militarisation of counter-narcotics specifically, as opposed to militarisation in its entirety, 
which could range from anything, from riot control through to environmental protection. By 
focusing on enhancing the framework through analysing one type of militarisation (counter-
narcotic), rather than spreading inquiry too thinly and widely, both the framework itself, and 
its claim to relevance in the securitisation debate, have been enhanced. Taking these factors 
into consideration, the main research question presented itself as: 
 
 To what extent has United States counter-narcotics policy in Colombia, Mexico and 
on the U.S. Southern Border become militarised? 
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The question originated from the need to demonstrate the relevance of militarisation to 
practical counter-narcotics policy, as well as to the securitisation debate. An effective way of 
doing this was to analyse the policy and strategic direction of the drug war in Mexico, 
Colombia and on the U.S. border. These effectively represent the beginning, mid-point and 
entry gate of most illicit drug trafficking routes that pose a problem, and consider the extent 
of militarisation that has occurred, utilising the framework that has been developed to 
determine this. However, in order to effectively answer what is still quite a broad research 
question, a set of specific questions were formulated to make the inquiry focused. It was with 
a qualitative/interpretive approach in mind, related to the study of the militarisation elements 
detailed above, that these sub-questions had to be posited if the framework was to be used 
satisfactorily, and be applied to each of the case studies undertaken18. Each sub-question 
directly relates to elements of the militarisation framework, namely making military, 
institutionalisation and criteria of violence: 
 
➢ How significant a role do the United States military and native Colombian and 
Mexican military forces play in counter-narcotics? 
 
This links to the making military element of the militarisation framework, when an 
emergency measure brought on by securitisation takes on a decidedly militarised quality. 
This can be through the direct involvement of military forces, or the gradual militarisation of 
civilian organisations, such as the police or similar law-enforcement agencies, in terms of the 
type and standard of the equipment and resources available and the training and tactics 
employed in operations. In seeking to answer this question, it is logical to assess the extent of 
involvement of the American and native militaries, both in themselves and in support of other 
security forces. 
 
➢ Has militarisation occurred in any U.S., Colombian and Mexican theatres of 
operations to the extent that it could be said to have become institutionalised? 
 
In examining the case studies, can it be concluded that the actions of U.S. and native military 
and security forces, their codes of behaviour, accepted priorities, ways of thinking, and so on, 
have been appreciably militarised for such a prolonged period of time that they have become 
entrenched? 
                                                 
18 See Chapter 3 on methodology for more detail on why the case study method was adopted. 
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➢ Which part of the security spectrum does the level of violence associated with the 
implementation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy best conform to? 
 
This question relates to the security spectrum. If the security situations under consideration in 
Colombia and Mexico can be said to have moved beyond regular securitisation and into 
militarisation – e.g. by the involvement of military forces or assets, and potentially on a 
prolonged, institutionalised basis – then we must also consider whether the levels of violence 
observed suggest a war-like, violised situation. If the levels of violence are more than would 
be expected in a conventional securitised situation, yet are less than one would expect in a 
violised, state-of-war type situation, then the situation conforms to the middle-way between 
the two on the security spectrum – i.e. a militarised situation. 
The findings that resulted from these questions helped determine how extensive 
militarisation has become in the counter-narcotics policies in Colombia and Mexico/U.S. 
border, as well as the U.S. involvement in them. By comparing the findings of each of these 
more focused questions into three separate sections clearly marked within each case study, 
this helped build an empirical picture of the extent of militarisation in U.S. domestic and 
Colombian/Mexican counter-narcotics policy. 
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has explored the securitisation framework, firstly be detailing how Buzan, then 
Wæver, then both ultimately joined by de Wilde, gradually developed the framework with the 
intention of answering the question as to what actually constitutes a security issue and how it 
can become securitised. Other scholars have agreed and disagreed with that trio’s positions to 
varying degrees, and these have been touched on along with existing gaps in the discourse. 
However, the securitisation framework forms the necessary conceptual foundation for this 
thesis, especially in the context of how the United States came to view illicit narcotics as a 
significant enough security threat to warrant the employment of emergency measures. It is 
the nature of these emergency measures, and specifically the militarised extent of them, that 
this thesis explores further. 
Just as Buzan and his colleagues sought to answer what counts as security, so too do I 
wish to establish what constitutes a militarised security situation, brought about by the 
employment of certain kinds of emergency measures. The second half of the chapter 
therefore covered militarisation, both as an academic and cultural concept, but more 
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importantly in its capacity as an analytical framework. It builds upon securitisation, and is 
therefore closely linked by virtue of being a distinct form of emergency measure. Yet it is 
that distinctiveness that merits its own framework, for just as securitisation takes an issue out 
of the realms of normal politics, so too does militarising an issue lift it out of being 
securitised only, and into a decidedly different, yet related, category. 
This chapter therefore concludes having laid the conceptual foundations for the thesis 
and has proposed a framework for the assessment of the presence of militarisation in any 
given security situation. This thesis specifically deals with the extent of militarisation of U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy, and so the main research question and the related sub-questions 
were also presented. In order to demonstrate how the militarisation framework, through 
qualitative research methods, can be applied in answering these questions, the next chapter 
explores the methodology required in analysing the case studies of Colombia and 
Mexico/U.S. Southern Border. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter explored securitisation and the foundation it provides for militarisation, 
the elements that comprise the latter, and the associated research questions. This chapter 
details the research design of the thesis. Specifically it explores the utilisation and 
development of the militarisation framework, the rationale behind adopting a qualitative 
approach, the decision to adopt a case study method and the choice of cases, and finally what 
methods were used in the research and why. 
The research design – from qualitative research methods to case studies – revolves 
around the militarisation framework, the essential ‘tool kit’ required to determine the 
presence and extent of militarisation in a security situation. The key term here is framework; 
that is, the structure that underlies the concept of how a securitised issue can be deemed to 
have become militarised, and the elements of which aid analysis of this phenomenon. 
Effectively, the framework helps us to determine where to look, and what to look for, in 
securitised security situations that have potentially become militarised. 
 In his discussion regarding the concept of securitisation, Thierry Balzacq submits that 
securitisation (as opposed to securitisation theories) is an ideal type, which is to say a set of 
essential qualitative features which, when combined, form a logical whole (2014, p.8). 
Balzacq argues that, "the construction of an ideal type is carried out inductively from the 
extensive study of relevant materials out of which the researcher selects certain segments of 
empirical reality" (2014, p.9). Likewise the heuristic methodological approach, whereby one 
seeks to obtain qualitative depictions that are at the heart of an issue, enabling the collection 
of documents, narrative descriptions, correspondence, records, quotations and case histories 
(Moustakas 1990, p.38-39). In so doing, the researcher selects from these 'segments of 
empirical reality' to inform their study and ideal type construction. As a result, "the ideal type 
is a useful instrument in producing analytical statements about our experience of the world" 
(Balzacq et al. 2014, p.9)19. Balzacq goes on to suggest that the form of an ideal type is 
                                                 
19 Balzacq (2014, p.9) takes inspiration from Max Weber, who put it that, "an ideal type is formed by [...] one or 
several points of view and by the synthesis of great many diffusely existing component phenomena [...] which 
are sometime more and sometimes less present and occasionally absent" (Weber 1949, p.90). 
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general, in that its component parts (or elements) are not equally present in all things it 
designates (Balzacq et al. 2014, p.9). 
 In a similar fashion, the militarisation framework seeks to constitute an ideal type as 
argued by Balzacq. The intention is to design a framework made up of several qualitative 
features suggested by the study of empirical reality (i.e. elements such as making military, 
institutionalisation, etc.) that combine to form the logical whole; that is, an analytical 
framework for the production of analytical statements (in this instance whether a security 
situation is militarised or not)20. 
 The militarisation framework as developed in Chapter 2 follows on from the 
securitisation framework, just as militarisation as a category is placed after securitisation on 
the security spectrum. The militarisation framework therefore does not seek to explain how 
the process of militarisation comes about. It is not a theory, but an analytical tool, simply one 
way of considering a certain area of security studies, in this particular instance counter-
narcotics. It is associated with securitisation because there is a logical progression. It is a 
process showcased in Chapter 4, which historically details how the narcotics issue was 
gradually elevated up the security spectrum until it became a securitised issue for the U.S., 
especially in a foreign policy context. This raises the important research question and sub-
questions detailed in Chapter 2, those regarding whether securitised foreign – and to a lesser 
degree domestic – U.S. counter-narcotics policy has progressed into becoming militarised 
and, if so, to what extent. It is through studying the development of U.S. counter-narcotics 
strategy in Colombia, Mexico and on the U.S. Southern Border that I seek to determine the 
answers to those questions. 
 
3.2 The militarisation framework: utilisation and development 
 
Militarisation is essentially an emergency measure generated by securitisation. Without 
securitisation as a foundation, militarisation would not be possible, as it would have nothing 
building up to it. Militarisation can only really be explored in reference to the process of 
securitisation that must come before it. The militarisation framework developed in this thesis 
only builds upon securitisation and does not seek to replace or separate itself from the latter. 
Securitisation has already provided an explanation as to why circumstances have emerged 
where military involvement is one possible response to a security threat. Thus, as detailed 
                                                 
20 As Balzacq suggests (2014, p.9), such a construct is meant to be general, and so its elements may not be 
equally present, which we later see in the case studies in how some of the militarisation indicators are more or 
less present in one case compared to another. 
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above, the militarisation framework is principally an analytical one, designed to determine 
the presence of the elements that make it up (i.e. making military, institutionalisation, and 
criteria of violence) in order to understand whether a security situation has indeed moved on 
from being securitised to militarised, or indeed even violised, in nature. 
The militarisation framework is effectively a tool, a useful one to shed light on 
counter-narcotics militarisation. However, through its use in empirical study, it can also be 
improved for other scholars to utilise in the future. This process is known as abduction. As 
Jorg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil explain: 
 
“The typical situation for abduction is when we become interested in a class of 
phenomena for which we lack applicable theories […] We collect pertinent 
observations while applying concepts from existing fields of our knowledge. Instead 
of trying to impose an abstract theoretical template (deduction) or “simply” inferring 
propositions from facts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level 
(abduction).” (2009, p.714-715) 
 
Additionally, James Rosenau explains that: 
 
“One advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth 
between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of 
the former to exert pressure on the latter even as the findings of the latter, in turn, 
exert pressure for the former, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and 
research feed on each other.” (Rosenau 1988, p.64 quoted in Friedrichs and 
Kratochwil 2009, p.707) 
 
In other words abduction is essentially a process by which, as Rosenau indicates, the scholar 
moves between the empirical and the theoretical, using new insights and ideas on each 
occasion to improve both, and thus the whole. This is the process I undertook in relation to 
the militarisation framework. Upon applying it to the case studies in the thesis, I determined 
what could be improved in the framework to make it more flexible, accurate and nuanced. 
While I have not conducted an ‘endless cycle’ of improvements, the alternations to the 
original framework post-application are thoroughly detailed in the concluding Chapter 7, and 
remain open for future scholars to conduct their own abduction process going forward. 
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Friedrichs and Kratochwil ultimately summarise abduction as: 
 
“A comparative case study method. It starts with a research interest that relates to 
some relevant purpose. The specific field of research is constituted by a limited 
number of core concepts. A variety of conceptual distinctions is applied to divide the 
field into a number of domains. The researcher examines the most important or most 
typical cases in each domain to establish whether and how each distinction is 
important in structuring the field under examination. To that end, cross-case analysis 
is combined with within-case analysis.” (2009, p.719-720) 
 
This summation of abduction neatly lends itself to the premise and structure of the 
militarisation framework in general, as well as the case study method selected for its 
application. Let us take each element of the above passage in turn. Friedrichs and Kratochwil 
state that abduction is a comparative case study method, and in this thesis that is represented 
by a comparative analysis of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia and Mexico/U.S. 
border. The research interest that relates to some relevant purpose is determining, based on 
the findings of the case studies, to what extent militarisation features in U.S. counter-
narcotics policy. The specific field of research constituted by a limited number of core 
concepts, is the nature and extent of militarisation as an emergency measure in any given 
security situation. Meanwhile the three elements of militarisation – namely making military, 
institutionalisation and criteria of violence – represent the division of this field into a number 
of domains. I examine how applicable each of the three militarisation elements (i.e. domains) 
are within the case studies, thus determining their importance in structuring the field under 
examination, i.e. the militarisation framework. Finally, cross-case analysis combined with 
within-case analysis, is represented by the conclusions at the end of each separate case study 
chapter, and an ultimate cross-case comparative analysis in the Conclusion chapter. 
The main research question and related sub-questions have been discussed in Chapter 
2, while the purpose of a framework, and the process of abduction, are discussed above. In 
methodological terms, the following are discussed below; the qualitative/interpretive research 
approach adopted, the case study format and reasons for case selection, and the methods 
involved in making use of primary and secondary sources. 
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3.3 Adopting a qualitative research approach 
 
Qualitative research is a means to achieve a more nuanced understanding of a phenomenon. It 
emphasises the qualities of entities, processes and meanings which are not subject to 
experimental examination or statistical measurements, i.e. the traditional scientific approach. 
In qualitative research, it is the socially constructed nature of reality that is stressed, along 
with the value-laden nature of inquiry (Clough and Nutbrown 2002, p.19). As a consequence 
there is a great degree of subjectivity involved, a hallmark of interpretivism. In this paradigm, 
“the locus of understanding shifts from the quantitative/positivist focus on objectivity, to an 
interest in subjective worldviews” (Rossman and Rallis 1998, p.35-36), of ‘thick description’ 
over predictability. It is where humans are viewed as creators of their worlds and their role in 
shaping those worlds is fundamental21. 
 The securitisation of narcotics in the U.S. is an example of human agency shaping the 
world, or more accurately shaping counter-narcotics strategy employed at home and abroad 
by America, as an emergency measure in response to a specific threat. In determining the 
extent that U.S. counter-narcotics strategy has become militarised, it was necessary to study 
the qualities of the processes involved and to build a ‘thick description’ understanding of the 
phenomenon. Sources featuring statistics, such as budgets allocated or personnel trained in 
the cause of counter-narcotics, were useful to the overall research, but ultimately were used 
in support of the qualitative material that revealed the evolution of the U.S. approach to 
counter-narcotics. It therefore seemed reasonable that this thesis pursued a 
qualitative/interpretative approach, as reflected in the construction of the underlying 
methodology and selection of methods. 
 In line with broader securitisation and militarisation research, I worked within 
qualitative methods utilised by other scholars in the field. For instance, Jonathan Fisher and 
David Anderson (2015) used qualitative case studies of four African states and their 
interactions with four major international donor countries to explore authoritarianism and the 
securitisation of development aid to Africa22. In studying the securitisation of international 
public health, Alexander Kelle (2007) adopted a qualitative historical and policy-based 
                                                 
21 Even if some scholars are of the view that interpretivism constitutes a wholly different paradigm, where the 
search of meaning takes precedence over the experimental search of law, scientific method is not incompatible 
with it, as the “distinctive contribution of science is to present a set of procedures for discovering the answers to 
appropriately framed descriptive and causal questions” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, p.37). Analytical 
frameworks such as militarisation aim to be the procedures for discovering such answers. 
22 This highlights the importance of the case study format, which I have utilised in my study, albeit a 
comparative approach featuring Colombia and Mexico and their respective interactions with the United States 
and its foreign counter-narcotics policies. 
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analytical approach. He took an overview of the deliberate spread of disease in the form of 
biological warfare, bio-weapon arms control policy, general international public health 
policy, and the emergence of bioterrorism as a security threat, thus demonstrating the 
importance of a broad narrative and policy overview23. In his study of the securitisation of 
non-deliberate infectious diseases in Vietnam, namely HIV and avian flu, Jonathan Herington 
(2010) studied both qualitative and quantitative primary and secondary sources24. He made 
use of government policy documents, legal instruments and budgetary allocations obtained 
from national and international sources to explore the securitised policy response to the 
security threats these diseases posed to society. I took a similar approach to the study of 
counter-narcotics policy25. 
Also, in studying militarisation, qualitative, quantitative and interpretive methods 
have generally been the favoured methods. Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler’s (1997) 
analysis of the extent of militarisation in domestic American policing employed a 
quantitative method in the form of a survey mailed out to hundreds of departments. This 
allowed them to construct a picture of the number of Police Paramilitary Units (PPUs) in 
operation and the level of their activity. However, such statistical information then allowed a 
qualitative/interpretative analysis to be conducted as to the extent of normalisation of the use 
of these units, and the direct links between them and the U.S. Department of Defence. I also 
made use of statistical sources, such as budget allocation charts and weapons and equipment 
transfer data for example, to ultimately inform my qualitative analysis regarding the extent of 
military involvement in and/or support of domestic and foreign counter-narcotics 
enforcement26. 
                                                 
23 In my own study this has been realised through a historical overview of U.S. drug control policy and its 
increasingly securitised and eventually militarised nature in response to the emergence of related security 
threats, such as violent drug cartels. 
24 I discuss in greater detail below how both primary and secondary sources aided in answering the sub-research 
questions, and by doing so cumulatively helped to answer the main research question. 
25 Likewise, Herington also made use of local and international media sources to acquire further data and 
information about the phenomenon in general, and to also establish the social context in which this 
securitisation was taking place, i.e. the attitudes and reactions of the public to the perceived threats. Making use 
of media sources was a prevalent method in my own study, both for the social context they helped provide, but 
also to provide primary material that I did not have the ability to acquire myself. For example, for her study of 
the militarisation of Rio De Janeiro’s favelas by paramilitary Police Pacification Units in the build up to the 
2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, Charlotte Livingstone (2014) adopted qualitative interviews and 
observational field work to establish the extent and nature of such militarisation and its social consequences. 
While primary interviews and field work did not feature in my overall research, secondary versions of such 
sources found in the literature and news media proved to be extremely informative in exploring the type and 
extent of counter-narcotics militarisation efforts actually in effect on the ground, as opposed to purely on the 
pages of policy proposal documents. 
26 In developing her concept of green militarisation (i.e. the use of military and paramilitary actors, techniques, 
technologies and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation), Elizabeth Lunstrum (2014) also demonstrated a 
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While it was informative to consult what securitisation and militarisation scholars are 
doing in other areas, it was also useful to study the approaches taken by counter-narcotics 
scholars, especially those researching similar topics to mine. For instance, Johnathon Rosen’s 
(2012) in-depth study of the origins and progress of Plan Colombia adopted a process tracing 
approach. It made use of mainly qualitative methods supplemented by quantitative research 
where appropriate, and focused on critical junctures of the initiative rather than a complete 
history detailing every nuance. The study is similar to my own in that it takes a chronological 
perspective of how a major counter-narcotics initiative developed and how policy and 
strategy altered over time, yet his single case study approach allowed him the luxury of space 
that my two case studies did not. That said, his is a broad study while mine focuses on 
militarisation, and one of his main goals was to assess the effectiveness of the initiative and 
to suggest policy recommendations. I do not aim to judge the effectiveness, merits or 
otherwise of militarisation, nor recommend future action, but to gauge the extent of counter-
narcotics militarisation, through the prism of the militarisation framework. 
On the reasoning behind the U.S. support of the Merida Initiative, Johnathon Hunter 
(2011) adopted analogical reasoning to explain how the interpretation and perceptions of 
policymakers (especially in regards to a belief in being able to ‘transplant’ the Plan Colombia 
model to Mexico) guided their decisions27. Elements of this are seen in my own later analysis 
of Mexico, whereby the U.S. initially supported militarisation in the counter-narcotics 
approach to Mexico, but eventually came to realise that the situation called for a different, 
                                                                                                                                                       
qualitative approach by using the geography of Kruger National Park to illustrate how geographical factors 
shaped the militarisation that was taking place, where and how it unfolded, its impacts, and its justification. 
While geography played a small role in my own research, there were elements that were of use, such as the 
correlation between the location of U.S. counties on major drug trafficking routes from Mexico and the amount 
of weaponry, vehicles and equipment they had acquired from the Department of Defence in support of their 
local counter-narcotics efforts. 
27 Analogical reasoning is a human cognitive trait. According to social psychologists Richard Nisbett and Lee 
Ross, “objects and events in the phenomenal world are almost never approached as if they are sui generis 
[unique] configurations but rather are assimilated into pre-existing structures in the mind of the perceiver” 
(1980, p.24–25). David Houghton describes “the essence of analogical thinking [as] the transfer of knowledge 
from one situation to another by a process of mapping – finding a set of one-on-one correspondences (often 
incomplete) between aspects of one body of information and aspects of another” (2001, p.25). Thus Aiden Hehir 
determines that analogical reasoning can play a role in foreign policy decisions, for: 
 
“Humans […] do not continually assess oncoming situations as unique, requiring concerted 
examination; rather, they recognize similarities, at least perceived similarities, and revert to 
behavioural patterns based on lessons learned from past events and thus pursue a course of action based 
on historical data rather than the characteristics of the contemporary situation.” 
(Hehir 2006, p.72) 
 
This suggests that when formulating a counter-narcotics strategy for Mexico, the U.S. looked at Colombia and 
what could be perceived as some successes, and attempted to replicate the Plan Colombia model. As revealed in 
Chapter 6, however, the initial emphasis on militarisation faded when it was realised that the two situations, 
while both still involving narcotics, were not entirely similar and thus required different strategies to be adopted. 
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law enforcement strategy compared to Colombia. Additionally it was encouraging to see that, 
while Johnathon Hunter (2011) looked at Colombia and Mexico and their individual 
situations, the case study itself was based on the overall initiative, a similar model to the one 
this thesis employs28. 
 Case studies analysing counter-narcotics have often focused either on one country, 
such as Colombia or Mexico, as with the examples above, or have made comparisons 
between countries on an operational level, with the intention of forming policy or strategic 
recommendations for military and political decision makers 29 . Nevertheless, it was 
encouraging to see that in all of them both qualitative and quantitative methods could be put 
to effective use, and that the narrative format adopted in my own work had past form. That 
many cases concentrated either on ‘big picture’ issues, or in instances when they were 
focused did not involve my specific field of enquiry, also enhanced the originality of my 
study, while at the same time I did not radically depart from the approaches from others in 
the field. 
 
3.4 The case study format and case selection 
 
Why was the United States and its counter-narcotics policies selected as the main case in this 
study? As indicated in Chapter 1, the U.S. has been at the very forefront of the international 
prohibition regime on illicit narcotics, as well as the gradual utilisation of military assets in 
the enforcement methods of that regime. It was therefore appropriate to centre the study on 
the U.S. counter-narcotics policy approach, and its interaction with Colombia and Mexico, 
the two principle operational areas where counter-narcotics and American foreign and 
national security interests coincide. It is true that other countries take an active role in 
counter-narcotics enforcement, either in their national or international interests, but would 
have led to very different studies had these countries been selected instead of the United 
States. 
                                                 
28 On the issue of Mexico, in attempting to understand why the country’s drug war has only recently erupted 
into violence when it has been a long-term player in the trafficking of illicit narcotics, Viridiana Rios (2011) 
took a quantitative approach instead. Using detailed datasets relating to the gender, age, location and dates of 
drug-related homicides since violence flared up in 2006, as well as statistical data related to drug-industry 
trends, she was able to test her models against several cases, namely a selected set of areas in Mexico. While the 
analysis of militarisation in my own research could not be fully quantified in such a manner, the extent of it 
could be by referring to figures for military aid, deployments, budgets, and so forth, for the case studies in this 
thesis. 
29 Examples of single-country and comparative case studies outside of Latin America, include the Centre for 
American Progress report on Guinea Bissau’s role in the South Atlantic cocaine trade (Hoffman and Lane 
2013), and the Brookings Institution’s comparative look at drug trafficking and counter-narcotics policies in 
Mali and Guinea (Gberie 2015). 
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For instance, the British seek to interdict narcotics shipments in the West Indies and 
West Africa (Royal Navy 2015). NATO, as a larger international organisation, cooperates 
with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to provide counter-narcotics training in 
Central Asia and Afghanistan (NATO 2015). Also, in recent years, Russia has inserted itself 
into the general drug war discourse, proposing various initiatives to counter the global drug 
trade that, much like the U.S., it believes constitutes a national security threat to its society 
and public health (Marshall 2014). These are a few examples, and could be worthy of study 
on their own merits. Yet the United States by far commands the biggest military asset 
contribution and budgetary allocation to counter-narcotics in general, than any other country 
or organisation in the world. This reaffirms the logic of selecting it for study as the main 
policy actor in this thesis, especially in the context of applying the militarisation framework. 
In order to establish exactly why narcotics present a security issue for the U.S., and 
why it devotes so many resources towards enforcement, an overarching historical context was 
provided, principally in Chapter 4. This was in order to both demonstrate the importance of 
considering context in securitisation, as indicated in Chapter 2, and also to help explain how 
and why U.S. counter-narcotics policy at home and abroad developed in the direction that it 
has. Such a development ultimately led to involvement in Colombia and Mexico, and the 
eventual greater securitisation and militarisation of the U.S. Southern Border linked to the 
insecurity in the latter country. Therefore, the historical overview of Chapter 4 lays the 
foundation for the subsequent case studies by exploring the history of U.S. counter-narcotics; 
initiated in the early 20th Century, the effective declaration of the drug war by the Nixon 
Administration, the beginnings of militarisation by the Reagan Administration, and the 
subsequent gradual but noteworthy growth in this strategy by Bush Sr. and Clinton 
Administrations. 
An argument could be made to produce separate historical case studies out of the 
three Administrations in office from 1981-2001. However, I decided against this because 
throughout this period there was never a dedicated and organised operational initiative 
launched against the illicit narcotics trade in Latin America. There were many small efforts 
and authorisations for U.S. military and intelligence assets to lend support to Latin American 
partners, but these were essentially piecemeal efforts that, while far from inconsequential, 
never fell under consistent ‘banner’ operations, such as those selected for the case studies. 
 King, Keohane and Verba consider the case study to be essential for the generation of 
the kind of thick description fundamental to social science (1994, p.44), while George and 
Bennett describe a case study as “a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the 
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investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself” (2005, p.18). This 
supported my rationale for employing the case study model for Colombia and Mexico/U.S. 
border. Counter-narcotics can encompass social, health and economically-based measures, as 
well as a sprawling narrative, but the decision was taken to concentrate on purely 
military/security matters, as they are most relevant to the study of militarisation. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, U.S. foreign counter-narcotics efforts in 
Colombia and Mexico have been focused through the prism of two major initiatives – Plan 
Colombia and the Merida Initiative. As the name suggests, Plan Colombia was intended to be 
a form of ‘Marshall Plan’ for the country. It provided U.S. aid for counter-narcotics 
operations and parallel economic and social development. While it has been subject to 
various strategic changes (such as increased military support following 9/11), its remit 
remains essentially the same today, though far decreased from its security peak as Colombian 
forces step up with greater resources and professionalism. The Merida Initiative was 
formulated in response to the spiralling violence caused by drug cartels in Northern Mexico 
in the first decade of the 21st Century, and is a security cooperation agreement between the 
U.S., Mexico and Central American countries. The declared aim of the Initiative is that of 
combating the threats of drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and money 
laundering. Passed into law by the U.S. Congress in mid-2008, it remains active30.  
 That these are the two primary U.S. initiatives, constituting its leading foreign 
counter-narcotics efforts, with specific mission remits and areas of operation, has made them 
ideal for the case study approach. Studies with a potentially greater emphasis on statistics risk 
‘conceptual stretching’ by considering many cases, perhaps dissimilar, to acquire larger 
samples. Case studies, on the other hand, allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level 
of validity over a smaller number of similar, concentrated cases (George and Bennett 2005, 
p.19). That the cases that have been selected for this thesis have also been subject to the 
structured, focused comparison questions raised in Chapter 2, has made it possible to 
reasonably gauge the extent of militarisation that has occurred in each. 
Compared to the slightly scattershot approach of the 1981-2001 period, these 
initiatives were launched in accordance with significant and specific narcotics-related 
security concerns. While the efforts against FARC in Colombia can be conflated with 
counter-terrorism as much as with counter-narcotics (Vauters and Smith 2006, pp.171-172), 
                                                 
30 While not a ‘named operation’, increased militarisation on the U.S.-Mexican border is directly tied to the 
Mexican drug conflict and therefore also significantly features in that case study, even if it is not the primary 
object of enquiry. 
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Plan Colombia was launched to prevent the country from becoming a failed narco-state, as 
explored in Chapter 5. The Merida Initiative was launched to try and address the slaughter of 
the drug cartel wars of Northern Mexico as instability risked bleeding across the U.S. border 
along with copious amounts of narcotics. It is also for this reason that U.S. border security 
has taken a more militarised, defensive approach, as is also explored in the Mexico case study 
in Chapter 6. 
These case studies are interlinked. The pressure that Plan Colombia placed on the 
native drug cartels and traffickers saw the Colombians outsource transportation to the 
Mexicans, who in turn decided to grow their own power bases and market share. This 
resulted in escalating drug violence in Northern Mexico as cartels fought each other for 
lucrative trafficking routes into the U.S. (Beittel 2013. p.8; Lee 2014). This prompted the 
development and launch of the Merida Initiative and increased U.S. border militarisation. The 
unintended consequences – be they positive or negative – of one initiative have led to the 
creation of a subsequent one to address new narco-security issues. The essential question is 
whether, and how much, militarisation has occurred in these initiatives, and so that is why a 
case study analysis of each was an efficient and justified approach to take. 
The initiatives the case studies focus on are still ongoing in one form or another, and 
so there is no end point that makes them self-contained. Yet this is not a major disadvantage, 
as the extent of militarisation can still be effectively indicated based on the amount of time 
that has expired so far in each initiative. After all, the purpose of the research was not to 
assess the results or effectiveness of these operations had they concluded by now, but to 
assess the extent of militarisation exhibited in them. 
It should be noted that Colombia and Mexico are not the only cases with U.S. foreign 
counter-narcotics policy involvement. There were alternatives that cover similar territory. 
One of the primary examples is the current American counter-narcotics support and 
operations in Central America, under the umbrella of Operation Martillo (Spanish for 
hammer) which commenced in 2012 (United States Southern Command 2015). In addition to 
being underway for only a few years – meaning that archival material and document/budget 
sources were generally unavailable compared to other operations – Martillo also primarily 
covers the Central American region, rather than just one country, inclusive of Belize, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. As such, each country 
would either have be become the subject of a comparative case study along with its 
neighbours, or Martillo itself would have to be a single large case study that made up the 
entire thesis. 
 58 
Further complicating matters regarding Operation Martillo is that the U.S. is not the 
only military and/or security contributor. While the U.S. is still the most significant regional 
actor due to the security assets at its disposal and its geographical proximity, allies such as 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, also contribute to the initiative (United 
States Southern Command 2015). As a result, it would be multi-national foreign counter-
narcotics policy that would be subject to analysis, not just American. 
By contrast, Colombia, Mexico and the closely associated U.S. border have been 
security issues for far longer, going back to the 1980s with Colombia, and so far more 
sources exist to facilitate research. Also, U.S. counter-narcotics efforts are by far the most 
dominant in these theatres of operation and, other than the involvement of partner 
governments, is generally undiluted by other allied contributions, meaning that solely U.S. 
and U.S.-influenced militarisation can be analysed. 
 Other potential case studies for analysis outside of the Western Hemisphere were 
considered. Western Africa has become one of the new major drug trafficking routes, with 
Latin American cocaine crossing the Atlantic and up through to Europe’s porous 
Mediterranean coastline. This is facilitated by easy passage through lawless areas in the 
region and the complicity of organised crime and terrorist groups seeking funds, such as Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which recently held sway over vast tracts of Mali (Csete and 
Sánchez 2013). The United States, working with European partners and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has worked to strengthen drug enforcement strategy 
in the region31. However, like Operation Martillo, this is a relatively new policy endeavour, 
and so the same lack of available material and a continuously changeable operational 
environment meant that it would be less appropriate as a case study. 
 One significant U.S. foreign policy engagement where access to substantial amounts 
of material would have been unproblematic is the recent war in Afghanistan, where 
militarisation is clear and unambiguous. There was a recognition that the opium trade in 
Afghanistan was a contributor to instability in the country, and at times efforts were made 
against it by both U.S. civilian and military agencies, specifically the DEA and U.S. Special 
Forces assisting the Afghan military and police in eradication efforts (U.S. Senate 2010, p.2). 
There was, in short, a potentially wide array of sources to draw upon, and the study of the 
                                                 
31 The U.S. contributed $50 million through the West Africa Coast Initiative, also known as the West Africa 
Cooperative Security Initiative, to combat drug trafficking. This helped prop up a regional law enforcement 
training centre, provided support to Liberia’s Drug Enforcement Agency, helped develop specially-trained, 
DEA-vetted counter-narcotics investigative units in Ghana, and facilitated anti-corruption training in Sierra 
Leone (Gberie 2015, p.4; Rosen 2015, p.17). 
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extent of the militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan could have easily 
merited a case study or even a whole thesis dedicated to the subject. However, I decided 
against this for two reasons. The first was that Colombia, Mexico and the U.S. Southern 
Border all form part of a chain, and are intimately linked together by cocaine trafficking. 
Introducing Afghanistan as a case study would have been to potentially divert attention from 
the overall grand narrative of counter-narcotics policy initiatives that the U.S. has embarked 
upon in Latin America since at least the early-1980s. Also, the smuggling of cocaine and 
marijuana into the U.S. from this region is on a far larger scale – and thus a more potent issue 
– than Afghan heroin imports (U.S. Department of Justice 2009a; UNODC 2015a). Secondly, 
the war in Afghanistan was primarily about counter-terrorism and nation-building, with the 
security implications presented by the drug trade all too often overlooked or under-
appreciated (Schweich 2008). By contrast, U.S. foreign policy and counter-narcotics policy in 
Colombia have virtually become synonymous, while drug-related violence in Mexico and on 
the U.S. Southern Border have driven American security interests in those two areas high up 
the political agenda. America’s building-up of native security forces and the development of 
institutions in Afghanistan may be similar to efforts in Colombia and Mexico, but in the 
former it is directed at suppressing terrorism and insurgency, while in the latter two it is 
primarily aimed at combatting the drug trade in the direct U.S. national interest. 
 
3.5 The methods and sources employed during research 
 
The amount of time available to conduct research played an important role in the efficiency 
and viability of the qualitative research methods and sources that were selected to analyse the 
case studies discussed above. Secondary sources consisted of literature analysis, such as 
studying general and specialist texts on U.S. foreign and domestic counter-narcotics policy, 
and media analysis, principally reviewing news media sources. The main primary sources 
were found in online archives, and consisted of policy memos, budget allocation data and 
congressional reports, amongst other period and present-day documentation.  
 
3.5.1 Literature and Media Analysis 
 
Consulting dedicated academic literature on the topic was an obvious course of action, 
though specialist literature on the region, U.S. foreign counter-narcotics policy, and so on, 
was available both in the form of texts intended for consumption by the general public, as 
well as dedicated news media. General texts by experienced journalists and regional 
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specialists, such as The Last Narco by Malcolm Beith (2010), The Candy Machine by Tom 
Feiling (2009), Amexica by Ed Vulliamy (2010), and El Narco by Ioan Grillo (2010), 
explored the organisation, personnel and various minutia on both sides of the drug war in 
Latin America. These authors often have direct access to, and primary experiences of, the 
phenomenon. The information and interviews found within these texts, in addition to the 
statistics and data used to support their analyses, were useful in providing valuable context 
and nuanced understanding sometimes absent from academic articles or official policy 
documents. 
Yet, there was a need to exercise a degree of caution that the research was not subject 
to too much influence from such sources, as it was clear that they were secondary and not 
primary. As Ian Lustick argues, “the work of historians is not […] an unproblematic narrative 
from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited for the framing of problems and the 
testing of theories” (Lustick 1996, quoted in George and Bennett 2005, p.95). This is to say 
that such sources can be subject to the author’s personal feelings and methodological choices, 
as well as personal politics and the broader political climate at the time a text is written. 
Therefore, while such sources were important, I was careful not to confine the scope of my 
reading too narrowly. 
Similar to these texts, news media sources, in the form of newspaper and news 
magazine articles and reports, also provided useful information, often far more contemporary 
than books which were written at a certain time. Small but relevant articles in the American 
press about the outcome of an interdiction operation by U.S. or partner forces, for example, 
indicated how a counter-narcotics initiative was progressing, or at least how its effectiveness 
was being sold to the public. Feature and investigative articles in both UK and U.S. 
broadsheet newspapers such as The New York Times and Daily Telegraph, as well as news 
magazines such as Time, Newsweek and The Economist, revealed previously unknown factors 
in the drug war. One example was the support of the CIA in allowing Colombian forces to 
launch targeted killings of FARC leaders using U.S. made military technology; notionally a 
counter-narcotics campaign but utilising techniques developed during the War on Terror 
(Priest 2013). As with Lustick’s caution regarding secondary sources though, I had to be 
mindful of any overt bias on the part of the journalists authoring the articles and reports, 
considering whether the tone was neutral and a straight presentation of the facts, or if those 
facts supported a pro or anti-drug war stance. 
Such readily available physical and electronic sources by major established national 
newspapers and news magazines, were complimented by additional sources from the likes of 
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CNN and the BBC that related to the region and U.S. counter-narcotics efforts. These 
constituted important sources in the composition of the historical Chapter 4, and for the initial 
construction of the case studies and early, broad analysis of the extent of militarisation before 
inquiring deeper with primary sources. Drawing on such contemporary or relatively recent 
media accounts may not be a substitute for locating a declassified strategy or budget 
document when analysing the substance of a policy. However, they are important in 
recognising the social context of the time (and context, as I have suggested, is worth 
considering in securitisation) for even classified policy decisions are not made in a contextual 
vacuum, with policymakers either driving or reacting to the public or state priorities of the 
day (George and Bennett 2005, p.97). In the opinion of Deborah Larson, political scientists 
value causal variables such as domestic public opinion, images of the opponent, beliefs and 
ideology, analogical reasoning, or trust (Larson 2001, p.337), precisely because they help 
establish context, and some of the best windows into those variables comes in the form of 
media sources. However, Larson also emphasises the importance of primary – i.e. archival – 
sources to construct a policy analysis that is not unduly influenced by outside interpretations 
(Larson 2001, p.327 & p.342). 
 
3.5.2 Archival Research 
 
The sources noted above, derived from the literature and media, were important for 
establishing context and building a narrative, but are nevertheless classed as secondary 
sources. The main primary sources for the research were to be found in archives, albeit digital 
ones due to time constraints not allowing for physical visits. Online archiving and document 
scanning allowed ready access to important policy briefings, presidential memos, budgetary 
allocation documents, congressional reports, and the like, and so this increased the speed and 
efficiency of the research undertaken. These sources were important in helping to answer the 
research sub-questions linked to the three elements of militarisation, namely making military, 
institutionalisation and criteria of violence. It is worth highlighting a few examples to 
illustrate the point. 
For instance, in helping to answer the making military sub-question – i.e. how 
significant a role do the United States military and native Colombian and Mexican military 
forces play in counter-narcotics – I was able to analyse the original texts of several 
presidential national security directives relating to the increased involvement of U.S. military 
and intelligence assets in prosecuting counter-narcotics policy (White House 1986; 1989; 
1993). Likewise, reports by the Congressional Research Service and Government 
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Accountability Office concerning U.S. military involvement in counter-narcotics efforts in 
Latin America, and support for native forces, helped detail the scope, scale and policy 
intention of such initiatives (Beittel, J. 2013; U.S. Government Accountability Office 1998; 
2003; 2005; 2008). From a raw statistical perspective, various budget allocation breakdown 
documents, tables and charts produced by government departments under successive 
administrations offered an insight into the financial and logistical support the U.S. provided 
to Latin American partner states (U.S. Department of Defence 1998; 2010; USAID 2009), as 
well as to domestic law enforcement and federal agencies (Giratikanon, Parlapiano and 
White 2014; U.S. National Guard 2014). Native government sources also contributed, such as 
figures relating to the numbers of new military and security personnel trained for counter-
narcotics purposes in Colombia (Government of Colombia 2014). 
While its origins were in the twilight years of the Clinton Administration, the George 
W. Bush presidency saw the acceleration of Plan Colombia in terms of funding and support 
(in no small part due to the fallout of the 9/11 attacks), as well as the commencement of the 
Merida Initiative (launched in response to the drug violence in Northern Mexico). Therefore 
the electronic documents of the George W. Bush presidential museum and library in Dallas, 
Texas were utilised, with specific documents relating to counter-narcotics strategy accessed 
online, where declassified. The National Archives in Washington DC were also accessed 
online, in order to view material that related to general government activities relevant to the 
study. Additional material was also secured through broader internet research, with a focus 
on strategy documents, budget allocations and directives issued by the White House, the State 
Department and the Department of Defence, as well as Congressional reports for the 
purposes of oversight, all of which were accessible from publication or because they had 
been declassified. 
Regarding the sub-questions relating to institutionalisation and criteria of violence, 
both primary and secondary sources were used. The primary sources were as above, 
principally reports and statistics that built up a picture of whether militarised support and 
practice was sufficiently entrenched as to be regarded as institutionalised. For example, this 
could be in the form of budget tables showing annual allocation of monies to finance military 
and counter-narcotics spending over a number of years (Beittel, 2012). However, analyses in 
secondary sources that made use of such statistics and archival sources to interpret longer-
term trends, were equally valuable. These often came in the form of think-tank papers 
regarding the drug-related security situations in Colombia and Mexico, such as analyses 
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published by the Washington Office on Latin America (Meyer, 2014a; Isacson 2012) or the 
Woodrow Wilson Centre (Wilson and Weigend 2014). 
 Likewise for the criteria of violence element, it was often the case that raw data 
concerning number of deaths, civilians displaced, and so on, were useful in establishing just 
how bloody the Colombian drug conflict was versus the Mexican one, and how complicit 
native military and security forces were in such matters. Bodies such as Human Rights Watch 
(2011; 2013) and Justice in Mexico Project (2013) were rich sources of both mortality, 
kidnapping and displacement statistics, but also for accompanying analysis as to the real-
world social and policy consequences of those figures. It was in researching the violence 
associated with the drug conflicts in Colombia and Mexico, as well as certain areas on the 
U.S. Southern Border, that secondary sources such as media reports, feature articles and 
interviews also aided understanding and appreciation of the situation on the ground. Indeed, 
secondary sources were important for helping to establish a broader narrative and aided in 
understanding the perspectives of the time. This applied to both the historical chapter as well 
as contemporary case studies, especially sources from several years or even decades 
previously, from the outset of the War on Drugs. 
Ultimately, the types of primary sources mentioned above were important for 
collecting essential information. This included the official policy rationale for the deployment 
of military personnel or assets, the numbers of foreign troops trained, the amount of 
weaponry and equipment utilised for counter-narcotics purposes in the U.S. and abroad, and 
the levels of expenditure committed year on year to realise these policy decisions, as well as 
the potential institutional and violence side-effects of these policy decisions. Without these 
sources and the qualitative and quantitative data acquired from them, the task of establishing 
the extent of militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy – in relation to all the elements 
involved in the framework – would have been far more difficult. 
For all the advantages of utilising archival research, there were limitations in certain 
areas, mainly relating to security or the passage of time surrounding some sources. For 
instance, while they would have provided some valuable insights, documents concerning 
activities and operations by specific agencies, such as the CIA, were inaccessible for obvious 
security reasons, though the involvement of such agencies was sufficiently chronicled in 
journalistic reports and literature. While the issue of security classification of various sources 
was not an overwhelmingly problematic one, it nevertheless frustrated efforts to find more 
contemporary information about the state of U.S. foreign counter-narcotics support and 
involvement, with CIA-sanctioned assassinations of FARC leaders being one example that 
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only came to light following journalistic investigation. Likewise, the passage of time – or 
more specifically, lack of – had an impact on the number of viable case studies. For example, 
it would have been of interest to include Operation Martillo in this thesis as the natural and 
most recent successor initiative to Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative. However, there 
were simply not enough new and readily accessible sources to produce a case study equal to 
the others, due to current ongoing operations at the time of writing. 
 The main restriction on the archival research method was that, in comparison to other 
past conflicts and security initiatives, the Colombian and – especially – Mexican case studies 
are simply too recent for there to be vast troves of material waiting to be ‘discovered’, that 
could result in new perspectives. The oldest, Plan Colombia, is still technically ongoing and 
only commenced in 2000, while the Merida Initiative has been active for an even shorter 
period, since 2008. That said, there has still been sufficient time for enough useful material to 
become available, such as government and defence policy documents, statistics, 
congressional reports, expenditure charts, and so on. It has been in the interest of democratic 
transparency and promotion of the counter-narcotics agenda to make these resources 
accessible, and so there was still enough worthwhile material of historical and contemporary 
relevance to Colombia, Mexico and the U.S. Southern Border to make viable case studies. 
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter I have clarified that militarisation constitutes a framework and how it can be 
developed through abduction. I have explained why primarily qualitative/interpretive 
research methods were better suited to this study, but how quantitative sources of information 
have also added value. The logic behind choosing the case study model has been examined, 
along with why potential alternative cases were rejected in favour of the ones that were 
selected. I have also described the methods employed in this study, namely the utilisation of 
primary archival material as well as secondary literature, journalistic and media sources. 
Having explored the methodological foundations and research design of the thesis, the 
following Chapter 4 represents the beginning of the core study. It explores the essential 
history of U.S. counter-narcotics policy leading up to the two initiatives that comprise the 
case studies, those of Plan Colombia in Chapter 5 and the Merida Initiative in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Emergence of the U.S. ‘War on Drugs’ 
and the Militarisation of Counter-Narcotics 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have explored the frameworks of securitisation and militarisation, and 
the methodology involved in examining militarisation in the two case studies. This chapter 
serves as a bridge, seeking to link the securitisation of American counter-narcotics policy 
with the employment – or not – of militarised policy in Colombia, Mexico and the southern 
U.S. border. To this end, this chapter is a historical examination of the securitisation process 
concerning narcotics in the U.S., beginning at the turn of the 19th/20th Centuries. Noted 
throughout are examples promoting the securitisation of the drug issue through the 
encouragement of fear of the narcotics threat. This serves to establish context for the main 
portion of the chapter, which explores the launch of the drug war under the Nixon 
Administration with regards to the institutions created and policies pursued. Subsequent 
sections explore the furthering of that war into the realm of militarisation under the Reagan, 
Bush Sr. and Clinton Administrations, which chronologically lead to Plan Colombia. Firstly, 
however, we shall briefly explore how underlying American cultural inclinations could have 
helped advance the securitisation and gradual militarisation of counter-narcotics policy at 
home and, eventually, abroad. 
 
4.2 Cultural Considerations 
 
In formulating their securitisation framework, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde wanted to ensure 
that if “security issues are to count as security issues then they need to meet strictly defined 
criteria” (1998, p.5), in order to prevent a situation arising where anything can be securitised. 
Yet, as Holger Stritzel points out, the risk of only counting issues as securitisable if they meet 
these ‘strictly defined criteria’ is that they risk ignoring “the various ambivalences of multiple 
local usages in the actual socio-political fields of security” (2011, p.347). Stritzel supports 
this claim by referring to how: 
 
“The meaning of security as ‘national’, ‘military’ and/or ‘state security’, along with 
the notion of a ‘state of exception’, expresses a deliberate political intervention in 
U.S. post-World War II discourse that then became temporarily stable as a hegemonic 
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understanding and practice of security – yet arguably only in specific locales, such as 
(parts of) the U.S. security discourse.” (2011, p.347, emphasis in the original) 
 
The thrust of Stritzel’s point is a questioning of the universality of the criteria for 
securitisation when more nationally or culturally specific considerations may be significant 
factors. Whether Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde approved of supposed universality or not, that 
was the prevailing discourse, and so they had to retain this position if they ever hoped to 
reconcile traditionalist security thinking with application to a wider range of issues as they 
had called for. However, Stritzel’s point, while aimed at critiquing on an abstract theoretical 
level, does inadvertently support the notion that something specific to American identity, 
brought about by historical experience and cultural development, has helped determine its 
outlook as to what constitutes ‘security’ and has thus influenced the securitisation process in 
the U.S. The consequence is that illicit narcotics are perceived as a security threat requiring 
emergency measures to counteract.  
If drugs are largely seen as a threat to American society, then perhaps it is not 
surprising that the gradually militarised response to that threat arguably has, if not its origins 
in American cultural attitudes, then at least a source of unconscious support underpinning it. 
Chapter 2 explored the cultural interpretation of militarisation via language, such as, but not 
limited to, the employment of war-like language and metaphors in sports, especially in 
aggressive forms such as American football and ice hockey. Deborah Tannen suggests that 
“military metaphors train us to think about – and see – everything in terms of fighting, 
conflict, and war. This perspective then limits our imaginations when we consider what we 
can do about situations we would like to understand or change” (Tannen 1998, quoted in 
Thorne 2006, p.13)32. 
The prevalence of military-style language and ethic in the U.S. – and arguably mass 
admiration for, and deference to, the military as an institution (Malt 2012; O’Connell 2012) – 
is a curious phenomenon. Despite involvement in medium to small scale wars since 1945, no 
conflict has posed an existential threat that required the mass mobilisation and 
propagandising of American society, yet arguably militarised ‘media’ has only increased in 
scope and scale. For example, sophisticated war toys exist today, but are not a recent 
phenomenon. 
                                                 
32 Given that U.S. counter-narcotics policymakers and those bodies charged with implementing such policies are 
either part of, or influenced by, political-military institutions and their inherent militarised culture, it is hardly 
surprising that the militarised option has gained traction in the drug war, an example of a situation they ‘would 
like to understand or change’. 
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“By the late 1960s, parents could buy Green Beret dolls, records, comic strips, 
bubble-gum, puzzles and books for their children […] Montgomery Ward’s Christmas 
catalogue promised to send a Green Beret uniform and, for an additional six pounds, 
they would throw in an AR-15 rifle, pistol, flip–top military holster and a green 
beret.” (Bourke 1999, p.22-23) 
 
Ironically such merchandise was available at the height of the Vietnam War and significant 
disillusionment with American military efforts, and was accompanied by the jingoistic John 
Wayne 1968 film, The Green Berets, featuring such language as “the only good Vietcong is a 
dead one”. In examples of the spill-over between militarised popular culture and social and 
cultural attitudes, in 1971 the Marine Corps League named John Wayne the man who best 
exemplified the word “American”, and a U.S. fighter ace was proud to sport the tactical sign 
of ‘Duke’, after John Wayne, because he said he respected Wayne’s ‘American ideals’ 
(Bourke 1999, 25-26). 
 Movies have always exercised a hold on the popular imagination, and the cooperation 
exhibited between filmmakers and the Pentagon has at times reached such a degree that the 
term ‘Military-Entertainment Complex’ could be justifiably used. As Keegan suggests: 
 
“Over the decades, the relationship between Hollywood and the military has served 
the needs of both sides: Filmmakers gain access to equipment, locations, personnel 
and information that lend their productions authenticity, while the armed forces get 
some measure of control over how they're depicted […] important not just for 
recruiting but also for guiding the behaviour of current troops and appealing to the 
U.S. taxpayers.” (2011) 
 
Videogames have arguably eclipsed traditional audio-visual media in the amount of 
attention commanded by young people. 'Shooter’ franchises easily out-earn even the most 
popular Hollywood films and are played by millions across America, while only 70,000 
young people joined the actual U.S. Army in 2009 (Singer 2010). Such has been the 
popularity of this form of entertainment, that the Department of Defence even created its own 
free-to-access game America’s Army for recruitment and training purposes, which has 
become one of the most downloaded games of all time (Singer 2010; Power 2007, p.273). 
Indeed, the rise of the videogame as a – perhaps the – dominant form of entertainment 
for a youthful generation within the realm of modern popular culture, has seen the pastime 
being declared a professional sport. Cyber athletes compete for significant prizes, watched by 
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hundreds of thousands in stadiums or online, presided over by presenters and commentators 
(Tassi 2012). Such tournaments usually involve games with militaristic or violent 
dimensions, whether the object be the elimination of opponents or conquest of territory. 
Consequently, perhaps the kind of sports commentary previously referred to, such as 
‘destroying the enemy’ or ‘blitzing the field’, is no longer hyperbolic metaphor in eSports, 
but is actually suitably descriptive. 
 Examining this phenomenon is not to make a moral judgement, but is simply intended 
to demonstrate the gradual saturation of militarised imagery and conduct within significant 
sections of American popular culture. As highlighted above, leisure activities with militaristic 
associations have been present for years, from tales of glory and adventure in popular 
literature, to the passive viewing of military-oriented cinema and television, to the active 
schoolyard games of Cowboys and Indians or ‘playing army’. There have been cases in some 
U.S. school systems where attempts have been made to stamp out ‘militarised’ behaviour in 
young boys. However, it is believed that such ‘heroic’ play featuring ‘good guys’ and ‘bad 
guys’ is important to the social development, imagination and moral compasses of young 
males (Sommers 2013). To debate whether an ‘acceptable’ level of militarisation can be 
found in a society is best left to social scientists and psychologists. The essential point is that, 
in the same way that context – whether involving a country’s history, culture or traditional 
approaches towards security threats – is worth considering in the securitisation process, so 
should cultural militarisation, especially in America, also be considered when discussing the 
implementation of militarised policy in the drug war as a form of emergency measure. 
 America’s global predominance makes its strategic and diplomatic militarisation 
inherent even in times of peace due to its superpower status. The securitisation of an issue, 
however, effectively grants license for these assets to potentially be unleashed on the security 
threat in question. This is why the process of securitisation does not simply end when an 
issue is securitised. Whether militarised American popular and institutional culture has 
played a role, or that U.S. strategic supremacy has meant that militarised solutions are 
increasingly favoured (in accordance with Mark Twain’s comment ‘if all you have is a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail’), the impact of such factors on foreign policy 
formulation has translated into practical strategic action in Latin and North America. These 
include initial small scale training deployments, to Plan Colombia, through to Merida 
Initiative cooperation in Mexico and the militarisation of the U.S. side of the southern border. 
It is a process that began with the growing calls for a prohibitive regime for narcotics in the 
early 20th Century. 
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4.3 A Threat to the ‘Correct State of Mind’ 
 
At the turn of the 19th/20th Centuries most of the illicit drugs that today are regarded as the 
biggest threat were perfectly legal, or at least unregulated. Cocaine in various forms, from 
medicinal solutions designed to stimulate energy, to coca-based wine, to even syringe-and-
sample packages, was legally purchasable across the counter or by mail-order catalogue 
(Feiling 2009, p.17). However, advances in the chemical refinement of opiates and cocaine 
by the mid-19th Century yielded heroin and concentrated cocaine powder respectively. The 
concurrent increase in addictive quality saw medical and moral concerns grow for both the 
physical and spiritual health of individuals and the impact that this would have on American 
society. 
Though the inherent moral driver of American establishment distain for illicit drugs 
would have played a role – as trailed by the banning of opium in the U.S. controlled 
Philippines (Bewley-Taylor 1999, p.11) – the first broadly international counter-narcotics 
initiative piloted by the U.S. was the Shanghai Opium Commission in 190933. However, this 
and the Hague Opium Commission held three years later in 1912, were more regulatory than 
prohibitive. They sought to restrict the use of opium to medical and scientific purposes, and 
there were no serious measures to make production or use of such drugs illegal (Bewley-
Taylor and Jelsma 2012, p.73). Gradually, however, the focus moved to illicit rather than licit 
drug markets and the 1936 Conference for the Suppression of Illicit Drugs, held in Geneva, 
was the first to make drug trafficking an international crime (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 
2012, p.74). 
Domestically, in December 1914, the U.S. Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics 
Tax Act. This attempted to control the manufacture and distribution of opiates and cocaine in 
the U.S. through licensing and special taxation rather than outright prohibition or 
enforcement. However, several abuses where some clinics simply became wholesale 
narcotics distributors to supply all-comers resulted in the Supreme Court declaring such 
clinics illegal, whatever the medical intent, leading to the closure of some forty facilities and 
the arrest of 25,000 doctors between 1914 and 1938 (Epstein 1977, p.30 & p.104). While 
drug treatment would always be part of the counter-narcotics policy mix in later years, it 
would often be dwarfed by an emphasis on enforcement, as predicted by this episode, thanks 
                                                 
33 It was also a shrewd way for the U.S. to gain commercial access to the Chinese market by helping it to oppose 
the opium trade, which had caused China so much social damage by dramatically increasing the number of 
opium addicts in its population. 
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to the growing view that narcotics vice was something to be combatted rather than managed 
or indulged. 
In the U.S., temperance and fear played significant roles in the politicisation and 
ultimate securitisation of that vice, principally consummation and use of alcohol and illicit 
drugs, before the former was de-securitised while the latter remains so34 . Possessing an 
underlying social bedrock of strong Christian values, it is not surprising that the U.S. proved 
to be such a fertile environment for the growth of various interest movements in the later 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Whether out of a sense of righteousness or social conscience, groups 
such as the Anti-Saloon League and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, played a role 
in influencing the political process and policy-thinking of the American government through 
their lobbying activities and overt campaigns (Behr 1998, p.45-47 & 55-56). 
A good example of the influence of the temperance movement comes in the form of 
Captain Richmond Hobson, an elected political figure whose reputation was already 
enhanced by his status as a military hero of the Spanish-American War. Hobson launched a 
moral crusade against heroin from the mid-1920s, aided by the temperance groups mentioned 
above, as well as other entities such as the Moose, the Kiwanis, the Knights of Columbus and 
various Masonic orders (Epstein 1977, p.28). Hobson created the World Narcotic Association 
and Narcotic Defence Foundation to ‘defend society’ against the perils of narcotic addiction. 
In addition to distributing substantial amounts of educational material to schools and media, 
he took to the radio waves to lecture millions of Americans. All of this, in the absence of 
concrete scientific studies at the time, “created for a large segment of the American public the 
stereotype of an addict as a vampire-like creature with an insatiable appetite for crime and 
destruction and a need to infect with his disease all who came into contact with him” (Epstein 
1977, p.29). 
Such encouragement of fear would be repeated for political effect several decades 
later by actors in the same vein as Hobson, seeking to legitimise emergency measures by 
securitising such a threat. The policies of various presidential administrations are discussed 
below, but another prominent example of an influential actor with a visible platform was 
Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York from 1959 to 1973 and future Vice-President 
under Gerald Ford. Using his vast family wealth, political savvy, and experience as a 
                                                 
34 Alcohol prohibition in the U.S. during the 1920s was a prime example of an issue becoming politicised and 
securitised, at least in the realm of law enforcement. I have chosen not to explore this phenomenon and instead 
focus on the kinds of illicit narcotics that have developed negative social connotations, i.e. opiates, cocaine, and 
the like. Alcohol may also be a potentially addictive substance with the capacity for social harm, but its 
consumption has been a generally accepted social practice in Western society for centuries, and even if frowned 
upon in certain circumstances, does not meet with the same taboo, fear and hostility as solicited by drugs. 
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propagandist in Latin America during World War II, he was able to latch onto the supposed 
epidemic of heroin addicts in his state to encourage public fear. Embracing the earlier view of 
drug addiction as an infectious disease spread by addicts, Rockefeller declared that the 
problem had “reached the proportions of a plague and was threatening the lives of middle-
class children”, and he “demanded an all-out war on drugs and addiction” (Epstein 1977, 
p.38-39). This involved rushing through emergency measures providing for the involuntary 
confinement of addicts for up to five years of treatment, even if they had not been found 
guilty of a crime35, and despite the fact that no effective treatment or rehabilitation actually 
took place (Epstein 1977, p.38-39). 1966 was an election year and such measures burnished 
Rockefeller’s law and order credentials that aided his re-election. Subsequent statistics were 
suitably flexible to encourage public security concerns on some occasions (e.g. rocketing 
increases in addicts to demonstrate the need for greater police measures and more judges) or 
to show that such measures were working (e.g. the number of addicts plummeting when 
referenced in important public speeches) (Epstein 1977, p.40-41). 
Examples such as Hobson and Rockefeller demonstrated the inherent hard line taken 
by the American political establishment against activities and mind-sets that deviated from 
the perceived ‘correct state of mind’ (Van Duyne and Levi 2005, p.3). Such pursuits, when 
encountering the intolerance of a temperance position, or portrayed as a threat to middle-class 
values and youth, will solicit a form of fear, prevalent in the securitisation of an issue, for: 
 
"Fear is a state of mind which can be aroused, strengthened, nursed and maintained, 
not as a self-propelling autonomous process, but by interested parties, like the church, 
the bureaucracy and the ruling elites (if any) which are their main stakeholders. An 
example is fear of deviant or non-conforming behaviour or attitudes […] considered a 
subversive challenge to social stability." (Van Duyne and Levi 2005, p.1-2) 
 
Returning to the international response to such perceived threats, it was the UN Single 
Convention on Narcotics Drugs in 1961, heavily influenced by U.S. input, which highlighted 
the moral and social motivators that underlie American drugs policy. In its preamble, the 
parties involved expressed their concern “with the health and welfare of mankind” and 
recognised “that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is 
fraught with social and economic danger to mankind” (United Nations 1961, p.1, emphasis 
                                                 
35 Similar emergency measures exist today, as with the forcible roundups of crack addicts for enforced treatment 
in Brazil, which could rightly claim to be experiencing a crack epidemic, whereas evidence for Rockefeller’s 
claims was far more contentious. See (BBC 2013a). 
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added). The use of the word ‘evil’ renders the text with a quasi-religious, moralising tone, 
portraying illicit drugs and associated trafficking and addiction as a threat to the health and 
welfare of mankind. Protecting people and society went to the heart of its reasoning for 
prohibition. The Single Convention went further than its predecessor treaties had, coming 
close to establishing a fully-fledged international prohibition regime, had negotiations not 
allowed for national authorities to decide on their own which narcotics to ban, or allow for 
medical purposes (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 2012, p.80). Indeed, the consequences of the 
Single Convention would extend down the decades, for it also introduced: 
 
“Widely accepted penal obligations for signatory states to criminalise, under their 
domestic law, unlicensed production and trade and extended the pre-existing control 
regime to the cultivation of opium poppy, coca and cannabis. In this way, the 
Convention provided the international legal basis for the ‘war on drugs’ approach 
against drug-related crops and farmers that developed later.”  
(Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 2012, p.80, emphasis added) 
 
The approach would focus on producing countries, which preserved the American 
perspective that supply was the main issue above that of domestic demand (Crick 2012, 
p.410). It was a view that would heavily influence counter-narcotics strategy towards Latin 
America when the drug war gradually began to militarise from the Reagan Administration 
onwards. Firstly, however, the drug war had to be declared. 
 
4.4 The Nixon Administration and Successors 1969-1981 
 
One of the main policy platforms of the successful 1968 Nixon election campaign was the 
issue of law and order, and that a Nixon Administration would ‘get tough’ to reduce 
nationwide levels of crime. As a consequence there was clear political incentive to 
demonstrate to the electorate in the next 1972 election a record of crime reduction (Epstein 
1977, p.64). However, the main flaw in this ambition was that, beyond Washington D.C., the 
federal government had neither the jurisdiction nor power to combat crimes such as 
homicide, assault, burglary and the like, which fell to state and local authorities. With no 
direct way of eroding the national crime figures, alternative approaches were sought. 
A solution presented itself with the realisation that one of the major areas of criminal 
activity where federal agencies could have immediate and dramatic impacts on crime 
statistics was in narcotics enforcement. The main argument was that crime statistics could be 
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lowered by dealing with the problem of addicts – who it was believed became criminally 
minded or deranged after consumption of drugs, or at least resorted to crime to fund their 
habits. Also, higher arrest figures for traffickers and distributors would demonstrate the 
reality of the ‘get tough’ approach to crime, a potentially win-win situation, statistically at 
least (Epstein 1977, p.77). A nationwide methadone (heroin replacement) treatment 
programme was developed to attempt to break the addiction of addicts, and thus their ‘need’ 
to commit crime36. At the same time the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), 
and the Bureau of Customs, conducted drug enforcement domestically and internationally, 
while the State Department and National Security Council were charged with overseeing it 
abroad on more diplomatic levels, combatting the supply of heroin into the U.S. at the source 
(Epstein 1977, p.78). 
 Latin America saw some notionally successful counter-narcotics efforts clash with 
broader foreign policy priorities, as demonstrated by two events in Mexico and Panama. 
Operation Intercept in September 1969 saw two thousand U.S. customs and border-patrol 
agents deployed along the Mexican border, where during a three-week period over five 
million travellers were searched for illicit narcotics, yielding little in the way of contraband 
but generating positive publicity for Administration policy (Epstein 1977, p.83-84). Growing 
public complaints and protests from the Mexican government saw the initiative quietly 
shelved under State Department pressure, though the Administration claimed the main goal 
of encouraging the Mexican government to step up its own efforts at drug interdiction had 
been achieved, aided by a $1 million grant for the purchase of light aircraft for such purposes 
(Epstein 1977, p.83-84). In Panama in February 1971, where delicate negotiations were 
underway regarding sovereignty over the Canal Zone, the BNDD snatched a senior 
Panamanian official suspected of facilitating the shipment of narcotics. While the BNDD had 
fulfilled the orders of White House strategists that it was “expected to arrest and bring to trial 
at least one major international trafficker to give the entire foreign [counter-narcotics] 
                                                 
36 Initially developed as a substitute for morphine during World War II, later research in the U.S. found that 
methadone could block the euphoric effects of heroin and be introduced as a substitute in an effort to wean 
addicts off it, or at least regulate their intake with a controlled alternative. City and state authorities, supported 
by the federal efforts of the Nixon Administration, introduced methadone treatment clinics, especially in New 
York City. Far from being a potential silver bullet to address the heroin problem however, methadone 
predominantly turned out to be a stop gap for most addicts until the price of heroin came down, or it was used 
interchangeably with other drugs rather than gradually weaning addicts off their habit. Despite some small 
successes, the statistics speak to the general failure of the programme, or at least its original intention to 
radically reduce addiction levels: in the mid-1960s there were 60,000 heroin addicts in New York City, but by 
1989 there were more than 200,000 (Maier 1989) 
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crusade credibility” (Epstein 1977, p.96), it had done so at the expense of sparking a 
diplomatic incident that had risked U.S. control of the Panama Canal. 
Whatever the perceived successes and failures of these initiatives, they needed public 
and political support37, as per the requirement of the successful securitisation of a threat, or as 
Epstein describes it: 
 
“Before a heroin crusade could be properly launched, public attention had to be 
focused on the drug menace […] If Americans could be persuaded that their lives and 
the lives of their children were being threatened by a rampant epidemic of narcotics 
addiction, Nixon’s advisors presumed that they would not object to decisive 
government actions, such as no-knock warrants, pre-trial detention, wiretaps, and 
unorthodox strike forces – even if the emergency measures had to cross or circumvent 
the traditional rights of a suspect.” (1977, p.138 & p.165) 
 
Prior to a planned June, 1971 address to Congress, in which Nixon declared a national 
emergency, American ambassadors were recalled from various countries over the drug issue 
to begin stoking the fires of publicity and public concern. Much was made of the ‘success’ of 
Operation Intercept, and radio and television networks became eager to donate advertisement 
time to public information campaigns about the drug threat, to incorporate drug themes into 
their dramas, or even to create new dramas that focused on drug enforcement (Epstein 1977, 
p.165-172). 
The public awareness campaign cumulated in Nixon’s Special Message to Congress 
on June 17th, 1971, where language indicative of a speech act/securitising move included: 
 
“We must now candidly recognize that the deliberate procedures embodied in present 
efforts to control drug abuse are not sufficient in themselves. The problem has 
assumed the dimensions of a national emergency. I intend to take every step 
                                                 
37 Some initiatives remained ‘off the books’ however, such as one suggested strategy which sought to channel 
millions of dollars into a clandestine slush fund for the purposes of ‘destroying or immobilising the highest level 
of drug traffickers’, a euphemism for assassination. The effort was run through the BNDD, though the intention 
was never to make it accountable, and a CIA colonel with experience of coups and assassinations was recruited 
as the bureau’s head of strategic intelligence. Egil Krough, a senior White House official with responsibility for 
organising and overseeing the Administration’s counter-narcotics campaign, claimed that the only narcotics 
assassinations were in South East Asia as the CIA lured various traffickers into traps set by rivals, though other 
assistants indicated that some action was taken against the Latin American connection (See Epstein 1977, p.141-
146). Whatever the actual outcome of the initiative, if assassination was considered to be a legitimate tool, then 
while this does not reflect a growing militarisation of counter-narcotics, it does indicate that foreign espionage 
and potentially lethal techniques were introduced into what had mainly been a domestic law-enforcement and 
foreign-diplomatic strategy towards combatting narcotics, opening a door that would make it easier for 
militarisation to ultimately step through. 
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necessary to deal with this emergency […] Despite the magnitude of the problem, 
despite our very limited success in meeting it […] we nevertheless have thus far failed 
to develop a concerted effort to find a better solution to this increasingly grave threat 
[…] To wage an effective war against heroin addiction, we must have international 
cooperation. In order to secure such cooperation, I am initiating a worldwide 
escalation in our existing programs for the control of narcotics traffic.” (Nixon 1971, 
emphasis added) 
 
Shortly after his message, Nixon drove home the point to a meeting of media executives by 
declaring that, “drug traffic is public enemy number one domestically in the United States 
today and we must wage a total offensive, worldwide, nationwide, government-wide, and 
[…] media-wide” (Epstein 1977, p.178, emphasis added). Such securitising rhetoric by 
officials, amplified and enhanced by a helpful media, achieved the purpose of raising 
awareness of the drug threat in the public consciousness38. Private polling by the White 
House showed that citizens in cities which had few if any heroin issues still believed drugs to 
be a leading threat to their safety (Epstein 1977, p.172), paving the way for acceptance of the 
required emergency measures. 
In addition to making emergency measures such as Operation Intercept acceptable, 
the speech acts and securitising rhetoric used by Nixon and previous likeminded public 
figures allowed for institutional changes to be made, which would entrench drug enforcement 
domestically and abroad. A prime example was the gradual evolution of federal 
organisations, which saw their budgets and resources steadily grow thanks to a Congress 
unwilling to be seen as weak on crime by denying law enforcement the tools to do the job. 
The Bureau of Customs successfully made the case for the quadrupling of its narcotics 
interdiction budget between 1969-1970. It invested in a computerised system for collating 
intelligence on global narcotics traffic, as well as helicopters, drug dogs and an expanded 
force of agents to pursue international investigations (Epstein 1977, p.113). Yet the Bureau of 
Customs was one of multiple agencies and bodies dedicated to drug enforcement, and the 
increasing fragmentation and turf-wars over responsibilities needed addressing. In his Special 
                                                 
38 Alternatively, Thomas Johnson and Wayne Wanta (1996) suggest that, rather than Nixon driving public 
concern, he was merely responding to it. Using a path analysis model, they suggest that real world conditions set 
into motion the process of agenda-building during the early drug war (p.189). Increased drug arrests in the real 
world were picked up by the press. The press in turn devoted more coverage to the drug issue, which increased 
its salience in the minds of the public. Finally, the Nixon Administration reacted to this public concern by 
paying increased attention to drugs in policy and public statements. This was possibly in an effort to capture the 
support of middle-class voters worried about their family’s and community’s susceptibility to drugs, or to later 
compensate for growing negative views of Nixon as the Watergate scandal unfolded (p.189). 
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Message to Congress, Nixon not only sought to elucidate the narcotics threat, but to pave the 
way for fundamental institutional change. He declared that: 
 
“Our efforts have been fragmented through competing priorities, lack of 
communication, multiple authority, and limited and dispersed resources. The 
magnitude and the severity of the present threat will no longer permit this piecemeal 
and bureaucratically-dispersed effort at drug control. If we cannot destroy the drug 
menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us.” (Nixon 1971, emphasis 
added) 
  
Consequently, in 1973, Nixon sent Reorganisation Plan No.2 for Congressional scrutiny. 
Upon approval, an Executive Order in July of that year drew the numerous agency threads 
together and created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a ‘super agency’ at the 
Department of Justice. It combined and streamlined the BNDD, U.S. Customs Drug 
Investigation, the Office of National Narcotics Intelligence, the Office of Drug Abuse Law 
Enforcement, and the Narcotics Advance Research Management Team (Drug Enforcement 
Administration Museum 2014). It enjoyed a significant budget, staff and offices around the 
globe. 
The DEA’s growth into the hugely resourced, internationally connected agency it is 
today reflects the exponential growth of the drug war since Nixon’s declaration. Its budget 
for 2014 was $2.87 billion, while it has over 222 domestic offices in the U.S., 86 offices in 67 
countries around the world, and collectively employs more than 9,300 staff (Drug 
Enforcement Administration 2014a). This is in comparison to 1,470 staff and $74.9 million 
budget the DEA had at its disposal when it was formed in 1973 (Drug Enforcement 
Administration Museum 2014). It was a growth that did not necessarily guarantee 
militarisation. Initiatives from domestic methadone treatment, to intensive border inspection 
with Mexico, to involuntary extradition in Panama, bore little if any trace of overt military 
involvement, resource or cultural practice, despite the use by Nixon and various officials of 
words such as ‘war’, ‘crusade’ and ‘offensive’. Such rhetoric aside, if examined in its 
entirety, it can be reasonably claimed that the initial, early-stage ‘war on drugs’ was 
essentially metaphorical, and that the forces deployed in it were predominantly law 
enforcement-based, supported in a secondary capacity by medical treatment. It would take 
presidencies after Nixon to progressively overtly militarise counter-narcotics policy, 
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especially in Latin America, as that region came to be seen as the most potent source of the 
drug threat. 
 
Nixon’s two immediate successors essentially held the line when dealing with the narcotics 
issue. Under President Ford, a 1975 White Paper on Drug Abuse confirmed “the validity of 
the basic Federal strategy of a balanced attack on both the supply and demand for drugs” 
(Cannon 1975). It highlighted the growing emphasis on international drug enforcement and 
disrupting supply – especially with regards to Latin America – by recommending that “a 
higher priority be given to development of international cooperation in preventing illicit 
production of drugs and that special attention be given to Mexico as the major source country 
for U.S. markets” (Cannon 1975). Ford endorsed this foreign counter-narcotics policy in his 
1976 message to Congress, when he stated that “we must continue to provide technical and 
equipment assistance through cooperative enforcement efforts with U.S. agents stationed 
overseas, all aimed at strengthening drug control organizations within foreign countries” 
(Ford 1975). 
It was a policy goal that could easily be stated today, and one that manifested itself 
diplomatically in Ford’s dialogue with the leaders of Mexico and Colombia, the U.S. 
Attorney General’s discussions with his Mexican counterpart concerning drug control 
problems, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s engagement with senior officials 
throughout Latin American on the narcotics issue (Ford 1975). Under President Carter the 
status quo approach essentially remained, with various domestic laws toughened up, 
including the right of law enforcement to seize assets from arrested traffickers and 
distributors39. However, in a gradual shift that was to have repercussions for the focusing of 
the drug war mainly onto Latin America, the late 1970s saw cocaine emerge as a serious 
issue, along with associated violence. 
Concerns about drug use, especially of marijuana by youth, abounded, with one-in-ten 
18 year olds reportedly indulging in it each day, and two-thirds of 18-25 year olds admitting 
to having tried some kind of illegal drug, including 22 million Americans admitting to 
cocaine use (Feiling 2009, p.38). Such numbers meant high demand, and thus significant 
profits to be made. By 1979, cocaine ranked as one of Florida’s biggest imports, totalling $10 
                                                 
39 Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen (1998, p.40-41) contend that such laws generated the perverse incentive for 
law enforcement agencies to increasingly turn to asset seizures and drug-enforcement-related federal grants in 
order to compensate for budgetary shortfalls. This, as a consequence, helped produce self-financing law-
enforcement agencies, whether local, state or federal, that were divorced from any meaningful legislative 
oversight. 
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billion a year, and the competition between Colombian and Cuban traffickers saw a drug-
related murder in Miami every day (Feiling 2009, p.38-39). Violence spilled over into regular 
life, with one notorious incident featuring cartel assassins murdering two competitors in 
broad daylight at the Miami Dadeland shopping mall, spraying automatic weapons fire 
indiscriminately as they fled (Posner 2009). It portended a record increase in the Miami 
murder rate – 349 in 1979; 569 in 1980; 621 in 1981 – as the Colombian Cali and Medellin 
organisations violently displaced Cuban rivals and then turned on each other. It was a spiral 
of violence that fed media interest, which in turn promoted fear. The likes of Time magazine 
declared Miami to be America’s ‘crime-capital’, supported by statements such as “I’ve been 
through two wars and no combat zone is as dangerous as Dade County”, uttered by one 
prominent businessman (Posner 2009). 
If drugs were regarded as a moral and social concern, measured in crime figures and 
numbers of addicts, then the trade behind them quickly came to be viewed as a greater 
security threat. It had turned certain cities and areas of the U.S. into battlegrounds that posed 
a direct threat to public safety and law and order. The pendulum had swung from a market for 
heroin to a taste for cocaine. The dominance of Latin America in the production of that drug, 
and of spawning cartels that trafficked it and waged war over its proceeds, meant that a 
forceful and proactive response was required to meet this emerging threat. 
 
4.5 The Reagan Administration 1981-1989 
 
In 1986, President Reagan invoked a specifically militarised period of American history to 
highlight the nation’s tradition of combatting evil, in this case the threat of illicit drugs: 
 
“My generation will remember how we swung into action when we were attacked in 
World War Two. This war was not just fought by the fellows flying the planes or 
driving the tanks, but also at home by a mobilised nation. Well, now we’re in another 
war for our freedom, and it’s time for all of us to pull together again.” (Feiling 2009, 
p.64) 
 
If Nixon had declared what was essentially a metaphorical War on Drugs, then Reagan would 
begin the process of transforming such rhetoric into action and introduce militarised elements 
into what had primarily been a law-enforcement and diplomacy-focused campaign40. 
                                                 
40 Diplomatic avenues were still important, even with an increased emphasis on enforcement. Within months of 
the Reagan Administration taking office, the 1979 extradition treaty between the U.S. and Colombia was finally 
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Federal authorities estimated that by 1980, 70 percent of all cocaine and marijuana 
entering the country passed through South Florida (Posner 2009). In response to drug-fuelled 
violence in Miami, Reagan highlighted the problem and identified the possible solution: 
 
“Massive immigration, rampant crime, and epidemic drug smuggling have created a 
serious problem. It is my belief that the Federal Government has a special 
responsibility to […] do what it can to reduce and, hopefully, eliminate these 
problems.”              (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library 2014) 
 
Shortly afterwards, in January 1982, the South Florida Drug Task Force was formed and 
steered at a Cabinet level under Vice President George Bush. The task force combined 
personnel from several different agencies, including the DEA, FBI, Customs, Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It was designed to squeeze 
the cartels logistically through enforcement and interdiction, as well as financially, and 
provided a template for similar task forces in other troubled areas. Most relevantly, the task 
force marked the first time that the U.S. military – albeit on a small scale – were actively 
deployed with the objective of drug interdiction, with elements of the Army and Navy 
mobilised to patrol the South Florida coast and surrounding waters (DEA Museum 2014). 
Such initiatives highlighted the potential for military or associated assets to be used in 
counter-narcotics on an operational level, but the floodgates of domestic drug war 
militarisation were opened in 1981 with the passage of the Military Cooperation and Law 
Enforcement Act. This allowed extensive sharing of drug interdiction intelligence, training, 
tactics, technology and weaponry between the Pentagon and federal, state and local police 
departments (Balko 2006, p.7). In allowing such measures, as justified by the securitised 
threat of illicit narcotics and, increasingly, the groups responsible for trafficking them, the 
Act began eroding the Posse Comitatus Act, a Civil-War era law that prohibited the use of the 
military for civilian policing. Military personnel were technically still absent from domestic 
law enforcement, with the exception of the drug patrols of the National Guard and Coast 
Guard, allowed by the loophole of them being state rather than federally controlled. 
However, when increasingly paramilitary police forces were gaining access to the kind of 
intelligence, training and weaponry as used by the Pentagon, then the lines between civilian 
                                                                                                                                                       
ratified, raising the possibility of drug traffickers being tried and serving harsh sentences in the U.S. Such fears 
would later spark violent campaigns in Colombia by the likes of Pablo Escobar in an attempt to force the 
Colombian government not to extradite. Though they resulted in the annulment and banning of extradition in 
Colombia for a time, such campaigns only added to the security issues that prompted the militarising of the drug 
war. 
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enforcement and military force became increasingly blurred, especially when the Clinton 
Administration later accelerated the policy. 
During Reagan’s second term, the drug war was still a major priority but remained 
unresolved. Arguably, the issue of illicit narcotics originating in Latin America was getting 
worse. By the mid-1980s cocaine was no longer the preserve of those who could afford it, for 
crack cocaine, a potent and far cheaper alternative, was flourishing. Poor communities and 
inner-cities were being devastated just as during the earlier heroin scare, especially in New 
York City, where an estimated one million of the nation’s five million cocaine users resided 
(Gross 1985). A phenomenally addictive substance, the hunger for crack meant a demand for 
more cocaine powder to produce it, thus the need for increased supply and trafficking41. 
 A consequence of the government trying to address the problem was the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, one of the most punitive legislations of the drug war (U.S. Congress 
1986). Title 1 was named ‘Anti-Drug Enforcement’, and set the tone for the entire act. 
Domestically, hundreds of millions of dollars were set aside for new prisons and drug 
education and treatment, and its most consequential domestic action was the introduction of 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offences, whatever the context or rationale. Of 
particular interest is the content of Title 3, ‘Interdiction’, particularly in relation to efforts in 
foreign theatres. Its principal findings state that, as well as domestic efforts: 
 
“A balanced, coordinated multifaceted strategy for combating the narcotics drug 
abuse and trafficking in the United States should include […] source country drug 
eradication […] increased emphasis on stopping narcotics traffickers in countries 
through which drugs are transhipped […and] increased emphasis on the interdiction 
of drugs and drug smugglers at the borders of the United States, in the air, at sea, and 
on the land.”           (U.S. Congress 1986) 
                                                 
41 However, the perception that high murder and crime rates were as a result of psychological disturbance 
caused by drugs was disputed when 218 ‘drug related’ murders in New York City in 1988 were examined. Only 
five were found to have been caused by the psychoactive effects of crack cocaine, in comparison to 21 which 
were caused by alcohol consumption, with the remainder attributable to ‘turf wars’ among rival drug gangs 
(Baum 1993, p.71). Likewise, the government assertion of the time that cocaine was an instantly addictive 
substance was undermined by figures produced by its own Government Accountability Office, which found that 
of the more than 6 million Americans who used cocaine in 1990, one-tenth used it weekly and only 5.4 percent 
of all users consumed it daily (Baum 1993, p.71). Such findings challenged the attitude both of the time and 
during previous years by the likes of Hobson, Rockefeller and Nixon’s advisors, that drug consumption 
precipitated a direct moral decline in a user or addict, or that they became crime-embracing slaves to drugs. In 
other words, empirical evidence started to suggest that the predominantly morality-based motivator for the 
prohibition of drugs was neglecting the true social and economic complexity surrounding the issue. 
Nevertheless, the predominance of a morality argument and the presence of a threat to the ‘correct state of 
mind’ persisted beyond the Reagan Administration, with ONDCP director William Bennett, for example, 
declaring in 1989 that “[Drug use] makes a mockery of virtue” (Baum 1993, p.72). 
 81 
Such recommendations not only established the template for foreign counter-narcotics 
objectives for the following three decades, but also endorsed a more proactive role for the 
U.S. military in such operations. Further findings stated that: 
 
“The Department of Defence and the use of its resources should be an integral part of 
a comprehensive, national drug interdiction programme […and] since the amendment 
of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1981, the Department of Defence has assisted in the 
effort to interdict drugs, but they can do more.” 
(U.S. Congress 1986, emphasis added) 
 
The appeal for, and approval of, increased and proactive involvement of the Department of 
Defence (henceforth DOD) was crucial in the militarisation of the drug war. Even if U.S. 
military resources were not fully unleashed in a true ‘war’ on drugs, the act nevertheless 
allowed a green light for the Reagan Administration and its successors to actively involve the 
U.S. military and intelligence establishment in counter-narcotics without fear of 
congressional complaint or sanction. In the spirit of the DOD ‘doing more’, while the 
legislation was passed in October 1986, the Reagan Administration had sought to make early 
headway on the participation of the military, and justification thereof, with the issuing of 
National Security Decision Directive 221 the previous April, which deemed that: 
 
“The expanding scope of global narcotics trafficking has created a situation which 
today adds another significant dimension to the law enforcement and public health 
aspects of this international problem and threatens the national security of the United 
States.”                (White House 1986, p.1, emphasis added) 
 
To deal with such a threat, the policy implementation section charged the Secretary of 
Defence, in conjunction with the Attorney General and Secretary of State, to: 
 
“Develop and implement any necessary modifications to applicable statutes, 
regulations, procedures, and guidelines to enable U.S. military forces to support 
counter-narcotics efforts more actively, consistent with the maintenance of force 
readiness and training.”                 (White House 1986, p.3, emphasis added) 
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In addition, the resources of America’s intelligence community were also mobilised with the 
directives that: 
 
“The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General and 
other relevant agencies, and acting in accordance with E.O. 1233342, should enhance, 
where appropriate, support of the drug enforcement effort targeted against 
international drug traffickers” and that “The Director of Central Intelligence should 
ensure that the intelligence community gives special emphasis […] on all aspects of 
the international illicit drug trade.”            (White House 1986, p.4, emphasis added) 
 
As can be seen with repeated references to the Attorney General and the language used, the 
involvement of military and intelligence resources was intended to be in support of the law-
enforcement establishment, notionally the principal security actor against illicit drug 
trafficking, as well as with foreign governments and their native security forces. It was 
because law-enforcement was supposed to take the lead, that elements of the defence 
establishment took issue with the idea of the military going beyond a supporting role and 
becoming a de-facto lead counter-narcotics agency. In 1988 the Secretary of Defence 
himself, Frank Carlucci, publicly stated that while the military should be supportive, he was 
''very much against giving the military arrest authority or getting them into law 
enforcement''43, a sentiment that echoed the position of the preceding Defence Secretary, 
Casper Weinberger (New York Times 1988)44. 
As a demonstration of such supporting operations – with non-arrest caveats intact – 
Operation Blast Furnace set the tone. Three months after NSDD 221, a contingent of U.S. 
Army Blackhawk helicopters were deployed from their station in Panama to Bolivia to 
provide air transportation to native counter-narcotics police in an effort to locate and destroy 
cocaine labs. Under the direction of civilian DEA personnel, the army provided the means for 
                                                 
42 Executive Order 12333 was intended to strengthen the effectiveness of intelligence agencies and promote 
better information sharing between them - especially the CIA - and other federal agencies. The full text can be 
found at: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html 
43 This rebuke was in response to another Administration official, Education Secretary – and future ONDCP 
director – William Bennett’s suggestion that the U.S. consider ''a broader use of military force against both the 
production and shipment of drugs'’ (New York Times 1988). This was an example of how, often, politicians 
would take a more militant stance towards counter-narcotics than the military itself preferred. In 1988, 
presidential candidate and Republican Senator, Bob Dole, had also called for using “the full force of our 
military” in the drug war (New York Times 1988). 
44 This was a few years prior to the end of the Cold War, and before the Bush Administration entered office, 
with both events swinging the argument in favour of more military intervention, due to either exploiting military 
resources to take on new challenges after the fall of communism, or a more pro-active counter-narcotics stance 
by Bush Administration officials. See the below section on the Bush Administration 1989-1993. 
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under-resourced and undertrained Bolivians to disrupt cocaine manufacturing for the four 
months they were deployed. Yet, as soon as they left, production and export returned to 
normal, in addition to the corruption and complicity observed in many Bolivian officers 
while the U.S. military were in theatre (Abbott 1988, p.95). Ironically, as this operation 
unfolded, NSDD 221 began to take effect and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act navigated its way 
through Congress. Investigations also commenced into the involvement of the CIA and State 
Department in aiding drug traffickers to fund the Contras in their anti-Sandinista revolt in 
Nicaragua. This demonstrated that – just as with Mexico and Panama during Nixon’s time – 
broader foreign policy priorities could still eclipse drug war concerns when geo-strategically 
convenient (Scott and Marshall 1991, p.8-9). 
Towards the end of the Reagan Administration, international diplomatic efforts were 
also revisited and revised, and reflected the evolution of the drug war into a struggle between 
the state and an organised criminal enemy. The latter had become a more solid and definable 
threat, that in theory could be physically beaten through enforcement, rather than dealing 
with the more abstract and health-related issue of drug addiction. The 1988 UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances toned down the 
moralising of 1961 and instead took a more sober assessment of the threat the drug trade 
presented, declaring recognition of: 
 
“The links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which 
undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and 
sovereignty of States” and how “transnational criminal organizations […] penetrate, 
contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and 
financial business, and society at all its levels.” 
       (United Nations 1988, p.1, emphasis added) 
 
While concern for the health and wellbeing of society was still apparent, such language made 
clear that it was now the state itself that was threatened by the consequences of the drug 
trade, in economic, security and governmental terms, not just moral or societal. The issue had 
become effectively securitised. Emily Crick argues that the shift towards a state-based way of 
thinking allowed room for the war-metaphor regarding combatting drugs to enter into the 
discourse (2012, p.411), and for that rhetoric to be translated into action in the form of 
gradual militarisation. As repeated references in presidential speeches to threats against 
‘national’ security suggest, the state was a recognisable entity entitled to protection, and 
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traditionally the armed forces of a nation state (and intelligence agencies) have been the 
principal guarantors of such defence. In the post-war world the threat of communism had 
preoccupied these institutions, but as that had dwindled, a growing alternative threat to the 
state in the form of narcotics and its traffickers was ready to assume prominence. 
 
4.6 The Bush Administration 1989-1993 
 
In 1989, with the Cold War ending, the attention of the U.S. national security establishment 
increasingly turned towards the drug war, as demonstrated by the early rhetoric and 
initiatives of the George H.W. Bush administration. Bush, as Vice President, had overseen 
the South Florida Drug Task Force and had often called for greater participation of the 
military and CIA in drug interdiction (Scott and Marshall 1991, p.2). He was supported in 
this stance by Richard Cheney, his Secretary of Defence, who emphasised the threat against 
the state. He branded drugs “a direct threat to the sovereignty and security of our country”, 
and aimed to challenge this by ordering commanders to develop plans to provide operational 
support to counter-narcotics missions in Latin America, and vowed a “more aggressive and 
robust” U.S. presence in the Andean region (Scott and Marshall 1991, p.2). To facilitate these 
activities, National Security Directive 18 was issued in August 1989, declaring that: 
 
“One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and 
if possible eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotic substances to the United States. The 
impact of illegal narcotics use on our society has been and continues to be 
devastating.               (White House 1989, p.1, emphasis added) 
 
Under NSD 18, the Bush Administration placed the war on drugs on the centre stage of its 
foreign policy priorities. Like Reagan’s past directive, it sought to effectively mobilise the 
U.S. military and intelligence community in the service of drug interdiction, directing that: 
 
“The Secretary of Defence, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, shall revise 
DOD policy directives and procedures to expand DOD support of U.S. counter-
narcotics efforts and to permit DOD personnel to conduct training for host 
government personnel and operational support activities anywhere in the Andean 
region. DOD personnel will not accompany host government forces on actual field 
operations” and that the “Director of Central Intelligence, coordinating with the 
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counter-narcotics intelligence community, shall similarly develop detailed 
intelligence programs.”             (White House 1989, p.3, emphasis added) 
 
Administration policy quickly came to have a direct strategic impact. The 1989 U.S. invasion 
of Panama in Operation Just Cause was primarily about securing America’s interests in the 
region. However, the fact that the Panamanian dictator, General Manuel Noriega, had been 
complicit in cocaine trafficking for years with the Colombian Medellin cartel (despite at the 
same time being allowed to indulge in it due to his support for Contra operations in 
Nicaragua) was offered as one of several reasons for his ouster (Feiling 2009, p.202).  
More covert counter-narcotics support by the military was provided in the Andean 
region as per the direction of NSD 18, specifically in Colombia, the most problematic 
country at the time and the world’s largest cocaine producer. U.S. Green Berets were 
deployed to Colombia as trainers for native counter-narcotics forces. Though officially they 
did not accompany forces on field operations, as per the stipulations of NSD 18, practical 
necessity meant that U.S. forces would sometimes accompany the Colombians on raids in 
order to ensure that training was proving effective and to monitor levels of corruption (Smith 
2006, p.164). 
At the same time Pablo Escobar, head of the Medellin drug cartel, was in open 
warfare with other drug barons and the Colombian state, and his capture became a priority. 
With U.S. military training and strict security vetting, a native Colombian unit known as 
Bloque de Búsqueda (Search Bloc) was created to track Escobar down, and was substantially 
aided by U.S. military intelligence. A special American unit known as the Intelligence 
Support Activity (ISA), was deployed to utilise their intelligence gathering and surveillance 
expertise. Their airborne monitoring and cell-phone triangulation technology allowed for the 
capturing and gradual erosion of the Medellin hierarchy before locating Escobar himself, who 
was killed by Colombian forces in 1993 (Smith 2006, p.165-168). 
In 1989 the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was created as part of 
the Executive Office of the U.S. President. Its remit was to establish policies, priorities and 
objectives to eradicate illicit drug use and trafficking, criminality, violence and health issues 
(White House 2014). Led by the Director of National Drug Control Policy, referred to as the 
‘Drug Czar’ by politicians and the media, the office advised the president on drug policy and 
coordinated drug-control activities and related funding across the Federal government (White 
House 2014). The director oversaw both international and domestic anti-drug efforts, a role 
that was deemed important enough to be raised to cabinet-level a few years later. 
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The differing experience of each subsequent director is indicative of the evolution of 
U.S. counter-narcotics towards a more enforcement-based approach. The first director, 
William Bennett, came from academia and served as Education Secretary under Reagan 
(New York Times 1989). He was succeeded in 1991 by Bob Martinez, a former governor of 
Florida during Miami’s cartel wars, who had emphasised law enforcement and prison 
expansion (New York Times 1991). As the Clinton Administration entered office, Martinez 
was succeeded in 1993 by Lee Brown, a career police officer who had led departments in 
Atlanta, Houston and New York (Treaster 1993). Then, in 1996, General Barry McCaffrey 
(who had led U.S. Southern Command and so had experience in utilising military resources 
to combat Latin American drug trafficking) assumed the directorship until Clinton left office 
(Zoroya 1996). From academic, to politician, to law enforcement officer, to military 
commander; those who occupied the post of ONDCP director reflected the progressively 
securitised then militarised enforcement-oriented approach to U.S. counter-narcotics policy. 
Such a process was well in train when, in 1990, as part of an additional $1.2 billion 
request to fight the drug war – on top of the $8.8 billion anti-drug budget that already existed 
– President Bush recommended a 50 percent increase in military spending. This raised the 
Pentagon’s counter-narcotics operations budget to $1.2 billion a year, up from $800 million, 
a third of which was to be used for U.S. programs to help the cocaine producers of Latin 
America, namely Colombia, Peru and Bolivia (Burke 1990)45. Along with greater active 
military involvement in counter-narcotics, this demonstrated a growing emphasis on 
attempting to curb narcotics trafficking by improving the security situations in the producer 
countries. Such a strategy was to come into its own towards the end of the Clinton 
Administration. 
 
4.7 The Clinton Administration 1993-2000 
 
Remaining on the course set by its predecessors, within the first year of the Clinton 
Administration, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-14 was issued, focusing exclusively on 
Latin America and cocaine. It echoed rhetoric going back to Captain Hobson’s day by 
lamenting that, “the scourge of illegal narcotics is severely damaging the social fabric of our 
society” (White House 1993), and consequently the U.S. would: 
                                                 
45 Despite this increase, some politicians still felt not enough had been done to utilise military capability in drug 
war operations. Democratic Senator Joe Biden was an outspoken proponent of U.S. efforts against drugs, and a 
September 1992 report by the Senate Judiciary Committee, which he chaired, argued that the Bush 
Administration had failed to grant sufficient money and power to the U.S. military to shift its mission to fighting 
illegal drugs (Baum 1993, p.74). 
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“Treat as a serious national security threat the operations of international criminal 
narcotics syndicates, requiring an extraordinary and coordinated response by civilian 
and military agencies engaged in national security.” 
      (White House 1993, emphasis added) 
 
Yet the Directive also marked a change in emphasis, shifting from efforts mainly targeting 
interdiction of drug traffic, towards a strategy that distributed effort across three programs 
(White House 1993): 
 
 Expanded assistance to partner countries for the strengthening of their native security 
institutions and the encouragement of broad economic growth and equity in an effort 
to erode the attraction of, or reliance on, the drug trade. 
 
 The destruction of narco-trafficking organisations through law-enforcement, erosion 
of funds by squeezing money laundering, and the control of precursor chemicals 
essential for drug manufacture. 
 
 The continuation of interdiction efforts by U.S. agencies, but a gradual shift of 
emphasis from transit zones towards source countries, complemented by U.S. support 
for regional nations’ own interdiction efforts, both civilian and military. 
 
Though there had been previous instances of direct or covert assistance by U.S. military and 
intelligence assets (Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia, or ISA operations in Colombia), such 
a strategic shift marked the beginnings of a move towards sustained counter-narcotics 
initiatives of the kind that have been selected as case studies. This strategy focused on 
eliminating, or at least mitigating, drug trafficking by taking the fight to source countries. 
There was also recognition that a vital component was the enhancement of the security 
institutions of those countries, alongside the traditional approaches of disrupting/eliminating 
traffickers and improving interdiction. 
 The 1997 National Drug Control Strategy, overseen by ONDCP director and former 
military officer Barry McCaffrey, sought to establish the foundations for such initiatives by 
calling for a flexible and long-term strategic vision of a ten-year commitment to combat illicit 
narcotics. The document sustained the recommendation for a broad strategy, including the 
admission that drug education, treatment and demand reduction were the ‘number one 
priority’, but putting equal weight on supply reduction by eliminating coca cultivation, 
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supporting source countries’ counter-narcotics efforts, and stepping up interdiction in transit 
zones (McCaffrey 1997). 
Yet at the same time as foreign counter-narcotics policy increasingly focused on 
support for source countries, the process of domestic police militarisation that began with the 
1981 Military Cooperation and Law Enforcement Act was supercharged by the 1997 
National Defence Authorisation Security Act. The act created the Law Enforcement Support 
Program, an agency that organised transfer of excess or unwanted military equipment to 
civilian police forces to assist counter-narcotics in their jurisdictions (Balko 2006, p.8). This 
led to a huge rise in the availability of battlefield weaponry, equipment and vehicles at the 
disposal of not just large police forces, but even rural county sheriff’s departments. Between 
January 1997 and December 1999, the Law Enforcement Support Program handled 3.4 
million orders of Pentagon equipment from 11,000 police forces across all 50 states (Balko 
2006, p.8). At the same time, it was found that 90 percent of cities with populations of 50,000 
or more had at least one SWAT team which, given that such small towns and cities often lack 
the budgets to form such teams independently, suggested that Pentagon support was 
instrumental to many such teams’ existence (Balko 2006, p.9). 
Another study which highlighted police militarisation was conducted by Peter Kraska 
and Victor Kappeler (1997). They found that, by 1997, of the police departments 
participating in the study, during the initial setup and training of their Paramilitary Police 
Units (PPUs, i.e. SWAT teams) 46 percent had drawn expertise from police officers with past 
special operations experience in the military, and 43 percent had trained with active-duty 
military experts in special operations (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, p.11). This meant that 
almost half of surveyed police departments had been heavily influenced by past or present 
military training and culture during the formation of their PPUs. 
Additionally, when asked about the training that their PPUs continued to receive after 
their formation, 30 percent of departments reported that officers with past special operations 
experience in the military were involved, and 46 percent admitted to training with active-duty 
special operations experts (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, p.11). Therefore, not only were 
militarily-experienced individuals involved in moulding the institutional culture of newly 
formed PPUs, but their influence endured well into the continuous training of unit personnel. 
Such arrangements and cultural cross-pollination could be traced back to the early efforts at 
civilian and military institutional cooperation, such as the South Florida Drug Task Force, 
where elements of the armed forces cross-trained and co-deployed with their law 
enforcement counterparts. With the more proactive attitudes towards counter-narcotics of the 
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Reagan and Bush Administrations, the number of search and/or arrest warrants involving 
drugs surged, and responsibility for executing such warrants increasingly fell to PPUs. The 
result was that by the second term of the Clinton Administration, a typical unit could be 
called out on between 200-700 drug raids annually (Kraska and Kappeler 1997, p.7). 
The statistics relating to the resources police departments received from the Law 
Enforcement Support Program, as well as the influence wielded by military-minded trainers 
and members of PPUs, were indicative of the para-militarising of U.S. law enforcement 
efforts to combat the drug trade. If PPUs were more actively involved in drug enforcement 
than ever before, and had become far more militarised in resources, training and institutional 
culture, this constitutes a prime example of militarisation. Though the above examples 
concern domestic U.S. drug enforcement, the importation of military resources and cultural 
practices into civilian institutions established a precedent that would become observable in 
the kind of support eventually granted to, and encouraged within, the specialist police and 
military counter-narcotics units of Latin American countries. 
Meanwhile, in Colombia, though the Medellin Cartel’s Pablo Escobar had been killed 
in 1993 and the leaders of the rival Cali Cartel had, by 1995, all been arrested, the security 
situation was still serious. Conflict perpetrated by smaller successor cartels, right-wing 
paramilitaries and Marxist FARC guerrillas all contributed to pushing the country towards 
being a failed state. Whether overly simplistic or not, it was widely felt that the drug trade 
perpetuated conflict and instability by providing funding for the warring parties, as well as 
being a lucrative trade to fight over in its own right, regardless of combatants’ broader 
objectives. 
In one of his last foreign trips, Clinton visited Colombia in August 2000, bringing 
$1.3 billion of aid and sixty military helicopters, including $200 million to promote 
democracy, judicial reform, human rights and economic development (Hancock 2000). The 
allocation of funding for civil development was an important fig-leaf for U.S. politicians 
wary of becoming militarily involved in Colombia’s civil war. Yet if the drug trade was felt 
to be an integral part of that civil war, and the long-term policy had been to provide military 
support in combatting that trade, then it was difficult to envision how U.S. support in 
Colombia’s civil war and drug war46 could be so easily kept separate and compartmentalised. 
Whatever the complications that would ensue as policy aspiration met pragmatic reality, the 
                                                 
46 Clinton described the U.S. approach as “pro-peace and anti-drug” (Hancock 2000) 
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first truly sustained and comprehensive U.S. foreign counter-narcotics initiative in Latin 
America was underway: Plan Colombia. 
 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has provided the historical context for the case studies that follow, and has 
demonstrated that the gradual emergence of the War on Drugs, and its gradual militarisation, 
are applicable to sections that comprise the security spectrum, where progression is 
observable. From the non-politicised early sale and consumption of what would become 
illicit narcotics, through to the gradual politicisation of the issue from the early-to-mid 20th 
Century, to the securitisation of narcotics beginning with Nixon, and the first steps into 
militarisation from Reagan onwards, we are able to see the evolution of the security status of 
narcotics, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
What was initially considered a minor problem was gradually brought into focus, as growing 
temperance movements and public health concerns presented narcotics as a moral and social 
problem on par with alcohol and vice. Early institutions such as the (small and undermanned) 
Bureau of Narcotics were set up to offer a token response to the drug problem. However, 
general consumption was at such a minimal level that the ‘problem’, such as it was, hardly 
registered on the radar compared to broader post-war concerns regarding the economy, 
communism, crime, race-relations, and so on. 
It was the growth of drug-taking during the 1960s, particularly of heroin, and the 
accompanying political encouragement of popular fears, that helped precipitate the 
securitisation of the narcotics issue. By making the case that drugs and addicts posed a threat 
to society, rather than just being a niche problem that could be ignored or locked away, that 
threat then demanded emergency measures, hence the growth of counter-narcotics institutions 
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and resources under Nixon. With the issue firmly securitised by Reagan’s time, but little 
progress seemingly made in addressing it, a more bellicose solution was invited. Such a 
response was supported by the fact that violent cartel wars were actively breaking out in 
South Florida, and whether introducing a military aspect was correct or not, the violence was 
not questionable government spinning, as with statistics concerning addicts, but observable, 
bloody fact. 
The creation of multiple drug agencies or initiatives, their ultimate merger into the 
DEA, the continuation of other powerful agencies such as U.S. Customs, and the crucial 
introduction of a military component (with the approval of DOD involvement in counter-
narcotics with the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act), are all demonstrative of the kind of 
institutional expansion that would see it increasingly difficult to de-securitise the narcotics 
threat. Measurable success would arguably justify cutting budgets and resources, which most 
bureaucracies and agencies are resistant to, and so as it grows, the beast needs to be fed more, 
which prompts further growth, and so on. Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen observe that if the 
war on drugs may be deemed irrational as a public policy, then it is perfectly rational as a 
political and bureaucratic strategy, where the potential rewards at stake are finance and 
prestige (1998, p.39-40). If questions concerning their scale and purpose cannot be ignored, 
then institutions may seek to redefine their worth and justify budgets by demonstrating their 
utility in other areas of national concern. This arguably occurred in calls for the U.S. military 
and intelligence agencies to redirect some attention to the drug war once the Cold War 
concluded. They sought new worlds to conquer at the risk of losing their armies. 
The principal point is that there are certain historical and social reasons why 
prohibition of drugs has become so important in the U.S. This essentially moral crusade, born 
of self-interest in protecting the American citizen and thus society from the scourge of drug 
abuse, has been coupled with America’s geopolitical dominance and consequent ability to 
influence global policy through direct nation-state relations, or the umbrella measures of 
various UN conventions. Cracks have begun to appear, such as the temporary withdrawal of 
Bolivia from the 1961 Single Convention (Washington Office on Latin America 2013). 
Nevertheless, whether by coercion or willing cooperation from others, the U.S. has 
established a consensus on prohibiting the drug trade and coming down hard on illicit 
trafficking and the threat to national security and society it is perceived to represent. 
Combatting the international drug trade has increasingly utilised military resources 
and methods, either by involving the military directly in overt or covert supporting roles, or 
of the militarisation of civilian and intelligence agencies. Concerns were raised about a 
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creeping law enforcement role for the DOD. However, the small but pivotal introduction of 
direct military support in foreign counter-narcotics operations by presidential directive, along 
with Congressional legislation authorising and encouraging such support, pointed towards the 
growing militarisation of counter-narcotics policy. This was in addition to initiatives from 
Reagan to Clinton that saw military culture, training, resources and weaponry increasingly at 
the disposal of domestic American law enforcement agencies and police forces. 
The following chapters analyse the extent of this phenomenon in U.S. foreign 
counter-narcotics, in Colombia and Mexico respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
U.S. Counter-narcotics Militarisation and Colombia 2000-2013 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Colombia is one of the largest drug producing states in the world, and while marijuana and 
heroin account for some of its illicit drug output, cocaine dominates. While tonnage 
production of fresh coca leaf has halved since 2005, from 555,400 that year, it still stood at 
231,700 in 2012, with a potential result of 309 tons of pure cocaine (UNODC 2014, Annex 1 
p.iv). From the early-1980s onwards, Colombian cocaine, and those who trafficked and 
distributed it, eventually became a national security priority for the United States. American 
policy towards Colombia increasingly became defined by counter-narcotics. The emphasis 
gradually switched away from interdiction by U.S. military and law enforcement at the 
American border or coastline, towards tackling the problem at source and eliminating the 
production and trafficking of cocaine in the Andean region. 
As internal security in Colombia declined towards the late-1990s, coupled with a 
failure to significantly degrade the cocaine trade, the Colombian government, in close 
partnership with the U.S., embarked on Plan Colombia. It was a comprehensive initiative 
designed to re-establish state security and combat the cocaine trade. As the largest financial 
and military contributor, the U.S. and its counter-narcotics policy strongly influenced 
Colombian policy. The nature of the relationship effectively means that the study of the 
militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy also entails looking at how Colombian policy 
became militarised under U.S. direction and support. This was often embraced by the 
Colombian military despite initial reservations, as well as a security establishment and 
government desperate to improve internal security. 
This analysis focuses on the build-up to Plan Colombia, exploring Colombia’s long-
standing military ties with America, and the subsequent development and employment of 
Plan Colombia itself, followed by Plan Patriota and the Consolidation phase. This provides a 
set and focused time frame, allowing enough scope to analyse how U.S. counter-narcotics 
policy in Colombia became militarised according to the elements of the militarisation 
framework, i.e. making military, institutionalisation, and criteria of violence. These sections 
cumulatively explore how U.S. – and by implication, Colombian – counter-narcotics policy 
developed. 
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5.2 U.S. military and counter-narcotics support pre-Plan Colombia 
 
The United States and Colombia shared a military relationship for many years prior to 
American policy becoming influenced by the War on Drugs, and subsequent expansion and 
deepening of military ties. In the post-1945 global political environment, Colombia’s relative 
prosperity, as well as an essentially democratic system, made it, in the view of the U.S., a 
standard bearer for the kind of reliable, capitalist, anti-communist ally it wished to encourage 
in Latin America. It was a beacon of economic growth for four decades (even if dubiously 
distributed) and one which honoured its foreign loans as many neighbours defaulted in the 
1980s (McLean 2002, p.124). 
 Such positive relations extended to the military sphere. Colombia was the only Latin 
American country that contributed troops to the Korean War, and the remainder of the 1950s 
saw U.S. military relations with Colombia strengthen. Following the signing of a “Military 
Assistance Agreement” between the two countries in 1952, the U.S. established army, navy 
and air force attaché offices in Bogotá (Crandall 2008, p.21). Involvement was further 
extended when, in 1961, the U.S. sent its first Military Training Team (MTT) to help train the 
Colombian military in a broad range of areas. Such effort was prompted by the assessment of 
a CIA team visit in 1958, who determined that a significant nation-building package was 
required to mitigate and eventually end the effects of a low-level civil war called Le 
Violencia that had been underway for a decade (Sweig 2002, p.122). Absence of state 
authority in rural areas, inequitable land distribution, and widespread lawlessness and poverty 
needed addressing, with suggested solutions involving strengthening the judiciary, significant 
land reform and the elimination of the rural guerrilla insurgency (Sweig 2002, p.122). 
The diagnosis of Colombia’s problems in 1958 – which played a significant role in 
the rise of the drug trade – were not dissimilar from analyses conducted in the late-1990s, and 
in neither case was the recommended nation-building pursued by policy-makers. Yet, like the 
U.S. response to the drug trade in the late 20th Century, in the early-1960s security-based 
solutions were emphasised instead. While MTTs did instruct the Colombian military in civic-
project themed supply, engineering and sanitation efforts, direct military training concerning 
intelligence, counter-insurgency, psychological warfare and special operations was of equal if 
not superior priority (Crandall 2008, p.21). Such initiatives, along with the permanent 
military presence of the attachés, was indicative of the U.S. desire to see Colombia sustain 
the positives associated with being a regional ally, as well as increasing its own capacity to 
promote hemispheric security. 
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So important was Western hemispheric security to the U.S. that for several decades 
military support to the countries of the region had been institutionalised through a variety of 
legislation, programs and schemes. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 put most 
DOD spending on foreign military aid under the supervision of the State Department, the two 
departments that would eventually play the leading roles in Plan Colombia (Isacson 2005, 
p.17). However, it also allowed Congress to place limits on such assistance based on certain 
oversights, such as budgetary matters or human rights and civil democratic compliance by 
Latin American forces (Isacson 2005, p.17). Operating under the umbrella of the FAA were 
three direct military support programs. The Military Assistance Program (MAP) had 
provided the bulk of military aid until, in 1976, the educational component was separated out, 
creating the International Military Education and Training program (IMET). Thereafter the 
educational expenses were met for virtually all Latin American military cadets and officers 
who attended the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas, while MAP continued to supply 
grants of money and weaponry to regional partners until it was phased out in the late-1980s 
(Isacson 2005, p.18). Subsequently, weapons transfers as well as some services and training 
were channelled through the Foreign Military Financing program (FMF), and taken 
altogether between 1980 and 1991, MAP and FMF contributed more than $2 billion to 
Western hemisphere security forces, while IMET contributed another $110 million (Isacson 
2005, p.18). 
As illustrated in Chapter 4, it was the growing threat posed by the drug trade to 
broader Western hemispheric security, as well as to U.S. national security itself, that saw 
counter-narcotics grow in importance in the civil and military relationship between the U.S. 
and Colombia. American foreign policy and drug policy towards Colombia effectively 
became synonymous. By the end of the century, the U.S. expressed serious concerns 
regarding Colombia’s capacity to control the drug threat and remain a functioning state. 
According to a report compiled by Senator Bob Graham and retired General Brent Scowcroft 
(2000, p.13), the resulting U.S. support meant that Colombia had become the third largest 
beneficiary of U.S. security assistance in the world, behind only Israel and Egypt (U.S. 
Congress 1999a). 
U.S. counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia only formally began in 1973 when the 
two countries signed a bilateral agreement officially allowing counter-narcotics funding and 
aid to be transferred. Within five years, however, what had been an important but relatively 
secondary concern had increased in prominence so rapidly that the U.S. diplomatic and 
policy establishment responsible for the region, and the issue of drugs, could not help but be 
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surprised. Robert Drexler, a former Foreign Service officer, summed up the situation at the 
time: 
“By 1978 […] the drug syndicates had grown so powerful that the Colombian 
authorities had insufficient strength to overcome them […] We had not foreseen it 
three or four years earlier […] American authorities had become concerned with drug 
trafficking in the early 1970s [but] there was no sense of crisis […] and the narcotics 
issue was only one of several diplomatic problems facing the embassy […] never the 
most important one.” (Crandall 2008, p.22) 
 
Indeed, the American Ambassador at that time, Viron Vaky, corroborates this observation: 
 
“It [the drug issue] was there. We had DEA guys in the embassy but it was not a 
central element of our policy. At that time [the early 1970s] there were no cartels and 
little to no involvement in the cocaine trade. No one saw it [U.S. drug policy] 
reaching the proportions it did.” (Crandall 2008, p.22) 
 
As the 1970s gave way to the 1980s, so too did it appear that Colombia’s institutions 
were giving way to the power of the cartels, principal among them the Medellin and Cali 
organisations. High-profile individuals willing to speak out against the cartels and call for 
action were marked for death or successfully assassinated. Such individuals included 
Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in 198447, police colonel Jaime Ramirez in 1985, 
and Luis Carlos Galan, a Liberal party politician who stood a strong chance of becoming 
Colombia’s president, in 1989 (McLean 2002, p.126). The Medellin cartel especially, under 
Pablo Escobar’s leadership, undertook what could be described as narco-terrorism. It resorted 
to both targeted murders of politicians, judiciary and police, and mass casualty actions 
against civilians such as car and airline bombings, in efforts to resist challenges to its primacy 
and to dissuade the Colombian government from extraditing traffickers to the U.S. The 
campaign against the latter reached a highpoint in November 1985, when cartel-sponsored 
guerrillas attacked Colombia’s Supreme Court, burning as many extradition documents as 
possible, and leading to the deaths of half the justices in the ensuing rescue attempt (McLean 
2002, p.127). 
                                                 
47 Lara Bonilla was assassinated on the orders of Medellin traffickers following a successful joint Colombian-
DEA operation that captured ten metric tons of cocaine and destroyed 101 coca-processing laboratories 
(Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.103). 
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 It was against this declining security situation in Colombia, and the drug-related 
social and security concerns within the U.S., such as in Southern Florida, that convinced the 
Reagan Administration to take a tougher, militarised approach. The U.S. encouraged the 
administration of President Julio César Turbay (1978-1982) to toughen the Colombian stance 
against its native drug trade, including the huge quantities of marijuana the country was 
producing in addition to cocaine. Colombia began a fumigation programme against 
marijuana, the beginning of one the most utilised counter-narcotic methods employed in the 
drug war. 
However, Turbay went further by ordering direct military involvement in the 
campaign. Despite being as initially reluctant as their U.S. counterparts had been in becoming 
involved in counter-narcotic – essentially counter-criminal – enterprises while the potent 
issue of fighting guerrillas still dominated the security landscape, the Colombian military 
launched an operation involving 10,000 troops. They targeted marijuana production in the 
northern Guajira peninsula, and despite seizing or destroying thousands of tons of the crop, as 
well as hundreds of transport vehicles, progress was short lived as production moved 
elsewhere in Colombia or returned to Guejira once the campaign was over (Crandall 2008, 
p.23). 
 Just as with Operation Blast Furnace, the influx of American military personnel and 
equipment may have yielded short term results, but also impacted on the longer-term 
dynamics of the drug war. The military-led counter-narcotics intervention alienated tens of 
thousands of rural inhabitants involved in the drug trade, primarily to make a living, sowing 
the seeds of mistrust in central authority. Additionally the producers and traffickers of 
marijuana switched focus towards more lucrative cocaine, and changed tactics to make their 
processing and transport operations more mobile, smaller in scale and harder to detect and 
destroy (Crandall 2008, p.24). 
 Despite the efforts of U.S. and Colombian counter-narcotics initiatives, by the mid-
1980s the flow of illicit drugs northwards remained constant and growing. In 1986 the 
Reagan Administration issued National Security Directive 221, granting direct permission for 
the utilisation of U.S. military and intelligence assets and personnel in the fight against illicit 
drug production in Latin America, albeit in a supporting capacity (White House 1986, p.1). 
Following Operation Blast Furnace in 1986, which was mainly confined to Bolivia and was 
conducted for a limited time, Operation Snowcap was launched in 1987. It was a seven year, 
broad Andean initiative, initially targeting Bolivia and Peru, before extending into Colombia 
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in 1989 (Crandall 2008, p.27-28)48. With the DEA taking the lead, supported by several 
leased DOD Huey helicopters, the native police and military forces of the Andean countries 
were supported and instructed in counter-narcotics efforts, especially the police in Colombia 
as security deteriorated. 
In fact, from the early-1980s when they established the first of the special anti-
narcotics units, up until the late-1990s before Plan Colombia took militarisation to a higher 
level, the Colombian National Police (CNP) had been as equally a favoured agency for U.S. 
counter-narcotics support as the Colombian military, perhaps more so. As much as 90 percent 
of aid went towards the CNP for interdiction and fumigation efforts as late as 1997 (Ramirez 
Lemus et al. 2005, p.101 & p.105). Though the close military ties forged during the Cold War 
meant that the U.S. was inclined to work with the Colombian armed forces on the drug 
issue 49 , the Americans were still troubled by corruption, ineptitude and human rights 
allegations regarding the Colombian military (Crandall 2008, p.24 & p.36). 
It should be noted however that the CNP are not purely a civilian agency, but along 
with the Colombian Army, Navy and Air Force, form the Public Force under the control of 
the Ministry of Defence, and possess ranks, structures, uniforms, equipment and so forth, that 
would be considered essentially paramilitary in nature. This dates back to 1953 when, after 
seizing presidential power in a coup, Lt. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla issued Decree 1814, 
incorporating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police into the Ministry of War, later the 
Ministry of Defence (Herring 1956, p.704; Colombian National Police 2014). Therefore U.S. 
training, support, financing and equipment directed towards the CNP could be said to indicate 
gradual militarisation – in terms of assets and institutionalisation – of the counter-narcotics 
effort during this period, even if the beneficiaries were not the Colombian military directly. 
Indeed the height of U.S.-CNP cooperation came in 1994-95 when, thanks to U.S. pressure, 
General Rosso José Serrano was transferred from a Washington posting to command the 
CNP. He fired corrupt senior officers and thousands of rank and file personnel and, with 
intelligence support from the CIA and DEA, followed the model used to bring down Pablo 
Escobar to do the same to the Cali cartel leadership. The operations employed 6000 CNP 
special forces operatives to hollow out the cartel and associated criminal enterprises in over 
two hundred raids by targeting their personnel (Crandall 2008, p.91-94). However, the 
                                                 
48  The $24 million budget for the entire operation was minor compared to the $850 million allocated to 
Colombia alone in 2000, an indicator as to how much the U.S. would increase its counter-narcotics efforts with 
Plan Colombia (Crandall 2008, p.28). 
49 There were additional  practical reasons for this, such as the greater scope for certain kinds of direct support 
for militaries rather than police forces due to FAA stipulations, plus the military’s ability to police remote drug-
producing and transit zones more effectively (Isacson 2005, p.24-25). 
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dismantling of both main cartels would have unforeseen consequences of making the drug 
war even more intractable, as explored later. 
Despite the successes of the notionally civilian CNP, the U.S. was still moving in an 
increasingly militarised direction in its counter-narcotics policy towards Colombia and the 
region. Following World War II, a regional command structure incorporating all the U.S. 
armed forces had coalesced, but was solidified when U.S. Southern Command (Southcom) 
was declared in 1963, which assumed responsibility for the Latin American and Caribbean 
area of operations (United States Southern Command 2014)50. Though the smallest of the 
regional commands, Southcom always enjoyed a significant presence in Latin American 
affairs given the amount of U.S. military support, cooperation and activity in the region. By 
the beginning of the 21st Century, when the War on Terror had started and Plan Colombia 
was well underway, journalist Dana Priest noted Southcom’s importance when she observed 
that: 
“More people work there dealing with Latin American matters than at the 
departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Agriculture, the Pentagon’s Joint 
Staff, and the office of the Secretary of Defence combined.” (Isacson 2005, p.20) 
 
It was little surprise that the primary regional command for the U.S. military in the region 
should take such a prominent role. In 1988 the DOD itself had been declared the ‘single lead 
agency’ for detecting and monitoring illegal drugs transitioning to the U.S. by air or sea. 
Under this authority, the DOD was able to utilise its enormous budget to pay for narcotics 
interdiction efforts, such as radar sites located around the region, surveillance flights, naval 
and Coast Guard maritime patrols, and intelligence gathering (Isacson 2005, p.28)51. That 
Southcom played an active and enthusiastic role in arranging and overseeing such efforts 
could be traced to its search for purpose as the Cold War ended. With the U.S. due to 
withdraw from the Panama Canal in 1999, other than dealing with natural disasters, illegal 
migration and engaging in civil and military partnership projects with the countries of the 
region, Southcom was in need of greater justification for its existence. The increased focus on 
the drug war as the Cold War ended, and the drug-fuelled instability in Colombia, provided 
just such a reason. As one former Southcom commander-in-chief, General Maxwell 
                                                 
50 Mexico, the topic of the following chapter, is covered by U.S. Northern Command. 
51 Interdiction was one area where significant U.S. military resources and personnel could directly be brought to 
bear against traffickers, rather than having to take a hands-off supporting role with native security forces when it 
came to tackling land-based drug production and trafficking, where matters of sovereignty and legislative 
barriers prevented direct U.S. military participation – overtly at least. 
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Thurman, said of the drug war in the region, “[it’s] the only war we’ve got” (Isacson 2005, 
p.28). 
 
Figure 2 - Andean Initiative-Assistance for Colombia, Fiscal Years 1989-1994 (U.S. $ mil) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total 
Military 8.6 40.3 60.5 60.5 60.5 60.5 290.9 
Economics 0 3.6 50 50 50 50 203.6 
Law 
Enforcement 10 20 20 20 20 20 110 
DEA Support 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 26.2 
Total 22.8 68.3 134.9 134.9 134.9 134.9 _ 
 
(Crandall 2008, p.31) 
 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, over the five year period that the Cold War was winding down and 
the drug war against the Medellin and Cali cartels was ramping up, U.S. counter-narcotics 
assistance to Colombia under the Andean Initiative was heavily balanced towards security-
related support. Combined military and law enforcement support came to just over $400 
million, almost double the economic aid Colombia received over the same period, indicating 
that U.S. counter-narcotics policy priorities lay in a militarised and security-focused 
direction. 
From 1994 to 1998, Ernesto Samper was Colombia’s president. The period was 
notable for the decline in bilateral relations, principally due to the U.S. suspicion, later 
proven, that Samper’s election campaign had received donations from the Cali cartel (New 
York Times 1995). Ironically, the period proved to be one of the most productive for U.S. 
counter-narcotics efforts. Samper sought to undermine any suspicions by implementing 
significant counter-narcotics efforts, such as Operation Condor, which utilised thirty-eight 
helicopters and twenty-one aircraft in a huge aerial eradication campaign against illicit crops 
(Crandall 2008. P.102). Nevertheless, the U.S. increasingly froze Samper out and dealt 
directly with the Colombian military and CNP, as evidenced by the trust and support it 
provided General Serrano. While security relations remained strong, diplomatic ones 
deteriorated to the extent that Samper was one of the few heads of state in history to be 
refused an entry visa into the U.S. (Gedda 1996). Colombia was also decertified as a partner 
country twice, in 1996 and 1997, for supposedly failing to undertake suitably effective 
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counter-narcotics efforts. The self-defeating decision was taken despite the initiatives that 
were already in place, and that decertification arguably reduced the effectiveness of 
Colombian efforts even further by reducing aid, such as the delay or cancellation of $35 
million worth of counter-narcotics assistance (U.S. GAO 1998)52. 
The U.S. eventually realised that its campaign to undermine Samper risked being 
counterproductive, weakening the Colombian state at just such a time that it needed 
maintaining and strengthening in the face of increasing drug cultivation and insurgent 
violence. Thus the U.S. quickly moved to support Samper’s successor, Andrés Pastrana, and 
his early peace initiative with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 
explored below. Even then however, there were moves to consolidate the security 
relationship between the U.S. and Colombia, as a Bilateral Working Group was established in 
1998 to deepen cooperation between both countries’ militaries (U.S. Congress 1999a). It 
would become an increasingly important relationship as the Colombian military, with U.S. 
training, funding, support and supervision, took a growing and ultimately primary role over 
the CNP in counter-narcotic operations during Plan Colombia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52  A fact that was perhaps recognised with the inclusion of national security waivers in Plan Colombia 
legislation, which allowed certain concerns to be overridden and support to quickly proceed. 
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5.3 From Plan Colombia, to Plan Patriota to Consolidation 
 
Map 1 - Map of Colombia 
 
(Central Intelligence Agency 2015) 
 
Colombia’s geography, as well as socio-economic issues, has presented a significant 
challenge to central governments in extending their remits across the country. While a broad 
range of ethnicities comprise the population, having Spanish as the official language and 
Catholicism followed by 90% of the population has helped give rise to a common Colombian 
culture53. Yet the country is divided by three mountain ranges, with significant portions of the 
east comprised of the plains and jungles of the Amazon basin, home to only one-fifth of the 
population, while the rest reside along the western plateaus and the valleys between 
mountains and the Caribbean coast (McLean 2002, p.124-125). Infrastructure, whether in the 
form of transportation links or substantial and permanent governmental presence, had 
traditionally experienced poor penetration in these hard-to-reach areas. This has generated 
significant inequality, which allowed guerrillas and later drug cartels to take advantage and 
establish a presence, made all the easier by lack of central political and security authority. 
As was demonstrated with the capture or killing of the Medellin cartel leadership and 
the CNP dismantling of the Cali cartel, a successful kingpin strategy was employed by 
                                                 
53 The ethnic makeup of the country breaks down to: mestizo 58%, white 20%, mulatto 14%, black 4%, mixed 
black-Amerindian 3%, Amerindian 1% (Central Intelligence Agency 2015). 
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Colombian security forces with the logistical, financial and training support provided by the 
U.S. The unforeseen consequence of destroying the top two cartels was that the drug trade 
atomised into smaller organisations known as cartelios. This made the problem broader 
rather than deeper, and thus required more resources to tackle multiple medium and smaller 
entities, rather than larger, single ones. These smaller organisations lacked the ability to 
operate transnationally, to source coca from other neighbouring Andean countries as their 
predecessors had done (notwithstanding the crackdown on coca production in these 
countries), and so turned to cultivating coca locally in Colombia, where processing could be 
conducted closer to the source (U.S. Congress 1999b). As a consequence, Colombia’s 
National Narcotics Directorate reported a total of 43,000 hectares of coca cultivation in 1994, 
67,200 in 1996, and 79,500 in 1997, at which point Colombia assumed the position of largest 
coca producer in the Andean region (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.105). 
Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, the cocaine trade was only growing despite the 
best efforts of U.S. counter-narcotics policy. In fact, the increased cultivation resulted in the 
production tonnage of coca leaf in Colombia rocketing, from 45,422 in 1993, to 71,958 a year 
later in 1994, and then on to 165,934 tonnes by 1998, almost matching the production of Peru 
and Bolivia combined (UNODCCP 1999, p.42). United Nations figures showed that over the 
course of the 1990s, total coca leaf production in the three Andean source countries had been 
reduced, from a total 319,200 tonnes in 1990, to 287,000 tons by 1999 (UNODCCP 2000, 
p.28). On the surface this constituted a success for U.S. policy. 
However, while in 1990 Colombia only accounted for 16 percent of that year’s total, 
by 1999 it accounted for 68 percent of the total (UNODCCP 2000, p.28). Where once 
Colombia’s cocaine industry had depended on large shipments coming in from Peru and 
Bolivia, this increased self-sufficiency in its own, indeed more potent, coca crop led the CIA 
and DOD to estimate that such hectares of production ultimately yielded 65 metric tons of 
cocaine produced in 1993, 80 tons in 1995, 165 tons in 1998 and 250 tons in 1999 (U.S. 
Congress 1999a; Golden and Myers 1999). These figures demonstrated that while U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy in the region had, to a relatively successful degree, squeezed 
production in Bolivia and Peru, production had instead shifted into home grown Colombian 
coca, accounting for the significant increases in its domestic output over such a short period 
of time, even if overall regional output had shrunk. 
In addition to helping clear a path for the smaller drug trafficking entities, the 
breaking of the cartel monopolies and the significant increase in coca production also allowed 
 104 
guerrillas and paramilitaries54 to take advantage of revenues from the drug trade to a far 
larger extent than they had been able to previously. The ‘balloon effect’ of coca production 
moving to Colombia after the squeeze in Bolivia and Peru, presented the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries as useful an opportunity to exploit as had clearing the field of cartel rivals, 
especially when major coca production moved to the guerrilla-controlled areas bordering 
Ecuador (Crandall 2002, p.160). With a significant portion of Colombia’s coca being 
produced in FARC-controlled areas of the country, it was estimated that up to half of the 
organisation’s income, some $200-400 million, was derived from trafficking, revenues which 
went into improving FARC’s military capabilities, in terms of paying recruits, purchasing 
weaponry, supplies, and so on (U.S. Congress 1999b; Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.106). 
President Pastrana attempted to reach a negotiated settlement with FARC and the 
smaller left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN), to the extent of granting FARC an area 
the size of Switzerland in which to operate free of government forces, a zone de despeje 
(demilitarised zone), and a far smaller zona de convivencia (live-and-let-live zone) for the 
ELN (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, p.73-78). Negotiations dragged on, stopping and starting as 
FARC launched occasional attacks, or government forces threatened to move in on the zone 
only to pull back as negotiation deadlines were continuously extended, though little was ever 
achieved from the extra time granted and FARC was able to operate with impunity. 
Writing at the height of Colombia’s security crisis, and echoing how the difficulty in 
imposing central authority facilitated such instability, Gabriel Marcella and Donald Schulz 
paint a grim picture of the security situation that Colombia faced: 
 
“Integration of Colombia’s many regions into a coherent nation-state has been the 
principal challenge since independence. It is even more so now […] The rate of 
killing in Colombia far exceeds the amount of ethnic cleansing that went on after the 
breakup of Yugoslavia. Both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas take over areas and 
displace thousands of people. The nation’s capacity to deal with this turmoil has been 
sharply declining, due to the weakening of most state institutions and the 
fragmentation of the social fabric.” (1999, p.3) 
                                                 
54 These paramilitary groups were formed to push back against left-wing guerrilla incursions onto private 
landholdings. However, the operations of drug traffickers were also put at risk by guerrilla activity (since they 
were often landowners too), and so drug money went towards supporting the paramilitaries, who eventually 
came under the umbrella of the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 1997. Such paramilitary 
groups also turned to drug trafficking on their own to fund themselves, just as FARC had done and the ELN 
eventually resorted to (BBC 2013b). 
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In addition to the links between the guerrilla movements and cocaine for the purposes of 
financing operations55 (such as the increase in cocaine production in the FARC-dominated 
department of Putumayo), FARC took advantage of peace talks to consolidate gains and 
launch new offensives, while the ELN undertook an airline hijacking and mass kidnapping in 
Cali. Taken together, this convinced the U.S. that the negotiation strategy favoured by 
Pastrana was increasingly futile. Such sentiments only strengthened after FARC’s kidnapping 
and murder of three American indigenous rights activists (Crandall 2002, p.161-162). 
With the peace process collapsing, Colombia’s civil conflict showed no sign of 
abating, and was reaching new levels of chaos and violence due to the influence of the drug 
trade. Increased hectares of cultivation and bumper harvests of coca leaf meant there was 
more base material for the manufacture of cocaine than ever before, cocaine that continued to 
find its way in the U.S. market and beyond. This generated potentially enormous profits, not 
only for the smaller legacy cartelios that had replaced the once dominant Medellin and Cali 
organisations, but also funding for the coffers of the guerrillas and paramilitaries taking part 
in the broader civil conflict that threatened the stability of Colombia as a functioning state. 
Consequently, Colombia became a ‘crisis’ case in U.S. foreign policy circles 
(Crandall 2002, p.162). In an echo of how U.S. policy makers were only vaguely aware of the 
growing problem posed by Colombian cartels in the 1970s until the issue erupted, so too did 
Colombia’s internal security issues rapidly rise up the foreign policy agenda as the situation 
deteriorated. National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, stated at the time that “[Colombia] is 
a third-order issue that is going to become a first-order issue” (Golden and Myers 1999). 
The former head of U.S. Southern Command, and Director of the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, General Barry McCaffrey, pushed for increased aid to the Colombian 
government. This was to improve its security forces’ ability to combat guerrillas, and to 
adequately train sufficient counter-narcotics forces to erode the Colombian drug trade that 
helped sustain said guerrillas and smaller cartels. In testimony before a Congressional 
committee in August 1999, McCaffrey was clear about the threat presented: 
 
“The explosion of coca cultivation […] in Colombia undermines the U.S. source-zone 
strategy and Colombian democratic institutions. The growth of drug cultivation, 
production, and trafficking has added substantially to the war chests of the guerrilla 
and paramilitary groups, which protect and/or control various aspects of the drug 
                                                 
55 Some American intelligence reports estimated that guerrilla profits from the drug trade were between $30-100 
million a year, a lot less than many figures public officials had cited, but still a significant amount for insurgent 
operations in poor and underdeveloped rural heartlands (Golden and Myers 1999). 
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industry […] In Colombia, the melding of guerrilla movements, or in some cases, 
paramilitary groups, and international drug trafficking organizations has created an 
unprecedented threat to the rule of law, democratic institutions, and the fabric of 
society.” (U.S. Congress 1999b) 
 
McCaffrey was supported in his assessment by Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering 
who, after a visit to Colombia in August 1999 (the most senior U.S. diplomat to visit in years 
after the acrimony surrounding the Samper Administration) became convinced that more 
needed to be done to “stop the bleeding” (Crandall 2002, p.162). 
The intended primary recipients of the advocated aid were the Colombian security 
forces, with McCaffrey citing a “drug-related emergency” to justify the concentration of a 
proposed $1 billion increase in aid on the military and police. This included $360 million to 
allow the army to push into contested cocaine producing areas of southern Colombia, and a 
$120 million to increase the interdiction of drug flights (Golden and Myers 1999). Such calls 
for increased militarisation may have chimed with members of Congress of both parties who 
were hawkish on the drug issue56. Yet elements of the Pentagon, State Department and 
National Security Council were wary about becoming involved in a protracted civil conflict. 
They pressed to broaden the U.S. agenda in Colombia, arguing that "a modest rise in military 
aid should be balanced by support for social-development projects, the economy and a 
negotiated settlement to the war", with more support for Colombian police and judiciary in 
pursuing anti-drug operations (Golden and Myers 1999). 
In July 2000, the U.S. Congress approved a special supplemental appropriation of 
$1.3 billion for Plan Colombia, of which $860 million was designated for Colombia itself. 
Despite Pastrana’s original envisioning of Plan Colombia as more of a socio-economic aid 
package with a smaller security component (Crandall 2008, p.123), the ultimate version that 
was approved by Congress had 75 percent of Colombia’s $860 million – some $642.3 million 
– going to the police and, predominantly, the military (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.108). 
‘Plan Colombia’ was to remain the identifier of the main counter-narcotics initiative in 
Colombia, neighbouring countries and areas of the Caribbean, despite funds officially being 
                                                 
56 In late-1998, the Clinton Administration was caught off-guard when Republicans in Congress drafted an 
emergency spending plan to immediately increase military and counter-narcotics aid to Colombia by $287 
million on top of what was already allocated. It has been suggested that the extra support called for by the 
Administration in 1999 was an effort not to be outflanked again, to avoid appearing ‘weak’ in the prosecution of 
the drug war and the provision of the resources to fight it, a charge that Democrats as well as Republicans were 
keen to avoid. Even then, Republicans still wished to appear even tougher than Clinton by proposing their own 
wish-list of support, including one Representative’s call for $930 million in completely new aid in addition to 
what was already on offer (Golden and Myers 1999). 
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provided under the rubric of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) from 2002. Also, far 
from being a blank cheque, funding was to be provided on an annual basis only, subject to 
Congressional approval through the foreign operations appropriations process and related 
supplemental appropriations legislation (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.109). This ensured 
that Congress retained conditional oversight and that mission creep into an outright 
counterinsurgency operation did not occur, such was the sentiment at the time for supporting 
a counter-narcotics initiative, but making sure it stayed as such57. 
Important qualifiers and criteria were applied to ensure this remained U.S. policy. The 
two principal U.S. departments to lead the Plan Colombia initiative were DOD and State, and 
their mutual responsibilities with regards to supporting the counter-narcotics efforts of the 
Colombian military and police were clearly focused and defined, with no element of overt 
counter-insurgency, as made clear in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
 
(U.S. GAO 2008, p.12) 
                                                 
57 This was clear in the legislation, with one point stating that “funds appropriated […] shall be utilised for the 
procurement of and support for two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters for use by the Colombian National Police 
which shall be utilised only for counter-narcotics operations in southern Colombia” (U.S. Congress 2000, p.7, 
emphasis added). This was despite southern Colombia being a hotbed of guerrilla activity, which meant that any 
counter-narcotics operations would have been difficult to separate from counterinsurgency. It was a consistent 
problem encountered until the Bush Administration deliberately chose to conflate both counter-narcotics and 
counterinsurgency post-9-11 as two sides of the same war on terror, thus ‘solving’ the problem of the 
conditionality of U.S. military assistance being solely for counter-narcotics. 
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Additionally, “The Purpose Statute” is an important U.S fiscal law which requires that funds 
appropriated by Congress must be used for the purpose for which they were appropriated. 
Thus, all training, support and equipment that was provided to the Colombian security forces 
as a result of Plan Colombia funding (such as police helicopters or resourcing the Counter-
narcotics Brigade for example) by law had to be used for counter-narcotics operations only. 
Guidelines made it clear that any Plan Colombia-funded aviation or military unit could not 
even pre-plan nor conduct any non-counter-narcotic operation (USAID 2009, p.3-4). 
However, by mid-2001, such guidelines were increasingly meeting untidy reality, where 
unplanned engagements with FARC and ELN forces increasingly blurred the situation. What 
may have started as purely counter-narcotics missions could effectively become counter-
insurgency actions as soon as guerrillas were met in combat, even if said guerrillas were 
trafficking drugs. As a result, there was increasing operational pressure to be able to have the 
flexibility to utilise counter-narcotics assistance and equipment against such armed groups as 
the situation demanded (USAID 2009, p.4). 
 Such attempts at distinction between counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics 
dissolved after the September 11th attacks and the launch of the War on Terror. While there 
had been recognition that illegal armed groups in Colombia were inextricably linked to the 
cocaine trade, there was now acceptance that they thus constituted legitimate targets for 
Colombian security and counter-narcotics forces supported by the U.S. In 2002, President 
Alvaro Uribe was elected with a strong mandate to restore internal security and adopt a hard 
line against illegal armed groups, the FARC and ELN especially (Forero 2002). A meeting of 
minds occurred between his administration and the George W. Bush White House on the 
issue of treating the War on Drugs and War on Terror as one and the same in Colombia. This 
meant that the military aspects of Plan Colombia – especially weapons and equipment 
transfers, DOD support and interdiction support – were solidified and strengthened in 
conjunction with Uribe’s Democratic Security policy, which sought to greatly expand the 
Colombian military and police (Isacson 2012, p.3). 
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Figure 4 - U.S. Counter-narcotics Assistance to Colombia, FY2000-FY2006 (millions $) 
 
 
NADR = Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs 
(Veillette 2006, p.6) 
 
In summary, as Figure 4 highlights, throughout the initial Plan Colombia period of its 
original 2000-2006 remit, while alternative development (and initiatives under that banner 
such as judicial reform, human rights, etc.) received almost a billion dollars in U.S. funding, 
it is dwarfed by the expenditure on military and security related support. $2.3 billion went 
into interdiction alone, with DOD support contributing over $1.1 billion, and weaponry and 
equipment transfers through FMF accounting for over $300 million. It is no coincidence that 
this period of time saw a significant expansion and resourcing of the Colombian military and 
police, alongside a sustained counter-insurgency campaign which now effectively included 
counter-narcotics in its remit – counter-narcoinsurgency, so to speak. 
The Democratic Security policy formed the basis for Plan Patriota, an initiative where 
the progressively larger and better trained and equipped Colombian forces – thanks to U.S. 
support – sought to not only mitigate drug trafficking, but to expand state authority into 
ungoverned and guerrilla controlled spaces to deny the drug trade and insurgency space to 
operate (Isacson 2012, p.3-4). Commencing in late-2003 and early-2004, tens of thousands of 
Colombian troops, backed by U.S. support, intelligence and guidance, pushed into the 
predominantly FARC-controlled remote, rural, coca-cultivating southern areas of the country 
(Isacson 2012, p.4). While the Colombian military was able to score easy initial victories, it 
encountered continuing resistance from FARC, especially when attempting to eradicate coca 
fields and cocaine labs. A 2006 cable from U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, William Wood 
(2003-2007), illustrated the progress and the challenges of counter-narcotics operations 
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during Plan Patriota, and how any remaining notional divide between these operations and 
counter-insurgency efforts had essentially dissolved: 
 
“After months of intense campaigns, the Colombian Army has occupied former 
FARC strongholds and harried key FARC cocaine trafficking fronts […] Because of 
its strategic importance, [FARC’s] Eastern Bloc has defended these areas against 
encroachment by the Government of Colombia (GOC). In December 2005, the FARC 
killed 29 soldiers in Macarena, prompting the GOC to turn to manual coca 
eradication. Police suffered heavy losses guarding eradicators, leading to army 
reinforcement of police security […] FARC attacks [in Eastern Macarena] led to the 
deaths of seven civilian eradicators, 13 police and 15 soldiers [causing] the GOC to 
suspend manual eradication in August 2006 in favour of spraying.” 
(U.S. State Department 2006) 
 
This demonstrated how the Colombian military was closely operating with the CNP and 
eradicators in counter-narcotics efforts, in main part because its prior counter-insurgency 
priority and counter-narcotics had become a one-and-the-same campaign. However, the 
active involvement of the military, indeed the arguably predominant role it had assumed, was 
proving problematic in itself in translating short-term security gains and counter-narcotic 
successes into lasting social and economic stability. Again, Ambassador Wood reported his 
concerns to Washington: 
 
“For the Colombian military, installing bases in a former ‘no-go’ zone is a big step 
forward, but holding more territory stretches military resources while not defeating an 
elusive enemy […] supplanting a FARC narco-dominion with legitimate state 
governance and a legal economy will be a tougher challenge than the military victory 
[…] Victory requires the Colombian army to occupy more territory, leading it to 
convert mobile brigades into units of fixed area control and reducing offensive 
capacity […] To achieve lasting success, the military’s efforts must be followed by 
programs to replace terrorist control and a coca-based economy with government 
security, legitimate economic activities, and effective social programs.” 
(U.S. State Department 2006) 
 
It became clear that, while the military could effectively take and hold territory, governing 
these areas was a different matter that required a different approach. 
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 It was with this in mind that a Consolidation phase was introduced. It aimed to 
entrench security gains into longer-term economic and social advances, promote governance 
and stability in previously ungoverned or guerrilla-controlled rural regions and, via this 
cumulative social and security progress, deny the drug trade and insurgencies space and 
opportunity to operate. The initiative emerged – with substantial input from the U.S. embassy 
and Southern Command, recognising Ambassador Wood’s concerns – from the Colombian 
Ministry of Defence under Defence Minister Juan Manuel Santos, in cooperation with the 
Colombian Presidency in order to ensure a civilian component (Isacson 2012, p.5). 
The result was the Centre for Coordination of Integrated Action (Centro de 
Coordinación de Acción Integral, or CCAI), which was given legal standing to request 
support from all Colombian government departments as necessary to achieve the aims of 
Consolidation in each troubled region, where it set up regional centres. The aims were 
essentially ‘clear, hold, build’ initiatives whereby the military secured the area, then police, 
judiciary and development workers moved in to establish a state presence and deliver quick 
impact development and infrastructure projects. Ultimately the benefits of state authority 
would be recognised by the populace, where stable governance, police presence and social 
funding would improve local services and the economy, and the resulting stability would free 
up the military to move onto the next region (Isacson 2012, p.5). 
 Such a concentrated program helped address U.S. concerns that successful immediate 
counter-narcotic operations were not accompanied by longer-term efforts to reduce coca 
cultivation, as well as stabilise the country to an extent that the U.S. could be satisfied its 
initial reasons for launching Plan Colombia had been met. 
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Figure 5 - U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-2013 (millions $) 
(Beittel 2012, p.38) 
 
As Figure 5 demonstrates – and as is explored further below in the ‘Making Military’ section 
– a substantial portion of Plan Colombia assistance was allocated to military and security 
related expenditure. However, not all funding was directly militarily related. International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) accounted for almost $840 million during 
the period, and over $1.1 billion went towards Economic Support Funding (ESF). It is no 
coincidence that the table shows that these sources of funding, complimentary to establishing 
stability (more police and alternative development), became part of Plan Colombia support 
when the Consolidation phase began and the U.S. started seeking ways to nationalise the 
issue. By this it was meant that the U.S. wished to maintain support where needed, but to 
begin to draw down its previous heavy commitment with the confidence that the Colombians 
were on their way to being able to independently manage the drug and insurgency issues. 
The consolidation phase was further refined into the National Consolidation Plan 
pursued by former Defence Minister Santos when he succeeded to the presidency after Uribe 
in 2010. While he has emphasised the security gains made in the preceding decade, Santos’s 
presidency has generally focused more on social, legal and economic development issues. 
Consolidation has been a signature policy, along with attempts to restart peace negotiations 
with a weakened FARC, and the 2011 Victims’ Law, which allows damages to be paid to 
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relatives of those killed in the civil conflict and the restitution of land stolen by armed groups 
from rightful owners (BBC 2011a; Human Rights Watch 2011). While the table above shows 
that U.S. military-related and law enforcement assistance has still been substantial in recent 
years, U.S. policy has been to support the broader nation-building remit of Consolidation in 
the hope that the drug trade can be tackled through soft, as well as hard power application. 
The U.S. institutionalised such support with the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative 
(CSDI), effectively a new framework that has replaced the old, more security focused Plan 
Colombia model, and described as: 
 
"An inter-agency approach that provides U.S. assistance across a full spectrum of 
activities: eradication and interdiction; capacity-building of the national police, 
military, and prosecutor units; strengthening state institutions at the local level; 
creation of viable economic options for communities, particularly in the agricultural 
sector; support for land reform and victims’ reparations, and assistance to vulnerable 
populations."            (U.S. State Department 2012) 
 
In 2012, however, the Colombian Ministry of Defence launched a new strategy called Espada 
de Honor (Sword of Honour), which focused more on disrupting FARC structures and drug 
trafficking operations in contested zones as opposed to placing an emphasis on securing 
civilian populations. Regional analyst, Adam Isacson, argues that the newer strategy, while 
more a compliment to Consolidation than a replacement, returns to older models of more 
military-oriented counter-narcoinsurgency operations: 
 
“Unlike Consolidation, it does not include a civilian governance component. Joint 
military-police task forces (with U.S. advisors), largely made up of elite personnel, 
are carrying out mobile operations with a strong emphasis on intelligence and air 
power. There is no effort to ensure civilian coverage of territory, nor is “holding” and 
“building” there a priority receiving significant resources.” (Isacson 2012, p.19) 
 
This strategy highlights that – while a greater social and economic component has entered 
broader, long-term counter-narcotics strategy of late, coupled with a desire by the U.S. to 
nationalise the issue – when it comes to directly tackling drug trafficking, a militarised 
approach has effectively become institutionalised thanks to over a decade of such support via 
U.S. policy. 
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 The next three sections further break down this militarisation of U.S. and Colombian 
counter-narcotics policy into its component framework elements – that of making military, 
institutionalisation, and criteria of violence. 
 
5.4 Colombia: Making Military 
 
Before Plan Colombia’s legislation enacted in 2000, there were moves by the U.S. to 
facilitate the militarisation of counter-narcotics operations in Colombia. In 1998 Secretary of 
Defence William Cohen met with his Colombian counterpart, Rodrigo Lloreda, to confirm 
U.S. support for the creation of a 1000 man counter-narcotics battalion. This was to assist the 
CNP against guerrillas and drug traffickers, with operational effectiveness commencing in 
the first half of 1999 (U.S. Department of Defence 1998). In one of his press conference 
responses following the meeting, Lloreda stated that: 
 
“The U.S. cooperation is in the area of counter-narcotics, and to the extent that this 
cooperation increases, the army will be more effective in helping the police in efforts 
of eradication, crop substitution, and in going after the small cartels that we have in 
Colombia. So to the extent that we are effective in dealing with the drug traffickers 
we will be effective in dealing with the insurgents because they derive support from 
drug traffickers. So, although the United States is not directly supporting Colombia in 
this effort, one of [the aid’s] secondary effects is that insurgency in Colombia will be 
undermined.”              (U.S. Department of Defence 1998) 
 
This meeting, and Lloreda’s statement demonstrate three important points. Firstly, that a U.S. 
military aid strategy was well underway before the Clinton Administration requested 
additional emergency funding under the Plan Colombia initiative to expand and continue it. 
Secondly, that this aid was initially seen as increasing the direct role of the Colombian 
military in counter-narcotics, albeit initially as an effective compliment to CNP counter-
narcotics, what with the police being seen as the lead agency in the matter. Nevertheless it 
was still a clear boost to military effectiveness and involvement rather than channelling 
resources into the police exclusively. Thirdly, though the U.S. was keen to avoid any 
suggestion that it was becoming involved in Colombia’s counterinsurgency issues, Lloreda’s 
statement openly concedes that, albeit indirectly, some aspects of drug policy would 
ultimately impact on the civil conflict against the guerrillas. Lloreda however is clearly 
careful to follow the U.S. line that it is not ‘directly’ supporting counterinsurgency efforts. As 
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indicated previously, the attempt to erect a conceptual barrier between U.S. involvement in 
counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics for the sake of political sensibilities was always a 
delicate balancing act. It was a difficult one to maintain given the degree of overlap between 
the two in Colombia, though it was a barrier that essentially dissolved following 9/11. 
When the Clinton Administration did approach Congress for emergency 
appropriations in 2000, just under $645 million out of the total initial funding allocation to 
Colombia went towards military aid, 75 percent of the total. Such funding was designed to 
facilitate the founding of a Counter-narcotics Brigade (as opposed to just one battalion) 
within the Colombian army by providing for the addition of two more counter-drug battalions 
to the one set up earlier, as announced by Cohen and Lloreda. Together with forty-five 
helicopters, improved light-infantry training and the arms, ammunition and intelligence 
gathering and communications equipment necessary for operational effectiveness, it was 
intended that this specialist 2,300 man battalion would help clear the way for mass coca 
eradication in Putumayo province (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.108). 
The shift in U.S. policy towards overt militarisation and counterinsurgency support 
came in February 2002, in the wake of 9/11. The Bush Administration included in its budget 
proposal for 2003 a request for $98 million in foreign military financing to create an elite 
Colombian counterinsurgency battalion, alongside the earlier efforts towards creating 
dedicated counter-narcotics battalions, like the First Army Counter-narcotics Brigade and the 
Navy Riverine Brigade (Crandall 2008, p.139; Isacson 2005, p.25). Funding and, 
importantly, overt training and support from U.S. military personnel for the purposes of 
improving the counterinsurgency capability of the Colombian military, and not just its 
counter-narcotics potential, demonstrated the confluences of counter-narcotics and 
counterinsurgency in the eyes of both U.S. and Colombian governments. 
For example, in late-2002 the U.S. Congress approved a $99 million programme to 
help the Colombian army protect the oil pipeline in the province of Arauca, an economic 
asset to the local and national Colombian governments (as well as to U.S. energy interests) 
that had been subjected to hundreds of guerrilla attacks and sabotage over the years (U.S. 
GAO 2005). By mid-2003, despite delayed deliveries of helicopters and other specialist 
equipment until 2005, dozens of U.S. Special Forces personnel were operating in the 
province, training the Colombian army’s 18th Brigade and new 5th Mobile Brigade, not just in 
passive defensive operations, but aggressive offensive operations. This was confirmed in an 
interview given by Southcom’s chief of operations, Brigadier General Galen Jackson, who 
admitted that, “these brigades […] will be very offensively oriented. That is, focused on the 
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enemy, as opposed to a static defence around the pipeline” (U.S. GAO 2005; Ramirez Lemus 
et al. 2005, p.110). 
This is demonstrative of two things. First, the active involvement of the U.S. military 
and the encouragement of an overtly offensive ‘take out the enemy’ operational mind-set - 
two clear indicators of ‘making military’. Secondly, while in theory such Colombian 
personnel could be turned to counter-narcotics operations, the fact that this was not a 
precondition to what was essentially counterinsurgency support meant that, as a result of the 
War on Terror, militarily supporting counterinsurgency was no longer taboo. It was in fact 
regarded as counter-terrorism, the whole point of the War on Terror, after all. This confirmed 
the dissolution of the notional barrier separating counter-narcotics from counterinsurgency in 
Colombia. For all intents and purposes they had essentially become the same problem in the 
eyes of the U.S. and the like-minded Uribe Administration, and so could both be solved by 
increased military and security support. 
 
Figure 6 - U.S. Assistance for Plan Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-2013 (millions $) 
(Beittel 2012, p.38) 
 
As Figure 6 demonstrates for the period of analysis in this chapter, from 2000 to 2013, of the 
over $9 billion of U.S. assistance towards Plan Colombia, the lion’s share has been towards 
military and security support. $4.2 billion was dedicated to counter-narcotics funding, out of 
which was provided training, support and resources for Colombian military and police 
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interdiction and eradication efforts. In addition to this, almost $670 million of direct 
weaponry and equipment transfers to the Colombians took place via the FMF program. Over 
$400 million supported Air Wing operations, one of the most important tactical resources at 
the disposal of the military and CNP in adopting swift and effective counter-narcotics and 
counterinsurgency strikes. Almost $2 billion went towards Department of Defence funding 
and involvement in the Plan Colombia initiative. Additionally, Figure 7 below shows that 
military and police assistance has made up the bulk of U.S. support during Plan Colombia’s 
lifetime, peaking during the initial launch in 2000, before falling briefly and rising again after 
9/11 and in support of the Plan Patriota assault on the narco-insurgency. 
 
Figure 7 
 
(Isacson 2012, p.3) 
 
Military and police support has fallen as a proportion of U.S. support in recent years, and 
economic and social assistance has seen a relative rise in concert with Consolidation. 
However, this is not to suggest that U.S. and Colombian counter-narcotics are demilitarising 
in any way, as highlighted by the emphasis on U.S. assisted military and police mobile forces 
in the Espada de Honor strategy. On the contrary, U.S. support may be gradually reducing as 
it seeks to nationalise the conflict, but that is because the U.S. has greater confidence in 
Colombian forces thanks to institutionalisation of militarised counter-narcotics and security 
approaches. 
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5.5 Colombia: Institutionalisation 
 
The institutionalisation of U.S.-influenced militarisation in Colombian counter-narcotics 
received a major boost from Plan Colombia. However, this simply helped consolidate a long-
running trend. The embedding of the Colombian military’s power in state security and 
against the drug trade had begun long before. During La Violencia, the military had initially 
refused to be drawn into partisan conflict between the factions. Following this period, in 
exchange for accepting civilian control of the government, the military was granted effective 
authority over national security policy (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.123). During the 
counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1960s to 1980s, the executive branch regularly invoked a 
state of siege and the military’s power grew further. Under such decrees, legal rights were 
suspended, though constitutional guarantees remained, and eventually the military were 
granted de facto jurisdiction over civilians, made de jure with the 1978 Security Statute (itself 
informed by the U.S. National Security Doctrine) (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.123). 
Further decrees strengthened the military’s hand in counter-narcotics operations, with 
Presidential decrees 3655 and 3671 of December 1986 respectively increasing the military 
and police roles in prosecuting the drug war, and granting the military jurisdiction over 
civilians accused of drug offences, effectively reaffirming that the population was subject to 
martial law (Menzel 1997, p.48). However, in 1987 the Colombian Supreme Court declared 
that military jurisdiction over civilians was unconstitutional, and further that counter-
narcotics should be led by the Anti-Narcotics Police and the Administrative Department of 
Security (dissolved in 2011 and replaced with the National Intelligence Agency), freeing up 
the military to deal with the primary threats of FARC and the ELN (Menzel 1997, p.48). 
Though the army was satisfied that the ruling meant avoiding prosecuting both drug 
and counterinsurgency wars, another executive decree followed in August 1987. Number 
1630 attempted to keep the military engaged in counter-narcotics by confronting the 
emerging phenomena of drug trafficker-sponsored assassins (sicarios) and paramilitaries, 
though the latter were also becoming traffickers themselves (Menzel 1997, p.48). Despite the 
constitutional safeguards and legal ruling, the institutionalisation of the military in counter-
narcotics was still further enhanced in the judicial realm with the 1988 Defence of 
Democracy Statute. This included drug trafficking as a national security (and thus military) 
concern, and also allowed for the creation of special judicial procedures for drug traffickers 
and guerrillas, which remained in place until the mid-1990s, with a new Constitutional Court 
confirming the earlier rulings of the Supreme Court (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.123-124). 
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While these examples are more legal and judicial in nature, they demonstrate an 
institutionalisation of militarisation even before Plan Colombia and the U.S. policy of 
enhancing the direct role of the Colombian military in counter-narcotics operations. This 
emphasis by the U.S. was equally embraced by the Uribe Administration from 2002, which 
saw a greater role for the Colombian military in taking on both counterinsurgency and 
counter-narcotics in order to strengthen national security. 
Under the Democratic Security policy and the subsequent Consolidation phase, 
Colombian budget allocations to the security sector grew to 5.2% of GDP by 2003 and total 
spending on defence rose to $6.9 billion in 2006 (USAID 2009, p.10). By 2007, the 
Colombian army had grown by 78,000, and new military units were deployed, including 2 
divisions, 6 brigades, 12 new mobile units and 6 mountain battalions. The armed forces 
acquired mobility assets, including over two-dozen helicopters, and the U.S. also assisted in 
provision of technical and signals intelligence. Additionally, the extension of police presence 
to every municipality in the country under Consolidation, built on the advances of Plan 
Patriota. It was an effort to introduce a stable state presence in previously ungoverned regions 
and encourage economic growth in areas that were most susceptible to guerrilla activity and 
coca cultivation in the absence of legitimate alternatives (USAID 2009, p.10; Isacson 2012, 
p.6). Figure 8 highlights how military support for counter-narcotics became institutionalised 
as the highest proportion of aid to Colombia during the decade encompassing the launch and 
most active phase of Plan Colombia, before the Consolidation phase began. 
 
Figure 8 - Public Spending by the GOC on Defence, Security, Justice, Alternative 
Development and Assistance to Victims of Conflict (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
(USAID 2009, p.13) 
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The four tables of Figure 9, below, also highlight several factors. Firstly, the numbers of 
personnel in the four Colombian security services at the end of the time frame of this analysis 
are substantially higher than at the beginning. Even as Consolidation sought to build on the 
gains in national security by shifting more attention towards social, judicial and economic 
development, this substantial growth indicates that there will be no roll back. The increased 
size, operational scope and institutional practice and culture prompted by U.S. counter-
narcotics support is now institutionalised. Secondly, while in some years there are 
fluctuations in the numbers of security personnel from all three main military services (these 
drops are relative to each service’s overall size however, e.g. the smaller air force would see 
the loss of only a few hundred personnel as a noticeable dip), they quickly recover, 
consolidating security gains and maintaining counter-narcotic operational effectiveness. 
Thirdly, of all services, the CNP have experienced the most consistent increase in personnel 
over the years, highlighting the government strategy of making far more use of this 
militarised civilian force to project state authority and provide a consistent counter-narcotics 
presence and deterrence in every municipality. 
 
Figure 9 
Colombian Army numbers  Colombian National Police numbers 
 
  Colombian Navy numbers          Colombian Air Force numbers 
 
(Government of Colombia 2014, p.70-71) 
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It must also be emphasised that the Consolidation strategy originated in the Colombian 
Ministry of Defence. It enjoyed significant conceptual input from U.S Southern Command, 
and indeed given that the CCAI’s had no independent budget of their own, the biggest 
internal Colombian government department donor was the Defence Ministry (Isacson 2012, 
p.5-6). This highlights its significant role in the conception and execution of the strategy, and 
the institutionalisation of the military and security establishment in even a notionally more 
civilian-focused effort. 
 Taken together, the increase in budget, resources, manpower and deployment in the 
name of internal security and narcotics enforcement would indicate that this is not a 
temporary state of affairs, but a long-term commitment to ‘democratic security’ for the 
foreseeable future. Given that such measures have largely been reliant on Making Military, as 
demonstrated above, the unlikely rollback of such measures in the face of concerns about 
Colombia slipping back into insecurity would strongly indicate that these initiatives have 
become institutionalised. 
 
5.6 Colombia: Criteria of Violence 
 
When considering the thousands of civilians and combatants killed, substantial refugee issues 
for the former, and the outright armed-combat between the latter, the nature of Colombia’s 
civil conflict complied with the criteria for a violised security situation. However, as initial 
U.S. policy in Plan Colombia tried to maintain, the civil conflict and the counter-narcotics 
conflict were, in theory, separate, but in reality intertwined. As the U.S. became more 
involved in the country with the launch of Plan Colombia, and eventual policy post-9/11 
deliberately conflated counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics campaigns (Vauters and 
Smith 2006, pp.171-172), the U.S. attempted to ensure that the human rights violations of the 
civil conflict did not also automatically become entwined with counter-narcotics operations. 
As a result, the initial emergency appropriations bill that launched Plan Colombia contained 
provisions outlining the conditions for military assistance. Three principle points were that: 
 
"The head of the Colombian Armed Forces has been granted and is exercising 
authority that is identical to that held by the head of the Colombian National Police to 
summarily dismiss Colombian Armed Forces personnel for gross violations of human 
rights; 
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The Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian authorities in 
investigating Colombian Armed Forces personnel where credible evidence exists of 
gross violations of human rights, and, if those investigations result in indictments, the 
Colombian Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian authorities in prosecuting and 
punishing such personnel in the civilian courts; 
 
The Colombian Armed Forces are developing and deploying in their field units a 
Judge Advocate General Corps to investigate Colombian Armed Forces personnel for 
gross violations of human rights." 
(U.S. Congress 2000, p.10) 
 
These stipulations reflected the preceding 1997 Leahy Law on Human Rights, commonly 
known as the Leahy Amendment. Its chief sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy, sought to ensure 
that no funding contained in future foreign aid appropriations acts went to military or police 
units that included members alleged to have committed human rights violations (U.S. Code 
1997)58. Vetting was conducted through the State Department, though this has had its own 
issues, as explored below. Additional funding (via the State Department counter-narcotics 
program and administered by USAID) was allocated towards programs to strengthen civil 
and human rights awareness (U.S. GAO 2003, p.22), and both governmental and non-
governmental institutions, including units of the Colombian attorney general’s office, the 
inspector general and the public ombudsman. Additionally, the Early Warning System (EWS) 
was set up as an interagency program coordinated by the Office of the Public Ombudsman, 
designed to protect civilians from massacres, forced displacement and other rights violations 
(although, as explored below, its effectiveness was mixed) (U.S. GAO 2003, p.10; Ramirez 
Lemus et al. 2005, p.131). 
It was not without reason that the stipulations had been included in the Plan Colombia 
legislation, that the Leahy Amendment’s influence was felt in it and successive acts, and that 
support had been included for human rights institutions. In 1999 the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights reported that the "situation of human rights in Colombia – 
which involves massive and continuous violations of the most fundamental human rights – is 
currently one of the most difficult and serious in the Americas" (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, 
                                                 
58 An example of when the Leahy Amendment proved effective in Colombia came in 2002, when the U.S. 
suspended aid to the 1st Air Combat Command of the Colombian Air Force, a unit that was involved in a rocket 
attack on the village of Santo Domingo when clashing with the FARC in December 1998 (Ramirez Lemus et al. 
2005, p.129). 
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p.122). In the same year, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Colombia reported 402 massacres, mainly committed by paramilitary units, but with 
testimonies pointing to the involvement of some Colombian military personnel with such 
paramilitary units (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.128). At the same time, largely as a result of 
the jurisdictional carte blanche the military had under frequent states of siege, the rates of 
impunity for all crimes committed by military personnel reached 90 percent; almost 100 
percent for human rights crimes (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.128) 
Given that counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency policy became so entwined 
following the 9/11 attacks, the issue of human rights in Colombia’s civil conflict also became 
reflective of human rights issues resulting from counter-narcotics policy. Therefore, while 
criteria of violence is an important element to explore, in the context of the amount of force 
and lethality employed against drug traffickers, narco-guerrillas, and their operations, it is 
also important to consider the significant role of human rights considerations. These were 
emphasised in an effort to ensure that targeted violence did not exceed the boundaries 
demanded by U.S. policy, even if in the early stages of Plan Colombia such good intentions 
were honoured more in the breach by Colombian security forces. 
Human rights not only refer to the direct physical treatment of people, but also their 
ability to conduct sustainable livelihoods – threatened by the mass displacements resulting 
from the combined impacts of counter-narcotic and counterinsurgency operations – as well as 
their recourse to official and impartial means of justice to seek redress. In the early stages of 
Plan Colombia, when military involvement was being emphasised following 9/11, Julia 
Sweig observed that: 
 
“The U.S. effort to build regional support for a military campaign in Colombia will be 
further complicated by scepticism about Washington’s motivation for expanding its 
already significant military presence […] In Latin America, the U.S. armed forces are 
widely regarded as having been complicit in years of repression. Given the extreme 
weakness of democracy in the region, legitimate fear exists across society that if 
Washington makes stronger ties to local militaries a priority, it will only strengthen 
the very institutions that are most associated with the authoritarian rule of recent 
decades.” (2002, p.139) 
 
Aside from a brief interlude of direct military rule, Colombia is Latin America’s longest 
established democracy, and thus could not be regarded as authoritarian in the same capacity 
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as other regional dictatorships. Nevertheless, the human rights record of the Colombian 
security forces (and by extension an understanding of what level of violence the U.S. was 
willing to tolerate in pursuit of counter-narcotics goals) could not be said to comply with the 
expectations of conventional democratic standards, and the U.S. recognised this when it came 
to formulating counter-narcotics policy. 
Early indicators that human rights were of growing consideration in this regard – even 
before stipulations in Plan Colombia legislation – came from Myles Frechette, U.S. 
Ambassador to Colombia and an outspoken supporter of taking a hard line on the drug issue. 
He elucidated fears of becoming involved in overt military counterinsurgency operations in 
Colombia, given the negative fallout from the U.S. experience in Central America the 
previous decade, when thousands of tortured, dispossessed, killed or disappeared persons in 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua tainted the U.S. by association. In a 1997 diplomatic 
cable, he wrote that “the issue raises too many human rights concerns and has been a searing 
experience for us in Central America” (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.107). A year later, 
Frechette made a farewell speech in which he singled out the Colombian military’s Twentieth 
Brigade (also known as the 20th Intelligence Brigade) for human rights abuses, not least 
housing a death squad (Schemo 1998). Shortly after, it was announced that the Brigade was 
to be dissolved, its intelligence gathering responsibilities divided amongst the other services 
of the Colombian military, and its officers reviewed and vetted for alleged abuses, though the 
move was approached with caution from human rights watchdogs, who feared more of a PR 
exercise to dilute the problem rather than effectively tackling it (Schemo 1998). 
It was in this context that the Leahy Amendment was intended to be applied, as 
outlined above. Yet though this did provide greater safeguards against U.S. policy supporting 
foreign armed forces with dubious human rights records, national security waivers allowed 
them to effectively be watered down. For example, the very next point that followed the three 
primary human rights stipulations listed above was a waiver, stating that "The President may 
waive [these limitations] if the President determines that the waiver is required by 
extraordinary circumstances" (U.S. Congress 2000, p.11). In other words the President had 
the ability to waive such human rights concerns in the interests of U.S. national security, as 
President Clinton did in August 2000 (Serafino 2001, p.15). A further critique in this vein is 
that the State Department facilitated approval of certification in the early stages of Plan 
Colombia by relying on narrow, albeit technically correct, legalistic interpretations on how 
actions by the Colombian armed forces constituted compliance with human rights criteria. 
For example, State Department documents highlighted the numbers of military personnel 
 125 
who had been arrested, dismissed or prosecuted for alleged human rights abuses and/or 
collaboration with paramilitaries as evidence that the Colombians were complying. Yet the 
same document stated that: 
 
"Although the Secretary has determined that the Colombian Armed Forces' efforts 
justify certification at this time, the U.S. and Colombian governments recognize that 
the Colombian government and military need to do more to protect human rights and 
to sever military-paramilitary ties."         (U.S. State Department 2002) 
 
Further analysis reveals that between October 1995 and December 2001, only 125 military 
personnel suspected of gross human rights violations were subjected to preventative detention 
orders (U.S. State Department 2002). This leaves the impression that as long as tangible 
evidence existed of the Colombian military making efforts to meet its commitments (i.e. 
arresting some personnel), then certification could be approved, even if such commitments 
were not met in totality (it can be suggested that 125 cases in six years did not represent the 
entire catalogue of alleged human rights abuses that could conceivably have been assembled). 
It was perhaps not unexpected that significant numbers of the officer class of the 
Colombian armed forces would be accused or prosecuted for human rights violations, given 
that many had been educated at the School of the Americas during the Cold War period. 
Established in 1946 with the aim of improving ties between the U.S. and Latin American 
militaries, and educating them in the virtues of democratic civilian control over armed forces, 
the School of the Americas was not without controversy. In reality, training – even codified 
in an official SOA manual in 1987 – included instruction in interrogation techniques 
bordering on torture, as well as psychological warfare, mainly targeted at confronting the 
threats posed by leftist guerrillas and political movements in Latin America in the 1980s. 
Among its 60,000 or so graduates were Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, Argentinian 
Junta leader Leopoldo Galtieri and Roberto D'Aubuisson, the organiser of many death squads 
in El Salvador’s civil war (New York Times 1996). The School moved from Panama to Fort 
Benning, Georgia in 1984 and, following the exposure of its educational practices and the 
ensuing controversy, was reformed and rebranded in 2001 as the Western Hemisphere 
Institute for Security Cooperation (Campbell 2002). It has since proceeded with an avidly 
pro-human rights curriculum as the U.S. sought to repair its image-by-association and have 
policy match Plan Colombia’s legislative and moral stipulations. Currently, all prospective 
students are vetted and a Board of Visitors, including members of Congress, representatives 
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from the Departments of State and Defence, academics and clergy, provide regular external 
and independent oversight (WHINSEC 2014). However, SOA Watch, an organisation that 
has, since 1990, campaigned for the closure of the institute under whatever name it operates, 
has deemed the reforms as purely cosmetic (SOA Watch 2014). Additionally, a series of 
2004 academic interviews saw some staff argue that, while torture and brutality were 
unacceptable in the 21st Century, the old SOA manuals were part of a broader, legitimate U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy necessary for combatting enemies in a different era when certain 
actions were more permissible (Blakeley 2013, p.161). 
It may be the case that U.S. attitudes and policy have evolved since the end of the 
Cold War. However, as demonstrated above, for all the influence the U.S. wields through 
funding, training and support, it cannot necessarily dictate or minutely oversee the 
operational actions of the Colombian counter-narcotics forces it supports, especially given 
restrictions on the direct involvement of U.S. military and civilian personnel on anything 
other than training missions. 
Further evidence came to light with the ‘False Positives’ scandal, which broke as late 
as 2009, when almost 1200 members of the security forces were investigated, indicted or 
prosecuted across Colombia for over 900 cases where over 1500 civilians were killed and 
then dressed to look like narco-guerrillas killed in combat, thus contributing to positive 
campaign statistics (McDermott 2009; International Criminal Court 2012, p.3). As with 
earlier State Department certification approvals, the fact that Colombian military personnel 
involved in both counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency are being held to account is a 
positive factor, but the fact that there are still ongoing violations to be held accountable for 
are cause for concern. A recent ICC interim report on the situation in Colombia stated that: 
 
"While numerous members of the armed forces have been investigated and 
disciplinary measures, criminal convictions and prison sentences issued, the 
proceedings have not focused on the responsibility of those at senior levels for the 
occurrence of such crimes." (International Criminal Court 2012, p.57-60). 
 
Despite over a decade of initiatives, the U.S. has still not been able to completely expunge 
human rights abuses bordering on violised levels of violence. 
A sub-category of the human rights/levels of violence issue is that of displacement of 
populations (Internally Displaced Peoples, or IDP), due to guerrilla, paramilitary or state 
military incursions related to Colombia’s civil conflict, but just as often fuelled by counter-
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narcotics operations. Violence, armed conflict, drug trafficking and the search for better 
living conditions all came together at the height of Plan Colombia, with the numbers of IDP 
running into the hundreds of thousands. A microcosm example was the province of 
Putumayo where, according to the Social Solidarity Network (the Colombian government 
agency responsible for providing aid to displaced people) in 1999 415 people were displaced 
as a result of political violence, but by late 2003 IDP numbers had reached 56,000 after coca 
fumigation operations had been launched (Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.118). If Colombia as 
a whole during this period is analysed – as shown in Figure 10 – while the numbers of IDP 
were still high in 2000 when Plan Colombia launched, likely caused by the civil conflict, 
their numbers increased significantly in relation to greater fumigation that reduced coca 
cultivation levels. 
 
Figure 10 - Number of IDP and coca cultivation, 2000-2004 
 
The principle reasons for these 
displacements were the 
damage to livelihoods and the 
environment caused by 
spraying coca crops, partnered 
with civilians being caught in 
the crossfire between 
guerrillas, paramilitaries and 
Colombian forces, and thus 
being driven out for reasons of 
economic necessity or personal 
safety. While such 
displacements are the indirect consequence of counter-narcotic activity, rather than the direct 
intent, it cannot be said that IDP are victims of deliberate violence perpetrated against them, 
other than of course those victimised by the land grabs of guerrillas or paramilitaries. These 
groups are not under the influence of U.S. counter-narcotics policy and so their actions 
cannot be factored in when judging criteria of violence in this case study. Their actions are a 
consequence of the civil conflict in Colombia rather than the counter-narcotics campaign, and 
especially U.S. sanctioned counter-narcotics policy. 
U.S. policy cannot be completely regarded as benign however. While the official U.S. 
and Colombian position is that eradicating crops removes the incentive for armed groups to 
(UNODC and Government of Colombia 2005, p.39) 
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fight over territory, thus displacing civilians, the Colombian Human Rights and Displacement 
Consulting Office (CODHES) and the Ombudsman’s Office suggest that there is a direct link 
between eradication and the increase in internally displaced persons (Veillette and Navarrete-
Frías 2005, p.20). Though the U.S. could be accused of deliberate naivety in adopting this 
position regarding the consequences of its policy, the indirect nature of these consequences 
must again be emphasised in contrast to deliberate, targeted violence as perpetrated by illegal 
armed groups and, on occasion, Colombian forces. It can be shown that U.S. alternative 
development funding and measures were put in place to offset the negative displacement-
encouraging effects of loss of coca revenue on poor farmers and rural communities (Veillette 
and Navarrete-Frías 2005, p.20-21). However, for the majority of the period analysed, such 
funding was dwarfed by military spending as statistics throughout this chapter have 
highlighted, though social spending has grown as a proportion of overall U.S. aid in recent 
years during the Consolidation phase (Isacson 2012, p.3). 
Due to the ban on direct participation of U.S. military and security personnel in 
undertaking counter-narcotics operations, this section has inevitably been dominated by the 
criteria of violence in relation to Colombian counter-narcotics forces. However, in the same 
why that U.S. personnel lent valuable practical assistance in the past that led to the death of 
Pablo Escobar (lethal, yet still targeted violence), so too have U.S. assets recently been 
employed in the targeted deaths of guerrilla leaders, in a case where again the lines between 
Colombia’s civil war and drug war blurred. 
Operating under a covert programme authorised by George W. Bush following 
FARC’s seizure of American hostages in 2003, and continued under President Obama (and 
falling outside the approved Plan Colombia support package), the CIA was able to assist the 
Colombian military with intelligence and, eventually, equipment to facilitate the killing or 
capture of FARC commanders (Priest 2013; Guardian 2013). The CIA set up a special 
intelligence cell in the U.S. embassy in Bogota, where they were able to collect and assess 
intelligence on the FARC leadership and pass it on to Colombian forces, facilitated by U.S. 
Special Forces trainers. Lethal, direct military support was introduced when – after legal 
approval was granted – the CIA were authorised to provide the Colombian air force with the 
Enhanced Paveway II, a relatively inexpensive guidance device that could convert a standard 
500 drop-bomb into a targeted smart bomb. It was this combination of actionable intelligence 
and lethal ordinance that allowed the Colombian military to locate, attack and kill almost 
two-dozen guerrilla leaders since 2007, further compounding FARC’s strategic troubles 
(Priest 2013; Guardian 2013). 
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This is an example of the kind of limited, targeted violence that complies with 
militarisation, and one in which U.S. counter-narcotics policy was directly involved. In order 
to ensure that the use of such ordinance remained under U.S. control and was strictly limited 
and targeted, the CIA liaisons to the Colombian forces maintained possession of the 
encryption codes necessary to activate the smart bomb conversion equipment, freeing them 
up only with permission from above and when legitimate targets were confirmed (Priest 
2013; Guardian 2013). This demonstrates that, when the U.S. military and intelligence had a 
direct participatory role in counter-narcotics operations and Colombian forces were wholly 
reliant on U.S. oversight and support, it was possible to enforce a policy of targeted violence. 
This was in contrast to incidents where Colombian forces indulged in indiscriminate violence 
bordering on, if not crossing into, violisation, where U.S. funding, support and training have 
been provided but could not guarantee complete Colombian compliance in perpetrating what 
the U.S. might have considered acceptable levels of violence. 
Ultimately there has been progress within the criteria of violence applied to U.S.-
influenced counter-narcotics in Colombia. Where the U.S. has been directly involved – as 
with targeted FARC assassinations – the presence of militarisation via the provision of 
military equipment, intelligence and lethal practice, has been balanced with limited violence 
against specific groups and individuals. Where there has been fault, it lays with the 
Colombian security forces and individual and group actions, such as the indiscriminate 
violence of the False Positives incidents, where the loss of life could be classed a complying 
with a violised security situation. While the U.S. may have substantial influence thanks to its 
military and counter-narcotics aid, Colombia is still a sovereign country and its armed forces 
are not beholden or subordinate to the U.S. military. Therefore, in the absence of being able 
to take a direct command role – or at least vital participatory oversight as with the smart-
bombing of FARC – U.S. counter-narcotics policy is limited in the control it can exert on the 
associated levels of violence. The human rights stipulations attached to counter-narcotics aid 
provision in congressional legislation is the closest the U.S. can come to directly influencing 
the conduct of Colombian forces. While progress has been made in arrests and prosecutions 
of human rights violators, and the situation has markedly improved since the days of 
Colombian military impunity, it is still not a perfected situation. 
Therefore, when all factors are considered, U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia 
– at least its consequences, as indirectly applied by its partners – has had mixed success to 
date in respect to maintaining strictly militarised rather than violised criteria of violence. 
However, U.S. counter-narcotics policy itself – leaving aside Colombian partners – is 
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independently designed and intended to minimise human rights abuses while prosecuting the 
drug war, not to support or facilitate such abuses to the extent that they cross over into the 
violisation section of the security spectrum. Based on this interpretation, U.S. counter-
narcotics policy in Colombia complies with a criteria of violence indicative of militarisation. 
 
5.7 Results and Chapter Summary 
 
It can be reasonably concluded that U.S. counter-narcotics policy, during the time-scale of 
Plan Colombia, has been militarised. Evidence produced throughout this chapter supports this 
position. 
The long-standing military ties between the U.S. and Colombia prior to the drug 
conflict, be it training or funding programs with anti-communist aims, made increased 
military support, if not inevitable, then certainly accepted with greater ease than in Mexico, 
as explored in the next chapter. Before the strengthening of ties between the U.S. and the 
Colombian military in prosecuting counter-narcotics, American faith and funding was placed 
with the Colombian National Police. This was still a paramilitary organisation, and so 
American counter-narcotics support was already taking a decidedly militarised direction, 
even without principally supporting the Colombian military, as Plan Colombia measures 
eventually would. Also, leaving aside Colombia’s late-1990s drug issues and security crisis, 
the DOD was made lead agency for counter-narcotics in 1988, and the prominence of 
Southcom in the Latin American region dovetailed with the end of the Cold War. Southcom’s 
need to justify its existence and the financing and resources it consumed, matched with the 
DOD’s status as the principal agency for prosecuting America’s foreign counter-narcotics 
policy, altogether boosted U.S. counter-narcotics militarisation. 
However, this was not American support foisted upon another country solely in 
service to its own national security interest (even if that was the primary motivator). It was 
also in Colombia's interest to accept the counter-narcotics support on offer, given how drug 
money helped to feed its civil conflict. Pre-Plan Colombia policy, such as breaking the cartels 
and squeezing production in Bolivia and Peru, actually intensified coca cultivation in 
Colombia. The resultant revenues played a significant role in sustaining the civil conflict, 
even if the U.S. initially preferred to maintain an artificial distinction between the two 
security problems. Congress approved emergency funding for Plan Colombia, but for year-
on-year expenditure only, subject to annual oversight to ensure that counter-narcotics 
remained the focus and not counterinsurgency. This was always a difficult line to walk, and 
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after 9/11 and the commencement of the War on Terror, there was no longer a need to 
maintain this illogical distinction. The Bush and Uribe Administrations were in sync on the 
need to embark on a muscular, militarised strategy of counter-narcoterrorism. 
As a result, the Colombian military and national police experienced significant 
growth in numbers of personnel. This was especially the case for the ground forces of the 
army and CNP, in order to retake territory formally occupied by guerrillas, to clear coca 
crops, and to facilitate economic and social regeneration in those areas to create secure 
spaces. While this Consolidation phase emphasises economic and social development, 
military initiatives, such as Sword of Honour, still show that hard military power is utilised in 
the counter-narco insurgency cause, as well as soft socio-economic power. 
In truth, militarisation was always on an upwards trend. American military aid was 
well underway before Plan Colombia, with support allocated for a 1000-man counter-
narcotics brigade (U.S. Department of Defence 1998), which itself overtly boosted U.S. 
military involvement and support for the then-lead agency, the Colombian National Police. 
With Plan Colombia itself, 75 percent of the total budget allocation went to military aid 
(Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.108), intended to help form an entire counter-narcotics 
battalion, not just a brigade, plus support from helicopters, improved training, ammunition, 
intelligence, and communications equipment. All of these represented a direct injection of 
American military assets into Colombian counter-narcotics. The 9/11 attacks and their fallout 
only increased support, with military aid going towards the formation of a counterinsurgency 
battalion (Crandall 2008, p.139; Isacson 2005, p.25). This amounted to an additional counter-
narcotics force in all but name, due to the intertwining of counterinsurgency and counter-
narcotics in the Colombian civil conflict. Counterinsurgency support also saw the direct 
involvement of U.S. Special Forces on the ground in a training capacity, continuing the role 
they had undertaken for years, going back to the days of the Military Training Teams and the 
hunt for Pablo Escobar. 
Of the $9 billion spent by the United States between 2000-2013, $4.2 billion was 
dedicated to counter-narcotics funding for both the Colombian military and national police, 
with $670 million for direct weaponry and equipment transfers, $400 million for air wing 
operations, and $2 billion to fund DOD involvement in Plan Colombia (Beittel 2012, p.38). 
Essentially, the majority of Plan Colombia funding went into security and principally military 
assets, illustrating direct 'making military', as well as institutionalisation because it was 
carried out for such a prolonged period of time, and could not be regarded as a temporary 
emergency measure. 
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Concerning institutionalisation, this had begun pre-Plan Colombia, with the military 
allowed significant say over national security policy. Military authority was backed up by 
presidential decrees, which explicitly allowed the armed forces and the police to take the 
fight to drug traffickers, and even introduced effective marshal law for drug offences, until 
overturned by the Supreme Court. Institutionalisation is demonstrated by the confidence 
displayed by the United States in gradually leaving the Colombian military to guarantee their 
own state security. Fiscal issues in domestic U.S. politics have played a role in reducing 
military expenditure, and the Obama Administration’s desire to disengage from protracted 
conflicts around the world has seen increased American draw-down in various theatres 
(Feickert 2014). 
Yet it is likely that, even absent these factors, the growing strength and proficiency of 
Colombia’s security forces has become entrenched, with Colombian counter-narcotics forces 
even exporting their expertise to train regional neighbours’ forces, especially Mexico 
(Acierno and Kinosian 2015). Under the Democratic Security and Consolidation phases, the 
Colombian security budget and manpower availability grew substantially to solidify the 
security gains made in both counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics efforts. All said, the 
increase in budget, manpower and the continuous involvement of security forces in counter-
narcotics, all points to a long-term trend, not a temporary state of affairs, and is thus 
institutionalised. 
As alluded to, counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics are essentially one and the 
same in Colombia, and so violence associated with the civil conflict could, for most of Plan 
Colombia, be regarded as violised, at least in regards to domestic Colombian policy actions. 
However, U.S. counter-narcotics policy, the main objective of study, has sought to limit the 
scale of violence. This is not to say that the U.S. has discouraged it completely, nor abstained 
from indirect involvement, as targeted assassinations of FARC commanders demonstrates 
(Priest 2013; Guardian 2013). However, consider the aims of the Leahy Amendment in 
general, the human rights terms and conditions for Plan Colombia approval specifically 
(presidential waivers notwithstanding), and State Department efforts to fund governmental 
and non-governmental civil and human rights awareness and institutions (U.S. GAO 2003). 
These demonstrate an effort to keep violence minimal and targeted, and is thus in-keeping 
with levels of violence associated with militarisation, not violisation. Ultimately, the United 
States exerts a great deal of influence in Colombia, but cannot dictate all strategic aspects, as 
highlighted by the more complicated issues surrounding violence and human rights, 
compared to the more straightforward making military and institutionalisation elements. As 
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we shall see when compared to Mexico, the fact is that Colombia was actively fighting a civil 
conflict with a counter-narcotics dimension, but warfare was still a defining factor. Therefore, 
it is little surprise that militarisation was the outcome and was the pursued policy by both 
Colombia and its American supporters. 
 While the U.S. military has not had a sizable presence on the ground, it has deployed 
hundreds of personnel in small training and advisor units for decades. Additional input of 
weaponry, equipment and intelligence assets has contributed to ‘making military’ in 
Colombia, largely by empowering the native security forces with such militarised resources. 
This process has been underway for over fifteen years, since the start of Plan Colombia, and 
even before, during the operations against the cartels in the 1980s. A stronger, larger 
Colombian military establishment is here to stay, is not a temporary measure, and has thus 
become institutionalised. Finally, while violence has clearly been perpetrated on a large scale, 
it is the responsibility of Colombian parties, whether government forces, guerrillas or 
paramilitaries, and is not the direct responsibility of U.S. counter narcotics policy. Taking all 
factors into consideration, U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia meets all three elements 
required to be deemed ‘militarised’. The U.S. counter-narcotics relationship with Mexico is 
very different, however, as explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
U.S. Counter-narcotics Militarisation: 
Mexico and the U.S. Southern Border 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
While an examination of the extent of militarisation in U.S. drug policy in Mexico can be 
structurally similar to its Colombian counterpart, it is nevertheless qualitatively different. The 
United States and Mexico are direct neighbours, share a 2000-mile land border across which 
over $500 billion in annual trade occurs (Seelke and Finklea 2014), and have experienced 
almost two centuries of historical interaction, comprising politics, culture, society, commerce 
and conflict. This has shaped the two countries’ attitudes towards each other, and indeed 
shaped the countries themselves. Not for nothing did writer Gloria Anzaldúa – born in the 
Rio Grande Valley border area in Texas – refer to the U.S.-Mexico border as: 
 
“Una herida abierta – an open wound – where the Third World grates against the 
First and bleeds. And before the scab forms, it haemorrhages again, the lifeblood of 
two countries merging to form a third.” (Vulliamy 2010) 
 
While the two countries generally enjoy warm bilateral relations, there are long enduring 
memories and residual bitterness concerning how Mexico lost over half its historical territory 
to American expansionism in the 19th Century (Hamnett 2006, p.7-8). As a result, Mexican 
governments and their security forces have traditionally been reluctant to accept any U.S. 
assistance that may impinge on their sovereignty. This is in contrast to Colombia, with its 
hosting of American military personnel and facilities, and willingness to take direction from 
– or at least be influenced by – the U.S. This is not to say that cooperation between the U.S. 
and Mexico on security related issues is dismissed or discouraged, simply that the latter 
views itself as an equal rather than junior partner in such endeavours, and thus will not be 
‘ordered around’. 
Such diplomatic sensitivity, coupled with long-standing drug trafficking issues, 
criminality, immigration and border politics (all exacerbated by a geographical proximity that 
Colombia, for all its own problems, does not possess) mean that the U.S. encounters a 
different set of problems and concerns when dealing with drug trafficking in Mexico and 
related security issues posed by these Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). Primarily, 
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Mexico’s drug war is fundamentally different to Colombia’s. There is no political insurgency 
as such, as with the FARC or ELN, nor any counter-revolutionaries like the AUC, with all 
such groups contributing to a complex civil conflict. Instead, Mexico has experienced what 
can best be described as a criminal, or narco, insurgency59 (Bunker 2010, p.10), where large 
and powerful cartels not only battle the civilian authorities, but also each other, for territory, 
influence and all important lucrative smuggling routes into the U.S. Unlike FARC, which is 
vulnerable to airstrikes, leadership decapitation and large advances by the Colombian 
security forces to retake and consolidate territory, Mexican DTOs have no interest in political 
control or setting up shadow states. They blend into their communities and thus cannot be 
completely ‘conquered’ by military means. 
However, this is not to say that militarisation of some description has not taken place 
in response to Mexico’s narcotics conflict. Indeed, the drug war rages both in the 
conventional sense of states and their security forces taking on drug traffickers, and also in 
the sense of a war being undertaken between the DTOs themselves. A potent example of the 
former was the deployment of the Mexican Army and Marines into regions of Northern 
Mexico torn apart by drug violence, as well as the militarisation of domestic U.S. border 
forces which play a leading role in attempting to stem the northward flow of illicit narcotics. 
Both examples are explored in greater detail later. As for the latter aspect, that of DTO 
capability, while Mexico and the U.S. have armed forces to deploy or civil forces to 
militarise, the DTOs have equal access to armed force, albeit of a nature that is purchased 
outright, or recruited and trained with the latest battlefield weaponry. Both the money and the 
weaponry to raise and equip these Mexican DTO militias ironically flows south from the U.S. 
Money represents the spoils of the sale of narcotics throughout North America, and the 
weaponry a by-product of the American right to buy and sell arms, whatever the ultimate 
destination and intent for their use. 
These multiple issues involving the Mexican state, U.S. counter-narcotics, and the 
border between both countries, has been an issue for decades, as the Nixon Administration’s 
Operation Intercept in 1969 (detailed in Chapter 4) demonstrates. Yet with the huge upturn in 
violence between rival cartels and the Mexican state from 2006 onwards, these already 
troublesome issues gained increased prominence in U.S. counter-narcotics and national 
security concerns. While the Mexican state may not have risked collapse at the hands of 
                                                 
59 Though the use of the term ‘insurgent’ itself carries some difficulty in Mexico, since ‘insurgents’ are regarded 
as the glorious founding fathers of the country who rebelled against Spanish rule, and are not to be conflated 
with violent organised criminals in the Mexican mind-set (Grillo 2010, p.11) 
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narco-insurgents, as once looked possible in Colombia, the shocking levels of brutality and 
violence underway on a daily basis, especially in Northern Mexico, risked spilling over 
across the border into the U.S., with corruption of some border and customs officials by the 
DTOs the least of American worries. In recent years the Mexican cartels have become 
responsible for some 80 percent of the total illegal drugs that enter the U.S. – including more 
than 90 percent of cocaine – leading to U.S. counter-narcotics assistance to the country 
growing at a faster rate than even Afghanistan and Colombia (Lee 2014; Thompson 2011). 
Therefore it was with a similar sense of urgency to that displayed prior to Plan 
Colombia’s formulation and passing, that the Merida Initiative was launched in 2008 (Seeke 
and Finklea 2014, p.14). Initially a counter-narcotic and anti-crime assistance package for 
Mexico and Central America, it too followed the path of Plan Colombia. It had an early 
emphasis on promoting security via the training and equipping of Mexican counter-narcotics 
forces, but eventually moved in a more institution-building and social development direction. 
However, one of the main differences between the Merida Initiative and Plan Colombia is a 
marked decrease in the level of overt U.S. military involvement, at least on the Mexican side 
of the border for political reasons. Any direct participation in Mexican-related counter-
narcotics efforts by the DOD, or militarised domestic civilian forces, therefore largely takes 
place on the U.S. side of the border. Therefore, while this chapter places a strong focus on 
Mexico, the border issue between the two countries is part and parcel of the Mexican drug 
conflict, and so is worthy of equal exploration and consideration. 
This chapter will firstly detail the type and extent of counter-narcotics support the 
U.S. lent to Mexico before the Merida Initiative, and will then explore the origins and 
development of the Initiative itself. Then, given its importance within the overall case study, 
the militarisation of the U.S.-Mexico border will be thoroughly detailed. Following this, the 
three elements of the militarisation framework – making military, institutionalisation and 
criteria of violence – will be analysed in the context of Mexico. Special attention is given to 
the third element, due to its significant role in the nature of the conflict, as well as influencing 
the militarisation of the U.S. border region. A broad conclusion then ends the analysis. 
 
6.2 U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics support & cooperation pre-Merida Initiative 
 
One of the central issues to recognise in this case study is that, during the 20th Century, the 
Mexican government, under the 70-year control of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary 
Party) was either involved with, or at least tolerant of, drug trafficking and traffickers in 
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Mexico. As a consequence, U.S. counter-narcotics efforts conducted in cooperation with the 
Mexican authorities were received with one hand, while simultaneously the other hand was 
actively engaged, or at the least complicit, in the cross-border drug trade. For instance, in the 
1970s, it was reported that the government and security establishment, from the Mexican 
Army to the Federal Security Directorate to the Federal Judicial Police, exercised almost 
complete control over drug cultivation and transport. Permission was granted to traffickers by 
regional military authorities to cultivate a certain number of hectares in exchange for a 
portion of revenues (Hernández 2013, p.65). This was at the same time that the U.S. War on 
Drugs was commencing and gaining momentum, with the Americans seeking to cooperate 
with the Mexican authorities and lend them financial and logistical support. This was despite 
claims that the Mexican secretary of defence, attorney general and even president had 
knowledge of state complicity in drug trafficking, alongside the Federal Security Directorate 
– the former Mexican version of the CIA that its American namesake had assisted in creating 
– which the U.S. enjoyed a close relationship with (Hernández 2013, p.65). 
Likewise, the period 1990-2000 saw active cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico 
on a radar network designed to improve the tracking of drug planes coming in from 
Colombia. However, at the very same time, lucrative cocaine flights across the border into 
the U.S., belonging to drug lord Amado Carrillo Fuentes, were provided with federal 
protection as they left and returned to the drug-transit city of Hermosillo (Beith 2010, p.54). 
While complicity in drug trafficking by elements of the Mexican state continued, the 2000 
presidential election marked the first time in decades that an opposition candidate secured 
victory and placed Mexico on the path away from soft-authoritarianism towards genuine 
democracy. However this was to have critical side-effects for the development of the 
Mexican drug trade, and subsequent violence, as will be discussed later.  
Despite these embarrassing reputational blemishes on the record of the U.S.-Mexico 
counter-narcotics relationship, genuine and effective intelligence cooperation between 
Central and South American nations, Mexico and the U.S. was still substantial in the early-
1990s. The U.S. aimed to squeeze the Colombian cartels and their regional connections and 
allies, a process given an additional intelligence element following President George H.W. 
Bush’s authorisation for the American national intelligence agencies to become involved. 
Such cross border cooperation allowed not only for the capture or death of leading 
Colombian cartel figures, but also of significant Mexican drug traffickers, such as Joaquim 
‘El Chapo’ Guzman of the Sinaloa Cartel, who in turn revealed intelligence on his partner 
Cali cartel, other Mexican traffickers, and corrupt Mexican officials (Beith 2010, p.76-77). 
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The growing influence of Mexican traffickers was felt not just abroad, but within the 
U.S. as well. In December 2000, a major law enforcement operation conducted in ten 
American cities resulted in the arrest of 155 people connected to Mexican drug cartels, while 
also seizing almost 5,500 kilos of cocaine, 9,500 pounds of marijuana and $11 million (Beith 
2010, p.176). Later in the decade a series of special multi-agency law enforcement operations 
were launched, explicitly targeting Mexican cartels. From 2007-2008, the DEA-led Project 
Reckoning focused on the Gulf Cartel, leading to the arrest of over 500 individuals in the 
U.S., Mexico and Italy, as well as the seizure of $60.1 million, 16,711 kilograms of cocaine, 
1,039 pounds of methamphetamine, 19 pounds of heroin and 51,258 pounds of marijuana 
(U.S. Department of Justice 2008). Likewise, from 2007-2009 Operation Xcellerator targeted 
the Sinaloa Cartel, one of the most powerful Mexican DTOs. The DEA once again led a 
cross-border effort involving the U.S., Mexico and Canada, aiming to disrupt and eliminate 
Sinaloa branch operations in the U.S. in order to deny the main cartel revenues and 
manpower. The operation arrested over 750 operatives in twenty-six cities across the U.S. 
and denied the Sinaloa Cartel a $1 billion in revenue (U.S. Department of Justice 2009b). 
U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics efforts were not restricted to such domestic operations. 
Towards the end of the 2000s, as the scale of violence perpetrated in the Mexican drug war 
increased, the DEA and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
at the State Department provided support and training to Mexican officials. This came in a 
variety of investigative, enforcement and regulatory methods for countering trafficking, 
especially in the growing methamphetamine trade from Mexico. Such training included 
procedures in clandestine laboratory and precursor chemical investigations, especially 
relevant given the importance of specific laboratory conditions and precursor ingredient 
drugs and chemicals involved in the meth production process. During 2008, prior to the 
effective launch of the Merida Initiative, 1,269 Mexican federal, state and local officials 
received such training, as well as the donation from the DEA of eight refurbished trucks used 
in such laboratory enforcement operations in Mexico (U.S. State Department 2009b). 
Despite the efforts of such joint operations, support and training, in 2007 
marijuana became the biggest source of revenue for the cartels for the first time, bringing in 
$8.5 billion, while cocaine, long assumed to be the primary revenue generator for the 
traffickers, brought in $3.9 billion, and methamphetamine, the minority component of the 
drug trade, still earned $1 billion in illicit revenues (O’Neill 2009). Before its closure in 
2012, the National Drug Intelligence Centre, in one of its final National Drug Threat 
Assessments, stated that "Mexican DTOs continue to represent the single greatest drug 
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trafficking threat to the United States" (2010, p.2). Such an assessment was based on 
statistics that found Mexico to be a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, 
methamphetamine and marijuana60, and the key transit country for cocaine into the U.S., 
some 90 percent (U.S. State Department 2013a). In addition to the transit of illicit narcotics, 
of additional concern were the alliances forged between Mexican DTOs and native criminal 
elements in the U.S. in order to sell such illegal substances, especially street and prison 
gangs. In 2009, intelligence estimates found that midlevel and retail drug distribution in the 
domestic U.S. market was dominated by more than 900,000 criminally active gang members 
representing approximately 20,000 street gangs in more than 2,500 cities (National Drug 
Intelligence Centre 2010, p.2). 
It was clear that, despite the efforts of the Mexican government and security forces 
(especially since 2006, as detailed below) the flow of illicit drugs into the United States was 
unabated. It generated enormous profits for the cartels, furthered criminal, social and public 
health issues in the U.S., and contributed to the public safety and national security threat to 
the Mexican state, as well as to U.S. Border States and regions, as explored later. In 2008 the 
Merida Initiative was approved by the U.S. Congress in an attempt to tackle these problems. 
 
6.3 The origins of Mexico’s drug war and increased U.S. support 
 
Several factors account for the rise in prominence of the drug trafficking issue in Mexico, the 
increased violence, and the decision by the U.S. to adopt a smaller scale version of the Plan 
Colombia formula for Mexico, known as the Merida Initiative. 
 As discussed previously, U.S. and Colombian efforts to crack down and eliminate the 
South American cartels led to the dismantlement of these organisations and the closure or 
restriction of many previous air and maritime trafficking routes. As a result, the Colombian 
DTOs sub-contracted the trafficking of cocaine to the Mexican DTOs, making payment in 
cocaine. This gradually allowed the latter to evolve from mere traffickers into the wholesalers 
they are today, responsible for generating their own billions of dollars in revenue rather than 
being subservient to the Colombians as they were in the past. As profits soared, so too did the 
incentive for the Mexican DTOs to compete with each other for market share and lucrative 
routes into the U.S. (Beittel 2013, p.8; Lee 2014). 
                                                 
60  Opium poppy cultivation in Mexico 2009 rose 31% over 2008 to 19,500 hectares yielding a potential 
production of 50 metric tons of pure heroin, or 125 metric tons of "black tar" heroin, making Mexico the second 
largest opium poppy cultivator in the world. Additionally, marijuana cultivation increased 45% to 17,500 hectares 
in 2009 (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). These figures coincided with the effective launch of the Merida 
Initiative. 
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As covered above, the PRI effectively ruled Mexico in a soft-authoritarian manner for 
the best part of seven decades, and was often complicit with drug producers and traffickers, 
keeping them largely under control. This changed with the victory of the opposition National 
Action Party in the 2000 elections which made Vicente Fox president, sweeping the old order 
out of power along with its policy of accommodation with organised crime (Beittel 2013, 
p.8). While the issues of cartels had barely been mentioned by Fox in his campaign, 
American pressure saw a crackdown begin on traffickers and kingpins. This disrupted the old 
command and control structures of the established cartels, leading to power grabs, new 
leaderships and the splintering of organisations. As with Colombia, what had been a select 
few large cartels under the control of established leaderships either broke up, or remained 
intact but evolved. The most prominent included the Zetas Cartel, Juárez Cartel, Tijuana 
Cartel, Beltran Leyva Cartel, and DTOs from the long established Sinaloa Cartel, to new 
upstarts such as the cultish Knights Templar. All began fighting each other for the spoils of 
drug trafficking routes into the U.S. (Lee 2014; CNN 2012). 
It was against this background of Mexican DTOs being enriched and empowered by 
Colombian DTO decline, the change in Mexican government and the end of accommodation, 
and the splintering and competition within their ranks, which prompted the gradual escalation 
in trafficking-related violence during Vicente Fox’s 2000-2006 presidential term. 
Fox’s successor from the same party, Felipe Calderón, had made responding to the 
growing cartel issue one of his signature pledges after winning the election by the slimmest 
of margins. In essence assuming the mantle of a ‘war president’, he donned a military jacket 
and cap and announced the commencement of Operation Michoacán Together, the 
deployment of 4,000 troops in his home state in an effort to reduce crime and combat drug 
trafficking (Flannery 2013, p.182). As will be explored in greater detail below, from that 
point on drug-related violence in Mexico exploded. The DTOs were further splintered by the 
crackdown, adding even more violent players to the equation as they fought one another in 
competition for drug spoils, and attacked government security forces in an effort to intimidate 
and reclaim the impunity enjoyed during the accommodation with the PRI (Lee 2014). 
The U.S. was fully mindful of the national security implications posed by its 
neighbour descending into anarchy in the border regions, and the capacity for ‘spillover’ 
violence and criminality into America itself. Its policy response sought to support the 
Mexican security establishment within the parameters of Mexico’s constitutional prohibition 
on the use of foreign military forces in its jurisdiction. It was recognised that, as a 
predominantly criminal issue, Mexican law enforcement should ideally be the primary 
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solution to the drug problem. Yet it was also recognised that local and state law enforcement 
were simply not up to the task of containing the cartels or their violence, hence the decision 
to deploy Mexican military forces as an alternative. Addressing these deficiencies has 
become the long-term strategy of U.S. policy and is reflected in the four pillars that comprise 
the Merida Initiative, passed by Congress in 2008 (Seeke and Finklea 2014, p.14): 
 
 Disrupting the operational capacity of organised crime 
 Institutionalising reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights in 
Mexico 
 Creating a 21st Century border 
 Building strong and resilient communities 
 
To these ends, U.S. policy has involved training provision for Mexican security personnel 
(including the military, but mainly federal law enforcement), provision of intelligence 
gathered by U.S. surveillance assets, stipulations in Merida legislation regarding the 
observance of human rights, and the dedication of resources to aide justice reform and 
improve the integrity and reputation of Mexican authorities (Shirk 2011a, p.240). It has also 
involved cooperation on border interdiction (albeit increasingly militarised on the U.S. side), 
and U.S. support for Mexican community initiatives, as well as drug demand-reduction and 
treatment programmes (Seeke and Finklea 2014, pp.13-24). A more detailed exploration of 
Mexican and U.S. involvement in these measures is reserved for the relevant sections below. 
 Initial U.S. support in the first phase of the Merida Initiative very much lay with 
equipment provision, such as supplying funds for the purchase of $590.5 million worth of 
aircraft and helicopters for counter-DTO forces, as well as forensic equipment for Federal 
Police and Attorney General crime laboratories (Seeke and Finklea 2014, pp.13). Yet, the 
shift in focus towards a more institution-building approach is apparent in the funding 
allocations for the lifetime of the Initiative so far, as detailed in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 - Merida Initiative Funding for Mexico FY2008-2015 ($ in millions) 
 (Seelke and Finklea 2014, p.7) 
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As can be seen from the figures, despite an initial burst, Foreign Military Finance (FMF) was 
cut to nothing, while the more counter-narcotics and law enforcement specific INCLE 
(International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement) funding and Economic Support Fund 
(ESF) spending on social and community development have either gradually increased, or 
fluctuated but still remained relatively steady. This illustrates financial support for the more 
law enforcement, institutional and community development goals represented by the four 
pillars of the Merida Initiative, and U.S. policy has broadly been in keeping with supporting 
this more securitised stance than an outright militarised one. This is not to say, however, that 
military cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico on counter-narcotics is completely absent 
and domestic militarisation is a large factor for both. 
 
6.4 Domestic Militarisation on the U.S.-Mexico Border 
 
While U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico have adhered to the long-standing policy of 
tackling drug manufacture and trafficking in source and transit states61  (as demonstrated 
above by the provision of funding, training, equipment and intelligence support to Mexican 
authorities), an equal focus has been placed on the U.S.-Mexico border. Additionally, due to 
the ability of the U.S. to pursue certain policies and practises within its own jurisdiction 
without Mexican approval, the border area and associated issues has been subject to far a 
greater degree of militarisation than in broader U.S.-Mexican counter-narcotics cooperation. 
 As highlighted in Section 6.2, the reach of the Mexican cartels into the American 
homeland and cities was one of the growing concerns that influenced the continuing U.S. 
support for Mexican operations and the subsequent launch of the Merida Initiative. It was in 
an effort to curtail incoming drug shipments northwards, and the outgoing revenue and 
weaponry making its way southwards, that the border was one of the most obvious locations 
to pursue a concentrated interdiction effort. However, negative impacts of the Mexican drug 
trade along the border itself and further into the U.S. interior, further prompted such action. 
 The issue of ‘spillover’ violence into the Southern U.S. from Mexico has been of 
growing concern. In order to define the problem, the U.S. law enforcement agency 
community agreed that the definition of ‘spillover’ violence from Mexico: 
 
                                                 
61 While Mexico is classed as a transit state for cocaine, the amount and cannabis, heroin and methamphetamine 
it produces within its borders also make it a source state in the context of those particular drugs. 
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"Entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, 
military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions 
such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses." 
(Drug Enforcement Administration 2009) 
 
Based on this definition, it would be difficult to suggest that any substantial spillover 
violence has actually occurred on U.S. soil. While underground cartel operations, links and 
alliances may have spread rapidly since the mid-2000s, traffickers on the U.S. side of the 
border have traditionally been loath to directly take on powerful American law enforcement 
agencies. This may explain the absence of major cases of obvious cartel-inspired violence 
within the U.S. itself, compared to the brutality on the Mexican side of the border (Archibold 
2009). That said, there have been increased concerns that, as the cartel command and control 
structures have been eroded by Mexican and U.S. efforts, violent but cautious former 
traffickers have been replaced by less-rationale and more profit-minded juniors, potentially 
increasing the risk of the kind of spillover violence, as defined, taking place (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 2010a). 
As an illustrator of this risk, in March 2010 three individuals with links to the U.S. 
consulate in Ciudad Juarez were killed. The likely suspects were the Barrio Azteca, a 
prominent street gang in Mexico and one with hundreds of members in Texas and the 
Southwest of the United States, who were employed as enforcers by La Linea (The Line). 
The latter were a group of former Mexican police officers highly trained in urban warfare, 
who acted as gatekeepers for the Juarez Cartel (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010a). The 
leader of Barrio Azteca, Eduardo Ravelo, was placed on the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted Fugitives 
list in 2009, while José Antonio Acosta Hernández, the leader of La Linea, was captured and 
sentenced to consecutive life terms by a U.S. court in 2012 for the killings of the U.S. 
consulate victims, as well as 1,500 Mexicans (Borunda 2012). 
While this example highlights the pursuit and punishment of those responsible for 
direct attacks on U.S. interests, at the same time the agreed definition for spillover violence 
does not include acts of trafficker-on-trafficker violence. While bloody, this does not 
represent a dramatic departure from violence long associated with the drug trade or organised 
crime in most parts of the world (Drug Enforcement Administration 2009). Indeed, it can be 
difficult to directly attribute certain crimes to specific Mexican cartels due to the complicated 
operations that most of them employ in the distribution of illicit goods, typically involving 
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clandestine regional and local cells of Mexican immigrants and U.S. nationals, many of 
which have no knowledge of the existence of others, even in the same city (Archibold 2009). 
Nevertheless, there remains strong evidence to point the finger of blame at Mexican 
cartel involvement in violence, kidnapping, extortion and corruption on the U.S. border and 
in Border States. According to the agreed definition, some of these crimes – such as 
traffickers killing each other – would generally fall under the category of ‘to be expected’, 
and would not be classed as ‘spillover violence’. Yet, the actual or perceived threats to the 
safety and security of U.S. citizens brought about as a consequence of Mexican drug 
trafficking, has still prompted the advancement of militarisation as one part of the policy mix 
aimed at addressing these issues. 
 In Texas, Mexican cartels have increasingly adopted the practice of trafficking along 
the state’s oil pipeline infrastructure, where small pipes crisscross thousands of acres of 
private property. This makes it all but impossible to patrol due to the limited manpower and 
resources of law enforcement authorities, who will often stick to recognised highways and 
transit routes (Carroll 2014). The isolation of these routes has made them ideal not only for 
traffickers to smuggle in their contraband, but also to execute and dispose of cartel rivals, 
informants and even unfortunate migrants, with the result that since 1999 the death toll has 
reached 5,570, with the Border Patrol discovering on average one corpse a day (Carroll 
2014). That is in addition to the threats and acts of physical violence perpetrated against local 
ranchers, who arm themselves to meet the security threat. With the recent opening up of 
Mexico’s previously closed energy industry, the problem of cartel traffickers utilising 
pipeline routes into the U.S. in Southwest border areas and significant sections of Texas is set 
to worsen. The number of such routes – and thus smuggling options presented – will 
multiply, along with the need to clear difficult terrain and undergrowth to accommodate 
pipeline maintenance, making transit for drug smugglers all the easier (Carroll 2014). 
In Arizona, in 2009 roughly half of all marijuana seized coming into the U.S. was 
along the state’s 270-mile border with Mexico, while in 2008 its state capital, Phoenix, saw 
366 kidnap-for-ransom crimes (Quinones 2009). This itself was an increase from 359 
reported kidnappings in 2007, with an estimate that double those numbers went unreported 
(Quinones 2009), though controversy was later to arise concerning the accuracy of these 
statistics62. Cases of torture and abuse of victims, not dissimilar to terror-tactics employed in 
                                                 
62 An investigation in 2011 by Phoenix’s native television news station found that many of the 366 kidnapping 
cases that contributed to the city becoming known as America’s ‘kidnap capital’ – as well as allowing the city to 
successfully apply for millions of dollars in federal funding related to border security – were in fact inflated. Up 
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Mexico, were also reported (McLaughlin 2009). It was claimed that nearly all such cases 
were associated with the Sinaloa drug cartel, often due to the high concentration of 
immigrants from Sinaloa state in Mexico. The traditional cartel practice of kidnapping to 
extract payment of debts had also been imported, and like the original Mexican version had 
gradually changed from only targeting traffickers and dealers, to just as keenly kidnapping 
legitimate businessmen and civilians as an additional source of revenue (Quinones 2009). 
Such was the concern, that in 2008 the city established a Home Invasion and Kidnapping 
Enforcement – or H.I.K.E – unit, which utilised heavily-armed police officers in its 
investigations and dismantling of kidnapping cells (McLaughlin 2009). 
 A significant amount of the surplus military weaponry and equipment acquired for the 
Phoenix Police Department came from federal programs 1033 and 1122, which allow law 
enforcement agencies to acquire equipment at no charge, or to purchase at a reduced price 
respectively. Through these programmes, law enforcement in the state of Arizona has 
acquired almost $39 million worth of surplus military hardware, from weaponry to storage 
pouches (Arizona Daily Star 2014). Further examples of how these programmes have 
contributed surplus military equipment to law enforcement agencies throughout the U.S. – 
but especially in vulnerable border regions – are illustrated in data maps further below. 
 While not overtly violent, the corruption of U.S. officials also has security 
implications, not least in impacting on the confidence of the American government and 
public in the ability of the agencies responsible for tackling Mexican drug trafficking to 
effectively do so. Between 2004 and 2011, 127 U.S. border or customs employees were 
arrested or indicted for acts of corruption, in the form of cash or sexual favours, the majority 
of cases linked to Mexican cartels and especially the Zetas Cartel (CNN 2011; BBC 2011b). 
By 2011, the U.S. Border Patrol was staffed by 20,700 agents, a doubling of its size since 
2004, driven by the need for greater border securitisation, and part of the blame for the 
increased corruption rate was placed on this rapid increase (CNN 2011). In 2010, the 
inspector general opened 870 investigations into customs and border protection personnel, a 
                                                                                                                                                       
to 40 percent of crimes that could only loosely be considered as kidnapping were still being counted as such, 
including kidnappings that did not even take place in the city (Biscobing 2011a). A city panel later attributed the 
discrepancy to error rather than deliberate fraud, and that the inflation of such figures could also be attributed to 
Arizona’s loosely broad legal statutes (which deem restriction of freedom of movement of any kind – such as 
armed robbery or home invasion – as constituting kidnapping). Indeed, based on the flexibility that such broad 
statutes allow, the same investigation panel determined that the original statistics, while flawed, had in fact 
understated the number of kidnappings, with the corrected figure for 2008 coming in at 668 (Biscobing 2011b). 
Like the politicisation of the drug issue under Nixon and Rockefeller, the utilisation of such statistics concerning 
drug-related kidnappings and torture helped contribute to the perception of a city under siege, allowing for 
successful requests for federal funding. 
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48 percent increase on 595 cases in 2009 (Van de Vaart 2011). Illustrative cases include a 
border patrol officer sentenced to 20 years in prison for involvement with the Juarez’s 
Cartel’s La Linea enforcers (Van der Vaart 2011), and the 2013 arrest of two sheriff’s 
deputies and two police officers in Hidalgo County, Texas (a huge marijuana trafficking area) 
for serving as escorts and scouts for drugs shipments from Mexico (Fernandez 2013). These 
four men were just a few out of over 40 law enforcement personnel arrested since 2007 for 
facilitating cross-border drug trafficking in the region between El Paso and the Rio Grande 
Valley (Fernandez 2013). 
Such was the increasing concern around the issue that the 2010 Anti-Border 
Corruption Act was introduced to attempt to tackle it through mandatory polygraph 
screenings for applicants and regular background checks, though worryingly 60 percent of 
those polygraphed demonstrated deception when asked about previous criminal records 
(CNN 2011; Van de Vaart 2011). As a consequence of these cases and more, in 2009, as the 
Merida Initiative was getting under way, the FBI established six Border Corruption task 
forces. These focused on drug and general border corruption related to the Southwest region 
– dedicating 120 out of a total of 700 public corruption agents to the Southwest alone – and 
actively encouraged the expanded use of such task forces, so that by 2013 they had reached 
24 in number (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010b; U.S. Department of Justice 2009c; 
CBS News 2013). In general, the corruption issue may present far less of a reason for the 
militarisation of the border than others, but it has arguably helped contribute to the overall 
sense of an insecure border space, an insecurity that it is felt – by some citizens – could 
perhaps be addressed by greater militarisation (Olivo 2014). 
In response to this collection of security issues generated by the Mexican drug trade 
on both sides of the border, by 2009 the DEA had allocated additional agents to its Southwest 
border field divisions, increasing the number to 1,180, representing 29 percent of its total 
domestic manpower (U.S. Department of Justice 2009c). In addition to this conventional law 
enforcement approach, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency continued along the 
path of overt militarisation. In 2007 it formed the U.S. Border Patrol’s Special Operations 
Group (SOG) – headquartered in El Paso, Texas – to direct the operations of the Border 
Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) and the Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit 
(BORSTAR) (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2014a). While BORSTAR is, as the name 
suggests, a tactical medical and search and rescue unit, BORTAC is, for all intents and 
purposes, the Border Patrol’s in-house Special Forces unit, modelled on its military 
counterparts with characteristics of police SWAT teams. 
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Formed in 1984 to serve a civil disturbance function following rioting at several 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service detention facilities, the unit quickly evolved to 
undertake specialised roles in "high-risk warrant service; intelligence, reconnaissance and 
surveillance; foreign law enforcement/Border Patrol capacity building; airmobile operations; 
maritime operations; and precision marks-man/observer" (U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 2014b). With selection procedures and weaponry and equipment that mirror U.S. 
military Special Forces, BORTAC trains sector-specific smaller versions of itself along the 
border. It is unique in partaking in operations both in the United States and abroad, training 
and operating alongside foreign and domestic law enforcement and military entities, 
including in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Customs and Border Protection 2014b). The unit 
regularly targets drug traffickers from Mexico, on occasions resorting to lethal force or even 
falling victim to it, as was the case when a BORTAC officer was killed in a firefight with a 
drug gang on the Arizona-Mexico border (Gonzalez and Nowicki 2010). 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has also increased its use of military aviation 
technology, in the form of Predator Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs), albeit the B-Class 
which is unarmed and used for surveillance and reconnaissance. The programme began in 
2005 and by 2011 there were six Predators covering the majority of the U.S.-Mexico border, 
with plans to increase the total number of border agency UAVs to 24 by 2016, allowing the 
agency the ability to deploy a drone anywhere over the continental United States within three 
hours (Booth 2011). 
While this is indicative of the militarisation of civilian agencies in the context of 
prosecuting the drug war, the U.S. military itself has become actively involved in border 
protection against drug trafficking, to the extent that the Posse Comitatus act allows. The 
constitutional loophole allowing deployment of troops on American soil for the purpose of 
counter-narcotics/law enforcement is that such activities are carried out by the National 
Guard. It falls under the jurisdiction of the DOD, but is nevertheless a state and federal force, 
under the control of a state governor unless called to active service by the U.S. President 
(U.S. National Guard 2013). However, restrictions remain in that, like U.S. military counter-
narcotics support abroad, National Guard personnel are unable to take part in drug 
enforcement directly, unless a threat is posed to their own wellbeing. The National Guard 
Counterdrug Programme is careful to emphasise that its ground and air assets are for training 
and support purposes. It provides law enforcement agencies with aerial observation, 
photographic imagery and communication support, along with mobile radar, Airborne 
Reconnaissance Signals Intelligence, language, transcription, linguistics, criminal analysis, 
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and air surveillance support for interagency task forces operating along the border (U.S. 
National Guard 2014). 
Given the kind of drug trafficking-related concerns it faces, as explored above, Texas 
has been a proactive state in utilising direct and indirect military resources for the purposes of 
counter-narcotics and border security. In 2009, then-Governor Rick Perry announced the 
formation of Ranger Reconnaissance Teams, joint task force units made up of Texas Rangers 
and National Guard Counterdrug personnel to increase the efficiency of border patrolling and 
interdiction (Governor of Texas 2009). In the summer of 2014, as part of Operation Strong 
Safety, Perry ordered the deployment of 1000 National Guardsmen to assist Texas’ law 
enforcement agencies with impeding cross-border drug trafficking, using enhanced 
observational equipment and additional ‘boots on the ground’ as a force multiplier in 
vulnerable areas such as the Rio Grande Valley (Governor of Texas 2014; Olivo 2014). 
 The DOD itself has, indirectly, also precipitated the militarisation of the U.S.-Mexico 
border, materially at least. During the Obama Administration, police forces across the United 
States have received tens of thousands of assault rifles, nearly 200,000 magazines of 
ammunition, thousands of pieces of camouflage and night-vision equipment, and hundreds of 
silencers, armoured cars and aircraft – a continuing legacy of the military surplus transfer 
programme begun during the Clinton Administration (Apuzzo 2014). With Mexican border 
security concerns so prevalent, it is unsurprising to find that substantial military equipment 
transfers to law enforcement agencies in Border States have taken place. The maps below 
(based on data supplied by the Department of Defence) illustrate the counties – highlighted – 
where local and state police forces and law enforcement agencies have received certain kinds 
of military equipment from the Pentagon’s surplus programme. It should be noted that the 
portion of the total equipment utilised by these law enforcement agencies that came from the 
Pentagon programme is relatively small. However, the data does illustrate how ubiquitous 
such equipment has become in the name of law enforcement and, for the Southern Border 
States, border security with Mexico being an additional consideration. 
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Map 2: Aircraft (Planes and Helicopters) 
(Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014) 
 
Map 3: Armoured Vehicles (including cars and trucks) 
(Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014) 
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Map 4: Body Armour (including vests and helmet) 
 
(Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014) 
Map 5: Night Vision (including sights, binoculars and attachments) 
 
(Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014) 
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Map 6: Assault Rifles (5.56-mm and 7.62-mm rifles) 
 
(Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014) 
 
As can be seen on each map, a large concentration of counties that have received surplus 
military equipment are geographically located near the U.S.-Mexico border (with the 
exception of assault rifles acquisitions, where the majority of the country has partaken). 
California and Arizona are particular examples, two states that experience drug-trafficking 
related crime and violence due to their proximity to major smuggling routes. While of course 
there are counties throughout the United States that have purchased all manner of surplus 
military equipment, it is interesting to note that much of the resources and equipment that 
would have merit in surveillance, interdiction and patrolling – especially aircraft (Map 1) and 
night vision items (Map 4) – find healthy purchase in the Southwest. Indeed, Florida also 
shows healthy aircraft purchase, reflecting the recent revival of older drug trafficking routes 
through the Caribbean and up through South Florida, in order to avoid the violent Mexican 
border regions, and increasingly securitised American side of the border (Gibson 2014). 
It is interesting to note that fewer border counties in Texas have purchased surplus 
military equipment than their equivalents in Arizona and California. However, this is related 
to an important caveat that counties in the Southwestern states are invariably larger due to 
sparser population concentrations, and so ‘colour in’ more of the maps, potentially generating 
the illusion of significantly militarised regions. One only needs to see the difference in county 
size in the Southwest region by comparing their geographical scale to the hundreds of smaller 
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ones in the Eastern half of the U.S. Additionally, there are vast differences in asset purchases 
in each county depending on individual need. For example, Arizona’s Pima County – large 
and with a long stretch of territory along the border – received 455 night visions pieces, 282 
items of body armour, 141 assault rifles and 40 pistols; by contrast tiny Santa Cruz County 
merely received 8 assault rifles (Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014). 
 Nevertheless, there is a relation between the border security issues experienced by 
some states as a whole, e.g. Arizona, or certain counties within large states, e.g. Texas. For 
instance, every border county in Arizona has received military equipment of some description 
due to that state being classified as a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (U.S. Department 
of Justice 2010). Meanwhile, in Texas, not every border county received military equipment, 
with some purchasing nothing from the programmes. However, El Paso County, which 
mirrors the violent Mexican drug city of Ciudad Juarez, purchased 294 body armour pieces, 
108 assault rifles and 8 helicopters, while Hidalgo Country purchased 326 assault rifles, 22 
pistols, 85 night vision pieces and one mine-resistant vehicle (Giratikanon, Parlapiano and 
White 2014). Hidalgo County is part of the Rio Grande Valley, a major trafficking corridor, 
where 797,000 pounds of marijuana alone was seized by border protection forces in 2013, the 
second largest haul in the U.S. after the Tucson Sector in Arizona (Ortega and O’Dell 2014). 
The county leaders in surplus military purchases however are in California, with Los 
Angeles County’s vast acquisitions including 3,408 assault rifles, 1,696 items of body 
armour, 827 night vision pieces, fifteen helicopters and four armoured vehicles, with 
neighbouring Ventura County alone purchasing 3,275 pieces of night vision equipment 
(Giratikanon, Parlapiano and White 2014). The most likely explanation for purchases of such 
scale are the huge drug trafficking and drug-related gang activity and violence law 
enforcement authorities in this region must contend with. According to the Los Angeles 
Police Department’s own admittance, the city and county are the ‘gang capital’ of the nation. 
L.A. hosts up to 450 active gangs with a combined membership of 45,000, with the primary 
factor for such an increase in numbers and violence – including hundreds of homicides – 
being the Mexican-linked narcotics trade (Los Angeles Police Department 2014). Like their 
allies in the Mexican cartels, affiliated gangs have gradually come to possess more powerful 
weaponry that was once the main preserve of U.S. law enforcement, and even military forces. 
When asked whether it was a fair statement to say that in some cases his police officers may 
in fact be outgunned by some of the drug gangs in the area, City of Bell (part of Los Angeles 
county) former police chief Randy Adams replied that “I think that’s a very safe statement 
and that’s why we have to exercise the utmost caution” (CNN 2009). 
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In June 2013, a U.S. Senate amendment to the Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity and Immigration Modernisation Act appropriated $43.6 billion for expenses 
related to security on the southern U.S. border and initial administrative costs, a figure $38 
billion greater than the amount proposed in the original draft of the act (Congressional 
Budget Office 2013). The amendment stipulated that $30 billion of the additional amount be 
used to hire at least 19,200 additional U.S. Border Patrol agents, to equip them with the 
necessary resources, and to further secure and fence the border with Mexico (Congressional 
Budget Office 2013). In addition to the other security responses detailed above, this extra 
funding and directives for its use indicate that U.S. policy is seemingly set to continue along 
the path of fortifying and effectively militarising the border with Mexico. This is not only to 
address significant immigration concerns, but is aimed at improving the interdiction of illicit 
narcotics during transit in order to deprive the Mexican cartels of revenues, and to attempt to 
address crime and security concerns on the U.S. border, in Border States and indeed much 
further afield in the American interior. 
While such a policy and increased emphasis on militarisation is the prerogative of the 
U.S. within its own jurisdiction, as stated above, direct cooperation with Mexican authorities 
in such matters is far more sensitive concerning counter-narcotics operations on Mexican 
territory. The U.S. has been able to cooperate and assist with intelligence support, equipment 
and training. However, the overall counter-narcotics efforts, whether undertaken by the 
military or police, are primarily Mexican directed, and there is every sign that the Mexican 
government has increasingly turned to its military to combat its drug issue domestically. 
 
6.5 Mexico: Making Military 
 
The Mexican military has long been put to use for the purpose of counter-narcotics 
operations prior to the key deployments at the beginning of the Calderón Administration in 
2006. Several years before the large-scale deployment of military forces in Northern Mexico, 
the Army was used in manhunts for drug lords due to fears that local and state police in 
certain areas were corrupt and in the pockets of said cartel figures or bosses, such as during 
the aftermath of the prison escape by El Chapo Guzman in January 200163 (Beith 2010, p.20). 
                                                 
63 Even then it was alleged that elements of the military were potentially corruptible, such as when a Mexican 
Air Force plane flew over an area El Chapo was hiding in, allowing him the forewarning to flee before Army 
units hunting him closed in (Beith 2010, p.24). Likewise, in 1996 General Jose Gutierrez Rebollo took over as 
Mexico’s ‘drug czar’, with the support of his American equivalent, General Barry McCaffrey. Less than six 
months later, Rebollo was arrested and sentenced to over 70 years in prison for links with the Juarez Cartel 
(Beith 2010, p.92-93). 
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Reliance on the military as a reliable and more effective alternative to the civilian law 
enforcement agencies – in perception if not always in practice – has been one of the main 
developments responsible for militarising the Mexican drug conflict. However, whether the 
utilisation of the military has militarised the conflict, or whether it was already so violent and 
militarised that the deployment of the Army and Marines was one of the only viable courses 
of action, remains a point of contention. 
For instance, Mexican drug cartels are, by their own standards at least, increasingly 
militarised entities, often due to the presence of former military operatives and counter-
narcotics police in their ranks. The former police officers of La Linea have already been 
mentioned, but the most notable other example is Los Zetas. Though most of the original 
members have been captured or killed, in their original incarnation the Zetas were recruited 
by the Gulf Cartel as a military and enforcement wing for operations. They had training and 
expertise as a Special Forces military unit, with some members even rumoured to have 
undergone U.S. training at Fort Benning, Georgia (Vulliamy 2010, p.15). The initial leaders 
were even able to entice members of Mexico’s special airborne counter-narcotic military unit 
– the GAFE – into the Zeta ranks, as part of an ongoing recruitment process that has in the 
past openly directed recruitment advertisements at military personnel. It was a process that 
eventually created what the DEA estimated to be a paramilitary army numbering 4000 by 
2010, a powerful tool that helped the Zetas turn on their former masters in the Gulf Cartel 
and assume drug trafficking operations themselves (Vulliamy 2010, p.15-16). 
Not only has such a development increased the militarised skill-sets available to the 
Zetas Cartel, but has also increased the number and sophistication of the military equipment 
introduced into Mexico’s drug conflict. For example, in November 2008, the arrest of a top 
Zeta lieutenant, Jaime Gonzalez Duran, resulted in the largest weapons seizure in Mexican 
history up to that point – 540 rifles, 287 grenades, two rocket launchers and 500,000 rounds 
of ammunition (O’Neill 2009). In both the figurative and literal arms races between the 
cartels, such militarisation in techniques and equipment will be adopted by rivals, not only to 
combat and intimidate each other, but also the mutual enemy of state authority and border 
control. As one anonymous Mexican journalist stated (anonymous because the Zetas would 
have killed him without question): 
 
“The Mexican government can put all the money it wants into the customs and 
inspection posts, it’s all useless. A customs officer is as afraid of organised crime as 
anyone else. What are they to do [when confronted with men] wearing paramilitary 
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uniforms and ski masks, carrying AK-47s? [...] They just look the other way. Who 
wouldn’t? This is a military unit [they face]; they wear hand grenades in their vests 
[…] You can militarise customs instead of having civilian law enforcement, and have 
regular shoot-outs on the border […but] you’d be having battles all day.” 
(Vulliamy 2010, p.231-232) 
 
This is a concise analysis of the security issue Mexican authorities have faced since 2006 and 
the subsequent military deployments. On the one hand the incapability – or culpability – of 
civilian law enforcement to deal with cartel trafficking and violence in the worst affected 
areas of the country prompted the government to deploy troops as a capable counter-force to 
oppose aggressive and well-resourced cartels with no respect for authority. On the other 
hand, such a course of action prompted a huge upswing in violence, deaths, weapons imports 
and cartel militarisation in response. 
 Though unable to take a more overt role in the militarisation of the Mexican drug 
conflict, U.S. counter-narcotics policy has supported Mexican military endeavours where 
possible. This has been through Merida Initiative funding, direct training, support and 
equipment provision, as well as developing closer ties between the military and security 
establishments of both countries. In 2010 a high-level U.S. delegation comprised of Hilary 
Clinton (Secretary of State), Robert Gates (Secretary of Defence), Admiral Mike Mullen 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), Janet Napolitano (Secretary of Homeland Security) and 
Dennis Blair (Director of National Intelligence) met with Mexico’s Defence Secretary 
Guillermo Galván and the Navy Secretary Mariano Francisco Saynez Mendoza to discuss 
coordination between their respective militaries and to develop a comprehensive approach to 
counter-narcotics operations and planning (U.S. Department of Defence 2010). 
By 2013 the Mexican military was becoming increasingly comfortable cooperating 
with U.S. Northern Command in developing capacity, via upgrading airborne platforms for 
counter-organised crime operations and disaster relief, and institutional professionalism, such 
as allowing the U.S. Marine Corps to train Mexican junior non-commissioned officers as a 
step towards establishing a domestic Mexican NCO academy (U.S. Department of Defence 
2013a). By 2013, the Pentagon was spending $15 million on training up to 3,000 personnel 
from across the Mexican military, which was tiny in both budget and numbers in comparison 
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to similar efforts in Colombia, but a marked improvement over the $3 million spent in 2009 
(Michaels 2014)64. 
Equipment transfers and foreign military sales have also played a role in U.S. support, 
alongside institutional cooperation. As part of the Merida Initiative, four CASA maritime 
surveillance aircraft, valued at $50 million each, were delivered to the Mexican Navy to help 
increase naval vigilance and control over Mexican territorial waters with the aim of impeding 
and disrupting coastal and Caribbean drug trafficking (U.S. Embassy – Mexico 2013). 
Additionally nine UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters were delivered to Mexican security 
forces, with three going to the Mexican Navy and six to the Federal Police. (U.S. Embassy – 
Mexico 2013). Aid to law enforcement is the principal purpose of the Merida Initiative, thus 
the delivery of equipment and support to the Federal Police, but greater military cooperation 
between the U.S. and the Mexican Navy and Marines, rather than with the Mexican Army, is 
not coincidental. The former has become enthusiastic in working with the U.S. than what is 
regarded as the far more insular Mexican Army, with the Navy willing to adopt American 
techniques and modern intelligence gathering, such as the use of surveillance drones. 
Mexican maritime forces are by nature more mobile and insulated from bribery and 
intimidation, as experienced by the Army in its static bases and direct drug eradication 
efforts. Mexican marines are also often trained to a high level and used more for targeted 
raids so that, despite their far smaller numbers, the more trusted marines were used in as 
many raids on high-profile traffickers as were the Army and Federal Police (Michaels 2014). 
 The extensive use of the Mexican military in drug eradication, interdiction and 
enforcement alone complies with the ‘making military’ element, at least in terms of Mexican 
domestic policy. However, can the same be said of U.S. policy? As stated previously, there 
are multiple reasons why direct U.S. military involvement in the Mexican drug war is 
prohibited. U.S. policy of offering better vehicles, equipment and training to enable the 
Mexican military to provide a more effective counter-narcotics solution, does however 
indicate that the U.S. is generally supportive of Mexico’s militarisation efforts. As noted 
later, though, U.S. policy in totality is more securitised than militarised in emphasis, with 
focus principally on law enforcement support. 
 
 
                                                 
64 By 2015 that figure had increased again, with the U.S. providing 7,678 elite training courses to nearly 9,000 
members of the Mexican military since 2010, at a modest cost of $60 million, but still a 60 percent growth in 
training provision to Mexican forces since 2012 (Acierno and Kinosian 2015). 
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6.6 Mexico: Institutionalisation 
 
Though there is a greater degree of trust between the U.S. military and its equivalents in the 
Mexican Navy and Marines than there is with the Army, the latter is still looked upon more 
favourably in comparison to civilian law enforcement in Mexico, even by the Mexican 
government itself. This is in large part due to the greater resources and arguable efficiency of 
the military as compared to the under resourced and often corrupt, or intimidated, local police 
forces. As a consequence of such reliance on the military, militarisation of the drug conflict 
in Mexico has become de facto institutionalised, even if the longer term desire is to improve 
the effectiveness of civilian law enforcement, as demonstrated with the Merida Initiative’s 
emphasis on developing exactly that. 
Echoing the complicity between the state and narco-criminality during the rule of the 
PRI, a former police spokesman in one of the worst affected areas, Ciudad Juarez, stated that:  
 
“There is a culture of corruption which we face in this country, which hurts our 
country, but is part of its soul [...I believe] 80 to 90 percent of people in Ciudad 
Juarez, if not a 100 percent of us, are involved in some sort of corruption.” (Beith 
2010, p.134). 
 
Indeed, significant corruption, institutional breakdown and loss of authority or control by 
civilian law enforcement in certain regions of Mexico will often see the military being 
deployed in an effort to ‘clean house’ and retrieve the situation65. By 2009 there were more 
than 5,000 soldiers and federal police in Ciudad Juarez, following the deaths of over 3,000 
people between 2003 and 2008, with 2009 adding 2,600 victims (Beith 2010, p.168). The city 
– quite literally on the U.S. border – had effectively been transformed into a militarised zone 
in the name of counter-narcotics enforcement. The police stations from which the army 
operated resembled urban fortresses not dissimilar to structures seen in Northern Ireland or 
Iraq at the height of their respective insurgencies, with all forms of patrolling conducted by 
the military in armoured vehicles rather than by civilian authorities (Beith 2010, p.169). 
 Since 2006, this strategy has been pursued in the name of stability and counter-
narcotics, even if its effectiveness is continually questioned and human rights violations – 
further explored in Section 6.7 – often come to the fore due to the issue of deploying combat 
troops into a civilian environment. In addition to Ciudad Juarez, another illustrative example 
                                                 
65 This can create local friction between local and federal forces. Police and army personnel actually exchanged 
gunfire with each other when tensions boiled over in Ciudad Juarez (Beith 2009, p.135). 
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of the policy is Tamaulipas state on the north-eastern Gulf coast, bordering Texas, where 
violence between the warring Gulf and Los Zetas Cartels had become so bad, and 
kidnappings reaching a national high, that by 2014 the Mexican government revealed Plan 
Tamaulipas. The plan set three objectives that conformed to the general template that 
accompany military deployments, namely the dismantlement of organised crime groups, the 
closing of smuggling routes and the restoration of effective and reliable local security 
institutions (Wilson and Weigend 2014, p.1). To achieve these ends the plan involved 
deploying an estimated 2,200 Mexican army troops, 200 naval personnel, 1,400 federal 
police and 300 members of CISEN, the Mexican intelligence agency (Wilson and Weigend 
2014, p.4). Not only were troops deployed, but the federal government divided the state into 
four security sectors and supplanted corrupt and ineffective local leaders and security chiefs, 
installing regional military governors to take charge of security in an organisational manner 
befitting a form of quasi-military occupation (Wilkinson 2014; Meyer 2014a). 
Use of the military delivered some immediate success regarding the first objective, 
with federal forces capturing eight out of 14 priority targeted members of criminal 
organisations (Wilson and Weigend 2014, p.5). However, it is recognised that progress in the 
second and third objectives is far more difficult to achieve, since history has demonstrated 
that interdiction makes only a limited difference if the broader issues of supply and demand 
are not resolved, regardless of the numbers of ‘boots on the ground’. Additionally, local 
security institutions will always be vulnerable to bribery and intimidation once the military 
leaves unless sufficient training and resources are committed to developing them (hence the 
U.S. emphasis on this policy approach via the Merida Initiative). 
Recent policy by the Mexican government has led to the institutionalised 
militarisation of civilians themselves, in certain cases. The phenomenon of vigilantes, or self-
defence groups as they are known, is explored in greater detail in Section 6.7, but has 
generally involved civilian militias taking up arms in areas ravaged by drug violence and 
cartel intimidation, determined to take matters into their own hands rather than rely on 
ineffective local authorities. While initially regarded with suspicion, in 2014 the Mexican 
government began swearing in members of such groups into an officially sanctioned State 
Rural Force, the reasoning being that if such groups were determined to fight the cartels, then 
they may as well do so under official control (Meyer 2014a). In the western state of 
Michoacan, 3,000 members of a self-defence group who had been fighting the Knights 
Templar cartel signed up to join the Rural State Force, and were issued with registered 
firearms and military-style uniforms, with the intention that they support the federal and state 
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authorities in law enforcement and counter-narcotics efforts (BBC 2014; AFP 2014). While 
only 3,300 out of an estimated 20,000 vigilantes in the region signed up, and the self-defence 
groups have experienced various leadership and communications issues, by pursuing such a 
policy Mexico has, in effect, created a de facto civilian militia with all the trappings of a 
military reserve force. 
 In summary, the militarisation of counter-narcotics and public order policy has 
progressively become institutionalised, whether that militarisation takes the form of direct 
military intervention, or the arming and organising of civilians in a military fashion. 
However, this institutionalisation has come about incrementally and almost accidentally 
rather than by design. It is recognised by both the U.S. and Mexico that the long-term 
strategy requires the development of effective, professional, well-resourced and trustworthy 
civilian law enforcement institutions at local, state and, to some extent, federal level. 
While such a long-term policy is being encouraged and pursued with U.S. support, the 
moving target of cartel violence and drug trafficking routes mean that it is all too easy an 
option to deploy the military. They can plug the gaps and attempt to restore order when 
violence flares up. More recently the notion has been embraced of militarising civilians and 
incorporating them into the state security apparatus as a compliment to the main forces. 
However, by repeatedly utilising these emergency measures, whatever their faults and merits, 
the militarised response has become institutionalised and self-perpetuating. It can impede the 
kind of reforms and development law enforcement requires in the long-term, since the 
knowledge is there that the military is an immediate and viable option, an easy ‘quick fix’ so 
to speak (Meyer 2014a). Therefore civilian forces will not be given the full support and 
opportunities required to stand up on their own, meaning their performances may not be 
deemed acceptable and thus the military is called upon once again. 
Despite some successes related to military involvement, usually in the form of raids 
on cartel leaderships, the defining characteristic of Mexico’s drug conflict remains as 
prominent as it has been since 2006 – that of significant levels of bloody and brutal violence. 
 
6.7 Mexico: Criteria of Violence 
 
One of the most significant factors concerning the Mexican drug war since 2006 is both the 
numbers of fatalities and the often barbaric violence associated with those deaths. While the 
drug violence in Colombia is certainly cause for concern, it has often been more in line with 
conventional methods of killing, such as firearms, airstrikes, bombings and so forth. The 
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equivalent in Mexico however has taken on a far higher degree of sadism in the name of 
establishing respect and fear between cartel rivals and those in civil society who would 
oppose them66. However, despite thousands of cases of torture, dismemberment and mass 
killings, the essential question remains where this level of violence is located on the security 
spectrum – taking into account the nature of the violence perpetrated and the weaponry used 
to do so – and to what extent, if any, U.S. counter-narcotics policy plays a role. 
 Firstly, let us consider the key barometer of violence, which is to say death tolls and 
associated violent acts of mass executions, assassinations and disappearances. Homicide-
related data and statistics in Mexico are generally regarded as being consistent and reliable 
due to public health records chronicling the nature of a violent death (and thus whether it can 
be judged as being drug war-related), which in turn is fed into the autonomous government 
statistics agency, INEGI. A secondary source is the National Public Security System (SNSP), 
which is updated monthly and compiles and reports data on cases involving homicide that are 
identified by law enforcement. Taken together, both data sets can be closely correlated to 
form a detailed overall picture of the numbers of homicides related to Mexico’s drug war 
(Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.13). 
 
Figure 12 - Homicide Rate in Mexico: 1995-2012 
 
(Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.7)  
 
 
                                                 
66 Tallies compiled independently by Mexican media organizations suggest that as many as two-thirds of all 
homicides in 2012 bore characteristics typical of organised crime groups, including the use of high-calibre 
automatic weapons, torture, dismemberment, and explicit messages involving organised crime groups (Justice in 
Mexico Project 2013, p.2-3). 
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While Figure 12 above measures the rate of all homicides in Mexico since the mid-1990s, it 
demonstrates that, despite a general decline from the start of the measurement to just prior to 
the 2006 ‘launch’ of the drug war under the Calderón Administration, the homicide rate 
hugely increased in only a five year period, coinciding with the bloodiest period of the 
Mexican drug conflict. Since the ‘commencement of conflict’, the figure most cited by the 
international media for the number of those killed between then and 2012 is often in the 
region of 60,000 (Miroff and Booth 2012; 
Grillo 2013; CNN 2014a). However, closer 
inspection of INEGI statistics in Figure 13 
(Molloy 2013), reveals that the number of total 
homicides in the country during that period was 
closer to 121,000. The smaller figure is often 
cited due to the Mexican authorities referring to 
a specific subset of those deaths as being 
directly involved in organised crime in order to 
justify the tough, militarised approach to the 
conflict. To report the organised crime death toll as 60,000 or so would, despite it being a 
high number in itself, still generate the impression that government measures were working, 
at least compared to the actual figure which is nearly double the stated amount and indicates 
far more collateral civilian damage than reported (Molloy 2013). If the true drug war-related 
death toll was indeed 60,000 or so, then what would account for the rest of the 121,683 
deaths for the period? As Mexican security expert Alejandro Hope opines: 
 
“Does this mean […] that all other possible forms of violence are growing? Has there 
been an explosion of domestic violence, bar fights, land conflicts and assaults that end 
in murder? What factors could explain a phenomenon of this nature? Or, is it not 
more likely that the government changed the criteria for classifying a homicide as 
"related to organised crime"?” (2013) 
 
 The numbers of deaths relating to Mexico’s drug conflict extend, at minimum, into 
the tens of thousands in the space of only a few years compared to the longer time scale of 
Colombia’s internal conflicts. Mass executions have helped such macabre figures to be 
reached, and are illustrative of the exceptional levels of brutality that characterises the 
conflict. The Zetas Cartel has perpetrated some of the most infamous acts, from executing 
Figure 13 
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193 people in what has become known as the 2011 San Fernando massacre and burying them 
in mass graves, to killing over 50 people by setting fire to the Casino Royale in Monterrey, to 
dumping 49 mutilated bodies on the main road from Monterrey to the U.S. border – all of 
them acts to strike at competitors, especially the Gulf Cartel (Rueda 2012; Grillo 2011; 
Associated Press 2012). Indeed, mutilations have been a favoured tactic of the cartels to sow 
fear since the very beginning of the drug conflict when, in 2006, severed heads were thrown 
onto a crowded dance floor in the city of Uruapan in Michoacán state, one of the main 
trafficking avenues on Mexico’s Southwest Pacific coastline (BBC 2006). In 2011, a sack of 
heads was left outside a primary school in Acapulco following demands from local drug 
gangs for half of all teacher pay to be donated to local cartels (Whitwell 2011). Other 
examples of such mass violence and brutality are numerous, but these acts and Mexico’s drug 
conflict are not unrelated. As Map 7 highlights, the majority of mass grave sites uncovered in 
recent years are mainly found in areas of significant drug trafficking-related violence. They 
are close to the U.S. border with its export routes, to the Southwestern Pacific coast with its 
import routes from South America, as well as certain areas in the Southeast connected with 
trafficking routes over the Central American land bridge. 
 
Map 7 - Mass Grave sites and Number of Bodies Located, 2010-2013 
 
(Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.18) 
 
Many of the worst affected communities in Mexico have started to respond to such levels of 
homicides, mass killings and intimidation by forming their own self-defence units, known as 
 163 
fuerzas autodefensas, or what are effectively vigilantes. In the town of Hidalgo, the Pedro 
Mendez Column conducts night patrols independent of any law enforcement support, chasing 
off criminals who once triggered a wave of kidnappings and even murdering several 
members of the Zetas Cartel to send a message (Grillo 2014). In March 2013, over 1,500 
armed men marched into the town of Tierra Colorada, seized what they perceived to be the 
corrupt local police force, and fortified the town (Asfura-Heim and Espach 2013). Meanwhile 
members of the Self-Defence Council of Michoacán battled with members of the Knights 
Templar drug cartel for control of the town of Nueva Italia in early 2014 (Taylor 2014). 
These are just several example of movements that have sprung up across Mexico in response 
to violence and the seeming inability of the Mexican security forces to make a noticeable 
impact. As of late 2013 such groups had formed in the Pacific states of Michoacán and 
Jalisco, in the northern border state of Chihuahua, in the eastern states of Veracruz and 
Tabasco, and on the outskirts of Mexico City, operating openly in 13 different states and at 
least 68 municipalities (Asfura-Heim and Espach 2013). While Mexico has a tradition of the 
public rising up when faced with injustice, criticism of such groups includes charges that they 
only perpetuate the cycle of violence and that some could become criminal entities 
themselves, not dissimilar to the path followed by the AUC in Colombia, despite the 
government having begun a policy of bringing them under official control, as detailed above. 
In addition to mass killings, individual assassinations can also propagate a climate of 
fear and intimidation, with the elimination of certain security, political and media 
professionals furthering insecurity and instability in Mexico with the sense that no one is safe 
to take a stand. This potentially furthers the cause of militarisation in the sense that, if 
nothing else, the Mexican military are at least able to protect themselves by virtue of 
weaponry, equipment and urban fortifications often unavailable to the civilian state actors 
targeted. Notable examples of senior police deaths are Igor Labastida, a senior commander in 
the Mexican Federal Police and head of the anti-trafficking and contraband division, who was 
casually gunned down while eating lunch in 2008 (BBC 2008), and Edgar Millian Gomez, 
another federal police commander, executed by four assassins in a supposed safe house 
(Beith 2009, p.123). More broadly, numerous politicians and journalists throughout Mexico 
have been killed for opposing or investigating cartel activities, as highlighted in Figures 14 
and 15. While there are year-on-year fluctuations, once again the trend is one of increased 
violence from 2006 onwards as the Mexican drug war began to demonstrate notable societal 
impacts that would have drawn the attentions and/or criticism of non-compliant political and 
journalistic figures. 
 164 
Figure 14 - Mayors and Ex-Mayors Killed in Mexico (January 2006-March 2014) 
 
(Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.35) 
 
Figure 15 - Journalists and Media-Support Workers Killed in Mexico, 2006-2013 
 
(Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.36) 
 
In addition to overt violence, more subtle but no less socially damaging instances of 
kidnapping and disappearances have risen since the commencement of the drug conflict. As 
Figure 16 indicates, kidnappings broadly followed a decreasing trend from the late-1990s to 
mid-2000s before experiencing a sharp upturn. 
 
Figure 16 
  
(Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.46) 
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The explanation is similar to the reasons behind the increase in kidnapping incidents reported 
in U.S. Border States, as explored in Section 6.4. It has become an easy way for criminals to 
acquire revenues alongside trafficking, or as a replacement should trafficking be temporarily 
disrupted or broken, by snatching not only rich citizens, but increasingly anyone whose 
families have money (Partlow 2014). Official statistics noted that 2013 was the worst year on 
record for kidnappings, but authorities estimate that perhaps only one-in-ten incidents are 
reported due to mistrust of the police, some of whom are accused of taking part in 
kidnappings and disappearances themselves, as detailed below (Partlow 2014). Statistics kept 
by the independent organisation Asociacion Alto al Secuestro (Association to Stop 
Kidnapping) recorded 3,038 kidnappings in 2013, while another group led by former victims 
put the figure even higher, at 27,740 for the year, or 76 per day (Partlow 2014). 
 The related trend of disappearances has also increased since the beginning of 
Mexico’s drug conflict, with 26,121 people reported missing or disappeared between 
December 2006 and December 2012, with many suspected of being related to drug gang and 
cartel activities, and up to 40 percent having never been subject to criminal investigation 
(Amnesty International 2014). The high percentage of un-investigated disappearances may be 
related to the involvement of certain sections of Mexico’s security forces in such crimes. This 
was recently demonstrated with police complicity in the kidnap, disappearance and eventual 
murder of 43 student teachers from Iguala, whose protests and economic disruption aroused 
the ire of the mayor and local security establishment, which was intimately connected with 
the criminal activity of the Guerreros Unidos (United Warriors) drug gang (Miroff 2014; 
Archibold 2014). Ultimately, mass graves were uncovered (including one unrelated to the 
missing students) and dozens of police officers, Guerreros Unidos members and Iguala’s 
fugitive mayor and his wife were arrested, while the Mexican federal police and army have 
taken over the Iguala Police Department and assumed security responsibilities (Romo 2014). 
In terms of such enforced disappearances purportedly carried out by Mexican 
authorities, Human Rights Watch has documented 249 disappearances committed in Mexico 
since December 2006 (during the Calderón Administration, when the Mexican drug war truly 
escalated). In 149 of these cases, compelling evidence (eyewitnesses, photo and video 
evidence, and even admittance that they were security personnel) was found that state actors, 
i.e. national security forces, participated in illegal arrests and undocumented detentions, 
either acting on their own or collaborating with criminal groups (Human Rights Watch 2013, 
p.17-18). Indeed, a provisional list compiled by the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal 
Prosecutor’s Office that was leaked in 2012, listed more than 25,000 people who disappeared 
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or went missing during those years and who remained unaccounted for, and though there 
were questions concerning methodology, such figures still speak to the severity of the 
situation (Human Rights Watch 2013, p.2). Indeed, if the map of regions where enforced 
disappearances were most apparent (Map 8) is compared with one that highlights areas of 
drug-related violence and cartel activity in 2013 (Map 9), a broad but clear correlation is 
apparent, especially in trafficking-heavy provinces on the Northern border with the U.S. and 
on the Southwestern coastal border on the Pacific where shipments from Colombia arrive. 
 
Map 8 (Human Rights Watch 2013) 
 
Map 9 (Justice in Mexico Project 2013, p.30) 
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Alongside more dramatic cases of enforced disappearances, more general everyday human 
rights violations have been reported concerning the Mexican security forces, with complaints 
by members of the public having increased six fold since the deployment of the armed forces 
against the cartels in 2006 (Meyer 2014b, p.4). Figures 17 and 18 highlight this trend in rising 
complaints during the period of the drug conflict, with substantially more complaints directed 
at the Army in comparison to the Navy (see Figure 18) seemingly validating the U.S. 
approach of having more faith in the professionalism of the maritime service. 
 
Figure 17 - Complaints of Human Rights Violations by Federal Police, 2007–2013 
 
(Meyer 2014b, p.3) 
 
Figure 18 - Complaints of Human Rights Violations by Mexico's Armed Forces, 2007–2012 
 
(Meyer 2014b, p.4) 
 
Such trends are also symptomatic of the long-standing issues concerning inadequate training 
and professionalism that have dogged Mexican police forces for decades, as was alluded to in 
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Section 6.2. They also highlight the issue with employing a militarised mind-set for the 
policing of civilian spaces, as has been the case with the deployment of the Mexican military 
for law enforcement purposes. 
 As with the similar issues of Colombian security forces breaching human rights in the 
prosecution of their native drug conflict, the U.S. has been involved in attempting to address 
such actions. The provisions of the Leahy Amendment are as applicable to Mexico as to 
Colombia, prohibiting the funding of security units or forces with legitimately questionable 
records or proven human rights violations (U.S. Code 1997). From the outset of the Merida 
Initiative, the U.S. Congress placed such human rights requirements on 15 percent of select 
funding, including the improvement of transparency and accountability in Mexico’s police 
forces, investigating and prosecuting human rights violations committed by the Federal 
Police and military, and enforcing the prohibition on the use of testimony obtained through 
torture (Meyer 2014b, p.19). In accordance with such efforts, by December 2013 the U.S. had 
provided $8 million of training and equipment support to the national vetting program at state 
and federal police levels in an effort to stamp out corruption and improve trust in security 
institutions (U.S. Embassy – Mexico 2013). Furthermore, U.S. funding supported additional 
efforts: 
 
 In 2010 the State Department reported that it would utilise INCLE funds to improve 
Mexico’s polygraphing capacity, as well as provide 300 polygraph units directly 
(Meyer 2014b, p.19). 
 $8.8 million of INCLE funding via the Merida Initiative has gone towards supporting 
Mexico’s Police Registry, expanding and enhancing it and its availability 
nationwide67 (U.S. Embassy – Mexico 2013). 
 By 2013, the U.S. had trained over 4,500 Federal Police officers in investigative 
techniques, evidence collection, crime scene preservation and ethics. From February 
to June 2013, 1,498 state and municipal police officers had received appropriate 
training, the largest block of direct training provided to date during the Merida 
Initiative (Meyer 2014b, p.19; U.S. Embassy – Mexico 2013). 
 
                                                 
67According to the State Department., the National Police Registry will contain photos, biographical data, 
fingerprints, DNA, voice samples, and personnel data (all employment-related information, to include date of 
hire, education, training, discipline and terminations) of all active Mexican police officers (federal, state, and 
local), auxiliary officers, and private security companies in Mexico (Bricker 2009) 
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Irrespective of Mexican constitutional sensitivities, like in Colombia the U.S. is constrained 
in its ability to directly intervene with its own forces in counter-narcotics in Mexico. 
Therefore it must enact any influence through the training of native security forces to perform 
to a standard conductive to the efficient interdiction, disruption and hopeful elimination of 
drug trafficking interests. Again, like Colombia, while there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that Mexican security forces have violated human rights in the pursuit of counter-narcotics, it 
is U.S. policy to mitigate and eventually stamp out such abuses and associated corruption, 
and so blame for human rights abuses cannot be placed directly with the U.S. Likewise, the 
predominant violence in Mexico is carried out by organised crime, be it cartels or gangs, and 
so takes place outside the influence of both the U.S. and Mexican authorities, and so neither 
can be held responsible for the wanton brutality that characterises the conflict. 
 Where the U.S. does harbour a degree of responsibility is in the ready availability of 
weaponry in Mexico that is utilised in the violence. Mexico itself has such strict criteria for 
the issue of firearms ownership permits that there is, quite literally, only one gun store in the 
entire country. Known officially as the Directorate of Arms and Munitions Sales, it is located 
at a secure military base in Mexico City, where visitors are subject to strict checks to be 
permitted only one small-calibre weapon for sports or home protection (Booth 2010). Despite 
having some of the strictest gun-control laws in the world, Mexico is nevertheless awash with 
weapons. Tens of thousands have been seized from cartels and gangs, often of a 
sophistication and calibre to match anything law enforcement or the military possess. 
The charts below clearly demonstrate this, and along with almost every other 
measurable factor explored above, the onset of the drug war in 2006 was the harbinger of a 
significant increase in negative trends. Indeed, in 2011, five years into the Mexican drug 
conflict, of the 94,000 weapons seized, it was determined that 64,000 were of U.S. origin 
after tracing them back to their source (McGreal 2011; ATF 2012). Texas was the source 
state at the top of the list in a 2010 investigation by The Washington Post, accounting for 
eight of the top 12 U.S. gun dealers whose firearms ended up in Mexico, with the remaining 
three in Arizona and one in California, though with 3,800 gun retailers in Texas alone, this 
cannot be surprising (Grimaldi and Horwitz 2010). 
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Figure 19 - Firearms seizures by U.S. and Mexican authorities, 2006-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(McDougal et al. 2013, p.10) 
 
Figure 20 - ATF Data on Firearms Recovered in Mexico in 2009 by Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Goodman and 
Marizco 2010, p.188) 
 
 
Figure 19 highlights the huge disparity between the numbers of firearms seized in the U.S. 
versus the numbers seized in Mexico. Such a difference suggests that only a small portion of 
the firearms destined for Mexico are being intercepted at the border, meaning that the 
majority get through and are liable to be used before they are subsequently seized in Mexico. 
Figure 20 demonstrates the types of firearms seized, with the majority unavailable even for 
legitimate purchase in Mexico. This suggests that such huge numbers – as well as their high-
calibre and destructive lethality – originate in the significant cross-border smuggling of 
firearms purchased in the U.S. and transported into Mexico along with money generated from 
drug sales. 
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The U.S. broadly has a constitutionally and historically relaxed attitude to gun 
control, and a combination of factors has fuelled the smuggling firearms into Mexico. In 
1994 President Clinton signed into law a federal ban on 19 types of military-style assault 
weapons, which expired in 2004 after non-renewal by Congress, allowing such weapons as 
AK-47s, Uzis and TEC-9s to be legally purchased prior to, and during, the Mexican drug 
conflict (Associated Press 2004). Until recently, potential loopholes at gun shows in the U.S. 
allowed individuals to sell firearms, sometimes of military-grade, to other individuals without 
requiring the standard background checks (CNN 2013). With almost 5,000 gun shows across 
the U.S. each year, the opportunity for criminal elements to take advantage was significant 
(CNN 2011; Szoldra 2013). One of, if not the biggest factor, however, is the huge number of 
gun stores within easy reach of the border. There are an estimated 6,700 gun dealers located 
in the border region, which represent more than 12.5 percent of all registered firearms sellers 
in the U.S. (McDougal et al. 2013, p.10). Their impact is clear in Figure 21, where the top 
five source states for seized weaponry in Mexico for a two-year period were either Border 
States, or Florida with its drug trafficking connections. 
 
Figure 21 - Top 10 U.S. Source States for Seized Firearms 2007–2009 
 
 
The U.S. has clear concerns about the 
impact of the northern flow of 
narcotics on its national security and 
public health. However, Mexican 
complaints about the opposite 
southerly flow of smuggled weapons 
and money from drug sales has equal 
validity. Unlike U.S. policy to 
improve the training, equipment and 
performance of Mexican security forces – and therefore reduce violence and improve 
counter-narcotics initiatives – efforts to address this particular issue are held hostage to the 
domestic political difficulties of sufficient U.S. gun control reform, exacerbating Mexican 
frustrations (Shirk 2011b, p.13-14). The Obama Administration has called for the 
reinstatement of the assault weapons ban, but lobbyist pressure and Congressional opposition 
makes this unlikely. The 23 Executive Orders it was in Obama’s power to sign, in January 
2013, were modest initiatives designed to strengthen enforcement of existing laws and to 
encourage more information sharing between federal agencies and state governments, though 
(Goodman and Marizco 2010, p.192) 
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such minor adjustments were unlikely to address the issue (Corcoran 2013; Baker and Shear 
2013). Further Executive Actions were introduced in 2016, involving stricter background 
checks on firearms purchasers, improved mental health services, and increased resources to 
recruit extra ATF agents and track illegal online firearms trafficking (White House 2016). 
However, these actions were primarily in response to the regular gun atrocities carried out 
across the U.S., rather than seeing to address cross-border weapons trafficking into Mexico 
(Lichtblau and Shear 2016). 
One direct measure that U.S. authorities did undertake in an effort to undermine 
weapons smuggling into Mexico was Operation Fast and Furious, where ATF agents in 
Arizona allowed the sale of more than 2,000 weapons to suspected criminals with links to 
drug gangs. The intention was to trace the guns over the border as part of a wider 
investigation of Mexican cartels and their weapons procurement (Barrett 2013). However, the 
ATF failed to track the contraband firearms, with two of the weapons being involved in the 
killing of a U.S. border agent. In addition to institutional incompetence, the failed operation 
solicited further scandal when a Congressional investigation damned then-Attorney General 
Eric Holder, and by implication the Obama Administration, for mishandling the operation 
and for attempts to dampen criticism and deflect blame (CNN 2014b; Horwitz 2013). 
 With significant domestic gun control reform beyond Executive Actions unlikely, and 
what efforts there have been to directly crack down on weapons smuggling being limited to 
traditional border interception or incompetent operations, it is questionable whether the 
situation will improve. The Obama Administration has sought to strengthen some gun 
enforcement laws, and additional border manpower and surveillance may improve 
interdiction. However, such is the scope and scape of cross-border smuggling – both ways – 
that it seems U.S. policy efforts to dampen drug violence and improve drug enforcement will 
remain focused on improving the capacity of Mexican law enforcement to make progress in 
these areas themselves, while regaining the trust of the civilian population through improved 
efficiency and respect for human rights. 
 
6.8 Results and Chapter Summary 
 
Mexico presents a more complicated case study than Colombia, both in analysis and 
assessment. Its traditional reluctance to accept U.S. security involvement beyond levels of 
training and support that comply with its highly guarded sovereignty, mean that U.S. military 
influence, and U.S. policy of a militarised nature, is far more minimal than in Colombia. This 
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accounts for the smaller size of Sections 6.5 and 6.6, as making military and 
institutionalisation of such efforts in the prosecution of the drug conflict are very much 
Mexican endeavours. While they enjoy U.S. support, they do not feature any significant U.S. 
involvement beyond what could be regarded as basic efforts to improve counter-narcotics 
efficiency through personnel training, institutional development and equipment provision. 
 Sections 6.4 and 6.7 – concerning U.S. border militarisation and violence in Mexico 
respectively – warrant the larger portions of analysis in this case study, as they are strongly 
connected to each other. Mexican violence, instability and penetration of criminal elements 
into the U.S. has prompted the increased militarisation and fortification of the border in an 
effort to try and keep the chaos confined to the Mexican side. Conversely, it is the huge 
demand for narcotics in the U.S. that encourages high levels of drug trafficking and cartel 
competition, which in turn fuels such extreme violence against rivals, state authorities and 
innocents caught in the cross fire. More often than not, these people are killed by weapons 
sourced in the United States and are ill-served by the inefficient local and state police that the 
U.S. attempts to train and equip to hold the line. 
It can be suggested that the death toll, mass executions, disappearances, 
assassinations, vigilantism, human rights violations and a flood of weapons all contribute to 
classifying Mexico as being in a violised rather than militarised state of affairs. However, as 
stated at the beginning of this chapter, Mexico is experiencing what can be best described as 
a criminal rather than political or guerrilla insurgency. While significant issues and concerns 
are present regarding Mexico’s public safety, as well as the efficiency and integrity of large 
elements of its security forces, the state itself is not at risk of collapse or violent takeover, as 
was possible in Colombia at certain times. Mexico’s transition to a fully legitimate 
democratic system is seemingly entrenched, while structural reforms of labour, education, 
competition policy, finance, telecommunications and energy have been passed to promote 
growth and productivity. The country has experienced positive economic growth figures for a 
number of years, with the lowest rate being 1.1 percent in 2013 and 3.5 percent anticipated 
for 2015 (World Bank 2014). 
Therefore, while the death rates and violence are undeniable, they do not mean that 
the security situation in Mexico should be judged as being violised overall. It is a country 
experiencing an acute security crisis in certain regions, not one engaged in a state of war. The 
key factor is the Mexican policy response – i.e. the deployment of the military as a primary 
tool in the drug conflict, its institutionalisation in prosecuting it, and the para-militarisation of 
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civilians in certain circumstances. These cause the situation to be classified as being a 
militarised one. 
Crucially though, it is Mexican policy in Mexican jurisdiction that is militarised. Due 
to the sovereign caveats of cooperating with the Mexicans, and the policing and economic 
focus of the Merida Initiative, only a minor portion of U.S. counter-narcotics policy is 
militarised. By emphasising training, intelligence and support for Mexican law enforcement 
above the military, U.S. policy towards Mexico can be considered as primarily securitised. 
However, U.S. policy in American jurisdiction, i.e. the border area and Border States, is 
decidedly militarised as Section 6.4 has revealed. Such are the complexities when dealing 
with a case study featuring two countries with different legal, political and security 
jurisdictions, but which are so intertwined in dealing with the drug trafficking issue that it is 
difficult to completely separate them. Figure 22 helps to visualise the arrangement: 
 
Figure 22 
 
 
A strategy of domestic militarisation, such as sending in the army and marines, has been a 
viable tool for the Mexican government, but not necessarily the most effective. A recent 
statistical analysis suggested that in 18 areas of drug-related violence where the Mexican 
military were deployed, the homicide rate actually increased, or experienced no improvement 
(Espinosa and Rubin 2015). In the notoriously violent drug city of Ciudad Juárez, after the 
military intervened in 2008 the homicide rate actually rose to more than 200 people per 
100,000 in 2010, the highest in the world at the time (Malkin 2015). This corresponds with 
charts featured in this chapter that demonstrate a correlation between the launch of Mexico’s 
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drug conflict and rocketing violence. By contrast, a 2015 report by the International Crisis 
Group detailed Ciudad Juárez’s path to relative recovery in the last few years, as greater 
government accountability, well-funded social programs, judicial and police reform, and 
greater engagement by the latter with citizens, has seen encouraging developments and 
improved security and stability, despite continuing challenges (International Crisis Group 
2015). If sufficiently replicated on a national level, then significant inroads could be made 
against the cartels and resultant violence. 
Such initiatives, while early in implementation and subject to unforeseen 
developments, could validate the U.S. strategy of shifting away from a principally militarised 
strategy during the early days, and towards a socio-economic and broadly securitised effort. 
In all three elements of the militarisation framework, U.S. involvement and policy intent has 
not met the requirements for its counter-narcotics policy towards Mexico to be regarded as 
being militarised on the security spectrum. 
In the following chapter, a comparison will be made between this case study and the 
previous one concerning Colombia. This way, a broad conclusion can be reached regarding 
the extent of the militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in these two hugely important 
theatres of conflict in the broader Latin American drug war. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has developed a militarisation analytical framework and successfully applied it to 
American counter-narcotics policies in Colombia, Mexico and on the U.S. Southern Border. 
In doing so, the research has proven the occurrence of counter-narcotics militarisation in 
Colombia and on the U.S. border, and of counter-narcotics securitisation in Mexico. The 
findings from those case studies also allowed the militarisation framework to be further 
developed and refined, thus making a valuable contribution to the securitisation debate. 
In this conclusion I firstly conduct an overview of the preceding chapters, reviewing 
their content and the reasoning behind the research decisions in each. The research question 
is then addressed, exploring the militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in 
Colombia/U.S. border and securitisation in Mexico. The academic contribution of the 
militarisation framework, including post-case study reflexivity, is then explored, and a final 
summary closes the thesis. 
 
7.1 From securitisation to Mexican drug violence – a chapter summary 
 
This thesis has charted the process behind the securitisation and militarisation of U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy, both at home and abroad, and has developed a useful and nuanced 
militarisation framework with which to conduct this research and reveal these findings. 
Chapter 2 explored securitisation and its components, such as security actors, the 
speech act, and so on, as detailed by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998). It was posited that 
context, which is to say the impact of specific historical and cultural considerations on a 
society and its identity, can help influence whether certain issues solicit enough concern to 
gradually become regarded as threats and thus eventually become securitised. Additionally, 
attention was given to the security spectrum, whereby a security issue progresses along a path 
from Non-Politicised, to Politicised, to Securitised, with the possibility of becoming a 
Violised, war-like situation at the furthest extreme, as suggested by Iver Neuman (1998). 
It was important to detail the conceptual foundations of securitisation, the security 
spectrum and highlight some of the surrounding debates, before proceeding to outline and 
explain the militarisation framework that builds upon securitisation, along with its three 
principal elements; making military, institutionalisation and criteria of violence. With regards 
to aiding the thesis’s empirical research – involving U.S. counter-narcotics policy in 
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Colombia and Mexico/U.S. border – it was important to first explore the broader 
securitisation and militarisation frameworks. Both proved to be useful tools to analyse the 
development and direction of U.S. counter-narcotics policy over the past century, both abroad 
and domestically, as it gradually securitised in general, and then militarised in more select 
initiatives and areas of operation. 
 Chapter 3 covered the methodology involved in conducting the research, the most 
important element being the research question that determined the direction of the thesis as a 
whole, i.e. to what extent has United States counter-narcotics policy in Colombia, Mexico 
and on the U.S. Southern Border become militarised? This involved a primarily qualitative 
approach, as it became clear during the initial research stages that government documents, 
policy proposals, and archival sources from various presidential administrations and 
congressional sessions, would provide the best sources for achieving the research goals. As 
the research progressed, primary and secondary sources were utilised, usually in the form of 
official documents and reports, but it was found that quantitative sources – either embedded 
in qualitative sources or separate – also provided useful statistical information. These often 
related to budget allocations, the size and type of security forces, duration of operations, and 
so on. They not only proved useful in determining the extent of militarisation of U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy in the case studies, but also helped to further develop the broader 
militarisation framework by suggesting new elements that could be added to the existing 
ones, as explored later. 
Chapter 3 also justified the case study selection, as well as the justification for 
regarding the U.S. as the main actor, due to its lead role in global counter-narcotics. From 
early preliminary research, it was concluded that Colombia and Mexico were, respectively, 
the biggest cocaine producing and transit states in the broader Latin American drug conflict 
(UNODC 2014; Lee 2014; Thompson 2011). Along with their relations with the United 
States concerning the drug issue, this made them both worthy of a case study. Though 
analysis of the security situation on the southern U.S. border with Mexico was substantial in 
its own right, it was logical to include it within the overall Mexico case study given how 
closely interrelated both security issues are (DEA 2009; FBI 2010a), rather than grant the 
border situation its own separate study. 
Chapter 4 chronicled the history and development of U.S. counter-narcotics policy 
during the 20th Century. This was in order to establish a historical narrative of how the 
narcotics issue increasingly became securitised in American politics and society, which gave 
credence to the importance of context in how and why societies securitise, as suggested in 
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Chapter 2. It was also useful to explore how popular culture in America can have an impact 
in facilitating an acceptance of increased militarisation in certain areas of public policy. The 
chapter demonstrated how narcotics progressed along the security spectrum from a non-
politicised issue, to politicised, to securitised, and thus how further progression into 
militarisation was the next stage. To this end, I highlighted how what began as a non-
politicised issue at the dawn of the 20th Century, became increasingly politicised as various 
actors sought to raise awareness and concern over the effects of narcotics on American public 
and moral health and civil society. Drugs became securitised from the Nixon Administration 
onwards, but it would later become militarised as later presidents, and increasingly an 
American security establishment in search of reasons to sustain itself, sought to tackle the 
drug issue and associated violence at home and abroad (Isacson 2005, p.28). The 
securitisation framework demonstrated its usefulness in analysing the development of 
narcotics into a security issue for the U.S. during this period. 
Having established this trend, the militarisation framework could then be employed as 
an analytical tool for the case studies, in order to determine the extent of the militarisation of 
U.S. counter-narcotics policy. Before embarking on the case studies, it was useful from a 
historical perspective to chart the gradual militarisation of counter-narcotics policy within the 
U.S. itself, most notably via the cooperation rendered to civilian law enforcement by the 
DOD. It was also useful to chart the early American military and security support for Latin 
American governments, which would pave the way for the major initiative of Plan Colombia 
from 2000 and (to a far lesser extent militarily as was eventually discovered) the later Merida 
Initiative in Mexico. 
 Chapter 5 constituted the first case study, that of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in 
Colombia, mainly through the prism of the Plan Colombia initiative. It detailed the long 
history of U.S military and security involvement in that country, initially motivated by anti-
communism and a desire to bolster a relatively stable and prosperous regional ally (McLean 
2002, p.124). Later support still aimed at maintaining Colombian stability, but the emphasis 
shifted to counter-narcotics. I illustrated that drugs had not only become a source of conflict 
with the cartels that undermined Colombian state security, but had also become a source of 
U.S. national security concern as narcotics encouraged violence and addiction in American 
society (the ‘existential threat’ that demanded ‘emergency measures’ to combat it, in 
accordance with the securitisation framework). While early American scepticism concerning 
the effectiveness and professionalism of the Colombian military meant that support 
predominantly went to the civilian-yet-paramilitary Colombian National Police (Herring 
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1956, p.704; Colombian National Police 2014), as the threat to the state itself by narcotics-
funded guerrillas increased, so too did the militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy. 
This led to the dedicated Plan Colombia initiative, which predominantly favoured 
military and security related aid, especially following 9/11 when all pretence to separate 
counter-narcotics from counterinsurgency was dropped (Vauters and Smith 2006, pp.171-
172). The quantitative sources used in the research showed that the later stages of Plan 
Colombia saw increased U.S. social and economic support (while simultaneously reducing 
military commitments). Yet the same statistics for the period which concerned expenditure, 
asset support and growth in military personnel numbers underlined that American counter-
narcotics policy as a whole in Colombia has nevertheless favoured an overtly militarised 
strategy (Crandall 2008, p.31; Veillette 2006, p.6; Beittel 2012, p.38; Isacson 2012, p.3). 
 Chapter 6 explored U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Mexico and the complexities of 
the issue, which is itself defined by the historical, diplomatic and geographical relationship 
between the two countries. As a reflection of the impact that drug-related violence in Mexico 
has on U.S. security and domestic counter-narcotics policy, a section on the militarisation of 
the U.S. border was included within the case study. This interrelated, cross-border security 
issue has proved significant in the gradual militarisation of U.S. domestic drug enforcement. 
Analysis then moved on to counter-narcotics policy in Mexico itself, which due to 
constitutional prohibition limits overt U.S. support, in comparison to Colombia. I determined 
that the situation concerning domestic Mexican counter-narcotics strategy could be classified 
as being militarised. This was due to the deployment and institutionalisation of Mexican 
military forces or militarised civilians into areas of drug violence in replacement of 
compromised or weak law enforcement (Meyer 2014a). This, alongside militarisation by the 
U.S. of counter-narcotics policy on its own side of the border, could potentially lead to the 
assumption of militarised American policy approach all round. However, the case study 
findings strongly indicated that U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Mexico is in fact securitised 
in nature and not militarised, given the far greater emphasis placed by the Americans on 
support for Mexican law enforcement, judicial reform and socio-economic development 
above purely military support (U.S. Embassy – Mexico 2013; USAID 2014). 
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7.2 Results 
 
The research question asked to what extent has United States counter-narcotics policy in 
Colombia, Mexico and on the U.S. Southern Border become militarised? As a precursor to 
exploring U.S. policy on its border, the historical analysis in Chapter 4 detailed the 
progressive securitisation and then gradual militarisation of aspects of U.S. domestic counter-
narcotics policy. This was explored further by a section in Chapter 6 that specifically focused 
on the extent of militarisation on the U.S. border with Mexico. These combined findings 
indicated that American law and counter-narcotics enforcement in general has not become 
some kind of domestic military force, a civilian version of the combat-oriented Department 
of Defence. Nevertheless, the war on drugs has facilitated an overall trend in militarising 
domestic counter-narcotics policy, and especially so on the border compared to the rest of the 
country. This is demonstrated by the increased material and training support from the DOD to 
regional and local southwestern law enforcement since the 1980s, to federal agencies such as 
the Border Patrol deploying their own Special Forces units and UAVs, to direct employment 
of military forces such as the National Guard for border protection. 
 The core of the research question, however, involves U.S. foreign counter-narcotics 
policy in Colombia and Mexico, the primary narcotics producing and transiting countries in 
Latin American, and the militarisation of such American policy in each. Below, I provide a 
detailed comparison between the Colombian and Mexican case studies. I compare how each 
of the three elements of the militarisation framework apply to both cases. The cumulative 
comparison will help determine a conclusion for the research question itself, while the 
findings will allow comment on what has been learned about militarisation as a process, as 
well as broader U.S. counter-narcotics and foreign policy. 
 
7.2.1 Comparing the ‘making military’ element in each case study 
 
As has been explored in Chapter 2, the making military element of the militarisation 
framework is intended to describe the direct involvement of a nation’s military forces and/or 
the utilisation of assets, resources and training support involving said military in cooperation 
with domestic or foreign civilian and military security forces. An example of this element put 
into practice is the long-standing military ties between the United States and Colombia, 
involving both Cold War geopolitics and, more recently and with greater primacy, the War 
on Drugs. 
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The security relationship between the two countries stretches back to the 1950s 
onwards, with the contribution of Colombian troops to the Korean War and the signing of a 
Military Assistance Agreement between the U.S. and Colombia in 1952 (Crandall 2008, 
p.21). This signalled the beginning of small but gradual increases in U.S. military training 
and support of Colombian forces, as well as a CIA presence. The persistent civil conflict with 
Marxist guerrillas also meant that the military held great influence in Colombian internal 
security, including de facto jurisdiction over the civilian population until its ultimate repeal 
(Ramirez Lemus et al. 2005, p.123). The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 saw the 
institutionalisation of U.S. efforts to promote Western Hemisphere security. Under the Act's 
three programs - the Military Assistance Program, the Military Education and Training 
program, and the Foreign Military Finance program – the U.S. contributed some $2 billion to 
Western hemisphere security forces over the following three decades, of which Colombia 
was one of the primary recipients. Therefore, even before sustained U.S. support for 
Colombian counter-narcotics efforts in the 1990s, and counter-narcoinsurgency in the 2000s, 
there was an established policy of American promotion of Colombian military capability and 
effectiveness – amplifying its already strong presence in Colombian society – in pursuit of 
anti-communism and regional security interests. 
In the case of Mexico there is a long history of security cooperation with the U.S., but 
due to Mexican constitutional sensitivities this has not involved the U.S. military to nearly 
the same extent as American security cooperation with Colombia. In accordance with the 
promotion of Western hemispheric security, the CIA assisted in the creation of its Mexican 
counterpart, the Federal Security Directorate (Hernández 2013, p.65). Likewise, there has 
also been a long tradition of counter-narcotics cooperation, as demonstrated by the Nixon 
Administration donating aircraft for drug interdiction following Operation Intercept (Epstein 
1977, p.83-84), or joint work on a radar network for detecting Colombian drug flights. In 
general, despite concerns about pre-2000 Mexican government tolerance of the drug trade 
bordering on collusion (Hernández 2013, p.65), U.S.-Mexican intelligence and law 
enforcement cooperation regarding counter-narcotics was generally effective, as 
demonstrated through numerous seizures and roundups of cartel personnel in the U.S. (Beith 
2010, p.176; U.S. Department of Justice 2008). 
 Whatever the moral qualms, Mexican government accommodation, and in certain 
cases even control, of the drug trade is generally regarded as having kept a lid on cartel 
power struggles and resultant violence. There was, in short, no pressing need for an internal 
militarised response to narcotics in Mexico, and thus also no reason it should have influenced 
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U.S. counter-narcotics strategy in Mexico in a more militarised direction, as the situation in 
Colombia had encouraged. Therefore, just as the swift rise of the cartels in the 1970s has 
caught Colombian authorities and U.S. representatives off guard, so too did the fallout of the 
PRI’s removal from power in 2000. This, combined with the erosion of the Colombian 
cartels, allowed for the rapid rise of the Mexican cartels and consequent violence and 
instability in prominent contested trafficking zones on the U.S. border. 
 Even with a more militarised approach to Colombia, there was still a greater emphasis 
on promoting the effectiveness of native law enforcement during the initial rise of the drug 
cartels via the CNP, just as the ideal – if not practically realised – course of action in Mexico 
is to respond to criminal cartel violence via effective law enforcement. The key difference is 
that the security situation in Colombia deteriorated in the late-1990s due to the threat posed 
by guerrilla movements, significantly supported by the drug trade, gaining territorial control 
from the Colombian state. This more conventional war-like situation necessitated a more 
militarised response by the Colombian state through direct involvement of its military forces, 
in conjunction with military training, equipment and asset support from the U.S. – both 
aspects described by the making military framework element. Even then, due to domestic and 
congressional caution, U.S. support had to be seen to be adhering to clear dividing lines 
between supporting the counter-narcotic versus the counter-insurgency efforts of Colombian 
forces. This was a distinction which was difficult to enforce in reality, and indeed one which 
was essentially abandoned in favour of combining both efforts after 9/11. To date, such a 
civil-conflict scenario does not yet exist in Mexico. The viability and stability of the Mexican 
state is not under threat from the cartels as Colombia was from guerrilla movements at the 
time. Therefore, the onus is on supporting the development of Mexican law enforcement 
capability via Merida Initiative funding, even if Mexico’s police forces are currently 
supplemented or even replaced by the Mexican military more often than is desired. 
The declining security situation in Colombia at the beginning of the 2000s prompted 
the U.S. to dramatically increase the military component of its support to native security 
forces. However, as has been repeatedly stated throughout, while both countries have drug-
related violence and insecurity in common, the circumstances in Colombia and Mexico are 
different. Colombia is principally a source country for drug production, has a long-running 
civil conflict with guerrilla movements, and has been receptive to outside U.S. training, 
equipment provision and intelligence support, largely accepting the terms and conditions that 
come attached, such as aerial eradication of coca crops. Mexico on the other hand is mainly a 
transit country for narcotics, and is dealing with an essentially criminal conflict rather than 
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civil-insurgent one. Due to long standing policy attitudes, Mexico has not been willing to 
accept significant direct American military support on its territory that may infringe on its 
sovereignty, which only leaves the ‘support’ aspect of the making military element. 
Equipment donation and training assistance for sections of the Mexican military by the U.S. 
is acceptable, as is funding support and equipment provision intended to improve law 
enforcement professionalism and resources. As with Colombia’s drug problems in the 1990s, 
where it was appropriate to meet criminal cartel activities with primarily law enforcement 
means via a strongly supported CNP, complimented by specialised military units, it is felt 
that Mexico’s current cartel-criminal problem is best met by a judicial approach. The 
problem however lies in a Mexican law enforcement establishment that is undermanned, 
under-resourced and easily intimidated or corrupted. This leaves the Mexican government 
little option but to send in the military to take control of law and order in certain areas, 
effectively militarising its drug conflict. 
 The U.S. has provided some military support in the form of high-level engagement 
between Mexican and American security figures, joint military cooperation with U.S. 
Northern Command, and the upgrading of some Mexican equipment and airborne platforms, 
such as naval surveillance aircraft and Blackhawk helicopters. Additional efforts at 
increasing Mexican military efficiency and effectiveness have involved U.S. Marine Corps 
provision of training to many Mexican NCOs (U.S. Department of Defence 2013a), plus $15 
million a year spent on training for 3,000 personnel from across the Mexican services 
(Michaels 2014). However, even taken all together, such efforts are dwarfed by U.S. military 
support to Colombia. U.S. counter-narcotics support in Mexico is not at the level of direct 
military involvement as set out in the making military element of the framework. 
 The U.S. counter-narcotics approach in Colombia has seen sustained and active 
involvement of Special Forces and intelligence officers in the country since the 1980s, albeit 
in supportive and not combat-oriented roles. Likewise, military-centred support for the 
training, resourcing, growth and operational reach and effectiveness of the Colombian armed 
forces and the paramilitary national police has gone hand in hand with a U.S. operational 
presence. While U.S. social and economic aid has increased during the Consolidation phase, 
such past and present direct military involvement, by both U.S. and Colombian forces, as 
well as long-running American military-related support, mean that the features of the making 
military element of the militarisation framework are present in this case study. 
By comparison, concerns regarding Mexican sovereignty mean that, despite U.S. 
policy in Mexico supporting the improvement of Mexican military professionalism and 
 184 
counter-narcotics assets, there has been no direct U.S. military involvement in drug 
enforcement in that country. Direct military efforts against narcotics are the preserve of the 
Mexican government and security forces. What U.S. military-related support that exists is far 
outweighed by the support for the development of Mexican law enforcement capabilities, as 
well as socio-economic aid. This is as a result of the recognition that, despite huge levels of 
violence, the Mexican drug conflict is essentially a socio-criminal problem, and not one 
where significant military resources need to be committed to ‘turn back the tide’ as was the 
case when Colombia was on the brink of state failure. While U.S. counter-narcotics policy in 
Colombia has primarily involved a military dimension to a greater, then gradually decreasing, 
degree as Plan Colombia evolved, its policy in Mexico is predominantly securitised in nature. 
Small-scale military asset and training support is still observable, but combined with an 
absence of direct U.S. military involvement, the principal factors involved in the making 
military element of the militarisation framework are not present in the Mexican case study 
 
7.2.2 ‘Institutionalisation’ of militarisation in the cases 
 
Institutionalisation, in the context of the militarisation framework, is the existence of a 
strategic environment whereby the elements involved in the ‘making military’ element, 
discussed above, have been present for a such sustained period of time that they can no 
longer be considered simply as emergency measures and have taken on the character of the 
‘new normal’ in terms of policy practice. The main issue is the term ‘sustained period’, which 
risks being an arbitrary one, as it could represent a period of time lasting months, years or 
decades. Every security situation is different, some with clear objectives and finite 
operational lengths, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Others have looser 
defined goals and generally commence with no established ‘end date’, as demonstrated by 
Plan Colombia, which broadly continues fifteen years after its launch and has been subject to 
constant evolution, from an initial focus on counter-narcotics, to support for counter narco-
terrorism, to an increasing socio-economic development programme. 
 I have attempted to address the issue of what constitutes a ‘sustained period’ in a later 
section of this chapter, which refines the militarisation framework and suggests new elements 
that take into account the length of time and the aftermath of security situations. The U.S.'s 
Colombian and Mexican counter-narcotics initiatives are still ongoing, and so it was reasoned 
that their lengths so far – sixteen and eight years respectively – constituted a ‘sustained 
period’. Several years is generally adequate to determine whether use of military assets in 
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pursuit of a strategic goal has grown and then receded (confirming it as a shorter-term 
emergency measure), or has been maintained long enough to become the ‘new normal’. 
 As detailed in the section above, U.S. military and intelligence agencies have had 
generally warm relations and varying degrees of involvement with Colombia since the early 
1950s, and such a long-established security relationship allowed anti-communist support to 
pivot towards counter-narcotics support. The Colombians have been willing to accept 
funding, asset and equipment transfer, military and police training and U.S. military and 
intelligence personnel in this strategic environment, in supervisory roles if not directly 
participating on the ground in counter-narcotics operations. Colombia's role is not necessary 
supplicant, but more one of a willing partner, mostly content to ally with American counter-
narcotics policy. That said, Colombians are not without the capacity to propose their own 
strategic direction, as well as defend Colombian sovereignty and priorities if the situation 
demands it. For example, aerial spraying was halted in May 2015 due to Colombian concerns 
over the detrimental environmental and health effects of the chemicals used (Neuman 2015). 
 Mexico on the other hand has often been reluctant to accept U.S. support on nearly the 
same scale. This has been due to historical factors of old-but-tempered enmity, and because 
the security situation in that country did not previously warrant such aid, until the recent 
decade with its accompanying explosion of violence and instability. As detailed earlier in 
Chapter 6, Mexico was a recipient of U.S. counter-narcotics support, such as interdiction 
aircraft or cooperation on airspace monitoring. However, due to smaller Mexican cartel 
power, and the controlling influence of the Mexican PRI regime, any significant drug-related 
security issues were easily tempered. Until 2000, when the PRI fell from power and the 
pressures on the Colombian cartels ultimately created opportunities for their Mexican 
counterparts, Mexico generally had no urgent need for significant U.S. counter-narcotic 
support, or to employ its own forces to that end on a mass or prolonged scale. Such 
emergency measures were not required in this strategic environment. 
 By contrast, Colombia was being pushed to the brink by FARC and narcoterrorism, 
and as a long-term U.S. ally in the region, security cooperation came more naturally. The 
Mexican state though, while perhaps not under the same existential threat as Colombia had 
been, has seen its security situation progressively worsen compared to the relative peace of 
the past. Prideful or not, it cannot turn down the offer of U.S. counter-narcotics support, even 
if Mexico’s constitutional caveats on the nature of that support are to a far stricter standard 
than Colombia’s, and it is principally focused on law-enforcement rather than military 
development. 
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 Each country’s drug conflict is inherently different and this has effected the nature of 
U.S. counter-narcotics support. In Colombia, while the criminal cartels were serious players 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and still occupy a current if diminished role, that country’s drug 
conflict conflated with its civil conflict. The already highly militarised nature of the 
Colombian state’s offensive against insurgents and their drug cultivation operations meant 
that U.S. counter-narcotics support also took on a more military dimension. Even notionally 
civilian security forces in Colombia, like the CNP, are essentially paramilitary in nature. Plan 
Colombia has increasingly focused on socio-economic development, though this was only 
really after the military advantage over FARC had been entrenched after almost a decade of 
sustained development of the native security forces and near-continuous military 
campaigning. It has only been with the establishment of this relatively stable ‘new normal’ 
that the U.S. felt it was safe enough to leave security progress in Colombian hands. 
 Mexico’s drug-related security situation is not a military-political civil conflict with a 
drug dimension as with Colombia, but is a criminal and public security matter where 
narcotics are the principal cause of conflict and insecurity. As such, there are no real 
guerrillas to defeat, territory to reclaim and government writ to restore in this security 
environment, as with Colombia, and so it is a security issue that does not – or at least should 
not – strictly require a military solution. The reason that the Mexican military plays such a 
key role in the domestic policy response to counter-narcotics is because the civilian law 
enforcement authorities are simply not up to the task through under-training, inefficiency, 
intimidation and especially corruption. It is because of this different problem in Mexico that 
U.S. counter-narcotics policy, while lending limited support to the Mexican military given 
their frontline role against cartels, is more geared towards providing support for law 
enforcement and civil justice capability in the longer term. 
 As the Colombian case study revealed, aside from long-standing military and security 
ties between Colombia and the U.S., the counter-narcotics-related support offered by the 
latter to the former totalled billions of dollars in direct or associated military aid. Colombia 
has increased spending on security and defence over the past decade in an effort to 
consolidate gains made in the civil conflict, and to disrupt the drug trade to cut off funding 
for guerrillas as well as satisfy U.S. concerns. As a result, the number of personnel in the 
Colombian military and national police has increased by tens of thousands. Indeed, Colombia 
has less than half the population of Mexico at around 48 million, yet has a combined military 
and paramilitary police force of some 405,000, while Mexico with a population of 112 
million has 260,000 active duty military troops and about 40,000 federal police (Molloy 
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2013). If Mexico were to expand its military and federal police to a per capita level 
comparable to Colombia’s, then it would involve a combined military and paramilitary police 
force of some 945,000 (Molloy 2013). 
 Irrespective of the prohibitively high budgetary requirements to institutionalise such 
an arrangement in Mexico on a permanent basis (and indeed whether it would even be needed 
to deal with a criminal and not civil conflict), this fact highlights how comparatively less 
militarily focused Mexican security is compared to Colombia. Likewise, this is also reflected 
in the less militarised focus of U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Mexico. For instance, budget 
statistics show that after the first two years the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) portion of 
the Merida Initiative decreased hugely before disappearing altogether. During the same 
period, U.S. law enforcement and socio-economic aid significantly increased or at least 
remained modest but consistent, indicating where American priorities lay in its counter-
narcotics approach in Mexico compared with Colombia (Seelke and Finklea 2014, p.7). 
 Adding to the case that a more military-focused U.S. counter-narcotics policy exists in 
Colombia is that the Colombian armed forces, notwithstanding small fluctuations in recent 
years, are significantly larger and more professional in the present than at the outset of Plan 
Colombia. This in turn complements the trend that the CNP, out of all services, has 
experienced unbroken and consistent increases in personnel. This has been part of the 
strategic thinking of the Consolidation phase, seeking to re-establish government writ by 
deploying civilian (albeit essentially paramilitary) security forces in territories recaptured by 
an upgraded and larger military, as opposed to having the military alone permanently 
stationed and 'bogged down' in such areas. Sustained increases to the defence budget during 
the Uribe presidency cemented the permanence of larger security forces. With this, and 
continued (if generally reduced) U.S. support, the involvement of the Colombian military and 
U.S. military and intelligence advisors in counter-narcotics has long moved from being a 
temporary emergency measure, to become institutionalised practice as relative security and 
stability is consolidated. 
 As observed in the Mexican case study, there is a recognition that civilian security 
forces taking the lead would be better for longer-term stability in cartel and drug conflict 
zones. However, the Mexican police – albeit generally the local constabularies than the more 
professional Federal Police – are currently significantly behind in realistically aspiring to this 
goal. As a consequence, the Mexican military is often called upon to fill the security gaps left 
by ineffective civilian authorities, merely perpetuating the cycle of militarised responses to 
narcotics in Mexico despite the recognition that this is not an ideal nor sustainable long-term 
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strategy. At present, such policy constitutes a short-term emergency measure. However, if the 
Mexican military were to be continuously deployed throughout the eventual lifetime of the 
Merida Initiative (even if the objective of improving native law enforcement had been 
advanced), and the U.S. military were to take a more direct role and/or increase its support, 
then this would constitute sustained and institutionalised militarisation. 
 In comparing both strategic environments, a militarised approach to tackling narcotics 
and associated insurgency in Colombia has become deliberately institutionalised, with 
American support, in order to consolidate the security gains made. By contrast, in Mexico, a 
native militarised response to cartel and drug violence has seemingly become institutionalised 
by accident rather than intention, with the authorities often having little option – often with 
American acceptance of the reality on the ground – but to utilise military assets in counter-
narcotics efforts in the absence of any viable alternative. When civilian law enforcement 
simply cannot cope with the security challenges presented by the conflicts between both rival 
drug cartels and against state authorities, and cartels that often employ their own private 
armies, then the only like-for-like response is a military one. However, the fundamental U.S. 
policy of supporting the development of competent and effective law enforcement suggests 
that the longer-term aim of American counter-narcotics policy in Mexico’s strategic 
environment is to institutionalise civilian security solutions over a sustained period and 
beyond, instead of native military-based solutions. 
 
7.2.3 The Inhumanity of Man: the ‘criteria of violence’ element 
 
In the context of the militarisation framework, the criteria of violence element concerns the 
amount of violence observed in a security situation that has a military dimension. Such 
observations can indicate the extent that military forces are directly involved in the 
perpetration of said violence, which can ultimately help to assess where on the security 
spectrum the situation is best placed, i.e. securitised, militarised or violised. Of the three 
components of the militarisation framework, this is the most difficult to ascribe to U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy. Any violence observed in the case studies is essentially a result of 
the actions of native security forces, guerrillas or cartel killers, and has little directly to do 
with the U.S. as it has no direct operational control of counter-narcotics efforts, merely a 
supporting and advisory role. In both Colombia and Mexico, any American aid, whether for 
counter-narcotic or counter-insurgency needs, is monitored by the U.S. Congress to ensure 
compliance with human rights as mandated by the Leahy Amendment (U.S. Code 1997). In 
both case studies, there have been multiple observations of how each country’s drug conflict 
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has given rise to violence and associated suffering. The issue is whether such violence 
remains within the boundaries of the militarisation framework (i.e. not wide-scale, war-like 
violence) or crosses over into (wide spread, war-like) violisation, and also to what extent U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy plays a role. 
 Internal displacement of peoples (i.e. people forced to flee from their homes but who 
remain within the borders of their nation state, effectively refugees, if not legally recognised 
as such) is a far larger concern in Colombia than in Mexico. Statistics cited in the case study 
showed that levels have decreased in recent years as the security situation has – reasonably – 
stabilised. However, at the height of internal displacement, the principal causes were the civil 
conflict and associated war-like violence that civilians are often subjected to and were 
perpetrated by the guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and elements of the Colombian state, 
and also the environmental and economic consequences of aerial eradication. With the 
absence of similar civil conflict and aerial eradication in Mexico, such a problem does not 
exist on nearly the same scale, though of course in areas plagued by cartel-related violence it 
is natural to expect some displacement of peoples as civilians or those under threat of death 
relocate in fear for their safety. 
 Mexico's violence primarily revolves around the casual and indiscriminate brutality 
employed by the feuding cartels. As observed in the case study, Mexican authorities have 
been accused of perpetrating or facilitating disappearances. However, the bulk of these, as 
well as kidnappings, assassinations and general drug-related murders are attributed to the 
cartels and their personnel, whether they be hired killers or former police and military 
officers who have switched sides. In response to such violence and intimidation of the public, 
some citizens have taken to forming quasi-militarised vigilante groups, but these are still 
relatively small in number. 
As stated in the Mexican case study conclusion, while the levels of violence would 
seem to indicate a violised situation, it is still not an open-warfare environment. Instead, it is 
just an atypically brutal criminal security crisis that, like the majority of U.S. counter-
narcotics policy towards that country, fulfils more of a securitised criteria on the security 
spectrum, despite the employment of military forces as a short-term solution. 
Colombia by contrast, as with making military and institutionalisation, meets the 
requirements of the criteria of violence component of the militarisation framework. This is 
due to the violence that does occur being a result of the civil conflict and the predictable 
consequences on the civilian population, on Colombian forces, and against guerrillas and 
their assassinated leadership. Violence is either targeted, or of a level to be expected when 
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military operations are involved, and are nowhere as indiscriminate and sickeningly violent 
as acts perpetrated in Mexico. 
In both cases the same finding can be applied to U.S. counter-narcotics policy; that of 
the American attempts to minimise official state violence by conducting oversight of, and 
attaching conditions to, its military or law enforcement support. In both cases, U.S. policy 
can only pursue best intentions. It cannot be held directly responsible for violence carried out 
by parties outside its direct operational control, be they Mexican forces and cartels killers, or 
Colombian forces and narco-guerrillas. 
 
7.3 Drug War militarisation and securitisation in the cases 
 
Given the direct intervention of U.S. military assets in Colombia, and military-related support 
provided to the latter’s security forces, all in the name of counter-narcotics, U.S. policy has 
been militarised in that country. While Mexico has taken its own militarised stance 
domestically, U.S. counter-narcotics support for that country is more law-enforcement 
focused – due to Mexican sovereignty and the fact that law and order is the key issue anyway 
– and so the American policy approach to Mexico is securitised rather than militarised. The 
U.S. border has seen gradual militarisation and is linked to the Mexican conflict, but falls 
within the realm of domestic American counter-narcotics policy and therefore outside its 
Mexican policy in the strictest sense. Such border militarisation though, along with historical 
trends as explored in Chapter 4, indicate substantial militarisation in domestic counter-
narcotics enforcement. This is not to say that the entirety of counter-narcotics efforts across 
the U.S. is now subject to a militarised approach, just that significant elements of it have seen 
increased military involvement, cooperation and support in terms of training, tactics, 
equipment and intelligence. 
 In general Plan Colombia represented a gradual shift into different phases as the 
strategic situation demanded. What began as a primarily militarised effort to stabilise the 
country, promote security and roll back the guerrillas, morphed into a more social, economic, 
judicial and law enforcement-based initiative once the security gains had been consolidated 
(or at least consolidated as much as the socio-economic challenges of the country currently 
allow). This conforms to the common strategy employed in prosecuting a civil conflict or 
counterinsurgency campaign, that of ‘clear, hold, build’ (British Army 2009; U.S. State 
Department 2009; Defence Technical Information Centre 2013), and as explored in the 
Colombia case study, any pretence that the counter-narcotics campaign and 
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counterinsurgency campaign were mutually exclusive was progressively dropped until they 
essentially merged after 9/11. In such circumstances where physical territory and resources 
need to be captured from the enemy, it is very much a military matter, and the conflict 
between the Colombian state and FARC and the ELN conformed to such a model. 
 In Mexico however, as has been repeatedly stated, a civil conflict similar to Colombia 
does not exist. The Mexican government has not ‘lost’ vast swathes of territory to the cartels, 
just as U.S. authorities did not ‘lose’ Chicago to Prohibition-era gangsters. Government writ 
and civil society seemingly go on as normal, but with the key exception of the cartel vs cartel 
and cartel vs state violence, kidnapping and intimidation. As a result there is no military 
solution available to the Mexicans in the same fashion as the Colombians. There is therefore 
no scope for U.S. counter-narcotics policy to be militarily supportive in the same way either, 
notwithstanding the constitutional limitations placed on such overt American military 
involvement and support on Mexican soil. The principal reason the Mexican military has 
been deployed into violent trouble spots is because they represent the best immediate option 
for the state to impose some form of effective order and control in an environment where too 
many civilian law enforcement personnel and departments are completely ineffective due to 
corruption, intimidation, murder or even the participation in organised crime themselves. 
 U.S. foreign policy and counter-narcotics policy in Colombia effectively became 
synonymous, whereas the more complex relationship the U.S. has with Mexico due to 
geographical proximity – i.e. trade, immigration, border security, etc. – is reflected in the less 
straightforward nature of American counter-narcotics policy concerning its immediate 
neighbour. Military-related support, funding, training and resourcing in assistance of 
Colombian counter-narcotics efforts has dwarfed that of U.S. involvement in Mexico, but this 
is not surprising. The Colombian case study covers double the time period of the Mexican 
case study, and so by virtue of benefiting from more time and attention, U.S. military 
involvement in Colombia is bound to be larger in manpower, material and budget allocated. 
 Additionally, U.S. militarised counter-narcotics support in Colombia effectively 
developed into counter-narcoinsurgency assistance following 9/11. This represented tacit if 
not overt U.S. involvement in Colombia’s civil conflict and efforts to erode FARC as a 
fighting force, reclaim territory for the state and decapitate the guerrilla leadership. While the 
Colombian government, or at least past and present figures within it, has at times expressed 
reservation about some of the counter-narcotics strategies espoused by the U.S., not least 
aerial eradication, by and large throughout Colombia’s civil and drug conflicts it has been a 
welcoming recipient of U.S. military, law enforcement and socio-economic assistance. 
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 Mexico by contrast, despite the appearance of chaos, is not a failing state. The case 
study highlighted its growing economy and reforms, the slow-paced but gradual increase in 
the effectiveness of its civilian security forces, and the general fact that drug violence is 
concentrated in certain areas of the country and not throughout, with some areas remaining 
untouched. There is therefore a degree of pragmatism in the U.S. policy approach – reflected 
in the changed Merida Initiative funding allocations – that building up an effective law 
enforcement establishment, judicial system and sustainable socio-economic development is 
the best counter-narcotics strategy to pursue; a pincer movement of punishment and 
incentive. Despite the involvement of the Mexican military, with American support for such 
moves, U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Mexico is, strictly speaking, primarily in-keeping 
with a securitised position. 
 
7.4 The factors that drive the process of militarisation 
 
Having compared both case studies through the prism of the three elements of the 
militarisation framework, I have identified a number of factors broadly responsible for 
driving the militarisation process: 
 
 The existing strategic situation in the theatre of operations 
 
The case studies in this thesis have demonstrated that, when considering U.S. counter-
narcotics policy towards certain countries, the strategic circumstances in those operational 
theatres will often determine the nature of the policy approach, whether it is more militarised 
or securitised. This is to say that if a country with a narcotics problem is experiencing a civil 
conflict, then there will likely be military solutions already in play in an effort to deal with 
the situation. This then means that it is all the easier to apply military-related solutions to 
counter-narcotics efforts as well, e.g. Colombia. If a country is instead dealing with narcotics 
through primarily law enforcement means in a securitised environment, then counter-
narcotics support will often compliment that approach, as with Mexico. 
 Colombia is a case in point, where the ostensibly civilian Colombian National Police 
was favoured for U.S. support because the threat in the 1980s and early-1990s came from 
criminal cartels. When the Colombian state was being pressurised by guerrilla armies with 
their own military-style structure in a civil conflict that had progressively worsened, a 
military response by the Colombian armed forces was the favoured option. Since the 
guerrillas were also involved in the drug trade, fighting insurgents also meant fighting drug 
 193 
traffickers, and so it made sense to utilise the military to take on both challenges. Now that 
Plan Colombia has moved on to the Consolidation phase, in reclaimed territories we see a 
reversion back to supporting law enforcement and socio-economic efforts. The military still 
fights guerrillas and their drug operations in contested areas, but ‘behind the lines’ narcotics 
are once again more of a criminal matter requiring a proportionate law enforcement response. 
 This is the situation that Mexico is currently experiencing, whereby the narcotics 
challenge, however violent, remains an essentially criminal matter that is best suited to a law 
enforcement solution. Despite the risk that it could become institutionalised if employed for 
years to come, the wide-scale use of the Mexican military in counter-narcotics is in theory a 
stop-gap emergency measure until civilian forces are up to the task, aided by U.S. training 
and support. If the Mexican cartels started to act in such a way as FARC has, taking territory 
from state control and aiming to topple it, then a fully militarised response would be 
proportionate. It is then likely that counter-narcotics efforts would also become militarised, as 
demonstrated by Colombian forces targeting coca fields that provide revenues to FARC as 
part of the parallel counter-insurgency campaign. 
 The strategic situation in theatres of operation can go a long way in determining the 
counter-narcotics policy approach, and this similarly applies to militarisation, which is to say 
that if a situation already features military involvement of some description, then it is likely 
this will be built upon. 
 
 The levels of power and influence of the security establishment 
 
The power and influence of the security establishment of a country and/or its partners also 
has a role in determining the likelihood of a security situation becoming militarised. In 
Chapter 4 I detailed how the U.S. military and security establishment frequently embraced 
reasons for being, especially as the Cold War came to an end and narcotics usefully presented 
a threat (Isacson 2005, p.28). The launch of the War on Terror further enhanced the 
Department of Defence’s growing role in broader foreign policy, a trend explored below. 
Added to this was the established precedent of the Reagan and Bush Administrations utilising 
military and intelligence assets in the pursuit of counter-narcotics efforts abroad (White 
House 1986; White House 1989), and of the Clinton Administration furthering earlier 
Reagan-era measures to enhance DOD cooperation with law enforcement agencies (White 
House 1993; Balko 2006, p.8). With the military already having involvement in broader 
foreign and security policy, it was natural for policymakers looking to make an impact 
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against narcotics to make use of defence assets, to utilise the ‘biggest tool in the box’ so to 
speak (U.S. Congress 1986). 
 In the case of Colombia, such a policy approach by the U.S. seemed all the more 
sensible given the heavy involvement of the Colombian military in counter-narcotics efforts. 
The U.S. would merely be complementing an already militarised situation. This leads into the 
point that the security establishments of partner countries can also influence how militarised a 
security situation can become. As noted in Chapter 5, the Colombian military has long held 
significant power and influence in the country, and so its militarised approach to native 
counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics issues went hand in hand with the growing 
American tendency to turn to military solutions in response to security challenges. Mexico, 
by contrast, highlights the opposite, where Chapter 6 detailed their security establishment’s – 
or at least Army’s – long-held suspicion of cooperating with U.S. forces too closely 
(Michaels 2014). This significantly limited American scope to involve itself in Mexico with 
either a direct military presence, or in a supporting role beyond constitutionally acceptable 
levels of training support and equipment transfer. Coupled with the strategic situation on the 
ground favouring a law-enforcement response to an essentially law and order drug problem, 
the U.S. counter-narcotics approach was consequently more securitised in character than 
militarised. This may not have necessarily been the case had the Mexican security 
establishment been more receptive to American military involvement, and had the drug issue 
in Mexico involved an insurgent/civil conflict (as with Colombia) rather than a criminal one. 
 
 The cultural and historical trends of the policy initiator/s 
 
The third and final factor in what can drive militarisation are the cultural and historical trends 
of the policy initiator/s, which relates to the importance of context proposed in Chapter 2. I 
mention above the historical precedent for the growing role of the U.S. military in counter-
narcotics efforts, either directly or by supporting partner countries, as seen with various 
presidential administrations. With the trend of military involvement established in the 1980s, 
it was easier for similar and then more advanced policy approaches to be taken in the 1990s 
and 2000s when narcotics-related security issues gained prominence in Colombia, Mexico 
and the U.S. border area. Part of why such policy moves gained traction in the first place can 
be attributed to the ‘tool box’ position – i.e. with the DOD playing such a significant role in 
national security and with vast resources at its disposal, it made sense to utilise those assets 
against the drug problem (U.S. Congress 1986) – and also because of underlying cultural 
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trends. I have explored militarisation in American culture, of how the increased use of 
militaristic language and metaphors helped amplify an ‘Us and Them’ narrative (Thorne 
2006, p.2 & 12-13), of American ‘good guys’ versus ‘bad guys’, be they communists, 
terrorists or drug lords. Military imagery has also permeated the American consciousness 
through popular culture, whether through movies or videogames (Power 2007, p.273; Singer 
2010; Keegan 2011). American cultural inclinations, in conjunction with the vast resources at 
its disposal that can be committed to policy objectives, combined with historical and patriotic 
reverence for its role and accomplishments, means that the U.S. military has become 
idealised as a means to ‘fight the good fight’. In more basic terms, it can be utilised as an 
emergency measure to counter existential threats, in this case the War on Drugs. 
 
7.5 DOD vs State – the broader impact on U.S. foreign policy 
 
Cumulatively, what does all this tell us about the current state of U.S. foreign policy, at least 
in the context of the provision of military and counter-narcotics support? The involvement of 
the Department of Defence in foreign policy matters has gradually increased since World 
War II. That conflict, then the Cold War and War on Terror, were all major foreign policy 
issues that involved the military and security establishment. As a consequence, DOD 
involvement in foreign affairs has progressively become institutionalised, almost to the extent 
of setting up a parallel foreign policy structure, as evidenced by the formation of regional 
commands that cover every sector of the globe, as well as the full global remit of Special 
Operations Command (Marks 2014, p.237). If nothing else, the sheer institutional imbalance 
in terms of the respective manpower at the disposal of DOD and State mean the former 
exercises significant influence, almost by default. For example, in 2008 for every single 
employee of USAID overseas, there were twenty-three State Department employees and six-
hundred DOD military and civilian personnel (Adams 2014, p.23). To put the entirety of 
these institutions into perspective, by 2012 the DOD employed 1.5 million active duty 
personnel and 770,000 civilians, nearly 28 percent of the federal civil service, while by 
contrast the State Department employed nearly 19,000 Foreign Service officers and civil 
servants, complemented by roughly 2000 USAID workers (Adams 2014, p.23; Office of 
Personnel Management 2014). With military involvement in many aspects of foreign policy, 
from its traditional role in hot wars to more benign efforts such as natural disaster relief and 
humanitarian intervention (see Anderson and Veilette 2014), then it is no surprise that the 
DOD would have an involvement in counter-narcotics foreign policy. 
 196 
 Legally the State Department still retains influence and oversight on military 
involvement and support in foreign policy issues, via the Secretary of State, ambassadors and 
department officials (Serafino 2014, p.123). This was in evidence when the U.S. Ambassador 
to Colombia, Myles Frechette, was regarded as having a pivotal role in overseeing American 
counter-narcotics policy during his tenure from 1994 to 1997, along with Assistant Secretary 
of State Robert Gelbard (Crandall 2001). However, this kind of State Department influence 
and primacy has reduced over time as DOD involvement has grown. If we examine U.S. 
foreign security support initiatives, such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or 
International Military Education and Training (IMET), from Financial Year 2002 to Financial 
Year 2010 there was a 66 percent growth in security assistance provided by the State 
Department, as compared to a 500 percent growth in DOD security assistance for the same 
period (Serafino 2014, p.130). Even accounting for the fact that many of the funded activities 
were during the Iraq and Afghan Wars, and that many have or are expected to return to State 
Department administration following U.S. military drawdowns, the percentage of overall 
U.S. security assistance administered through the DOD has risen from around 25 to more 
than 60 percent (Serafino 2014, p.130). 
 The State Department has responded to this new reality by trying to work with and 
influence DOD operations, rather than attempt to challenge or subvert them. Close 
cooperation is encouraged between foreign ambassadors and the military commanders of 
each Geographic Combatant Command, Political Advisors (or POLADs) are assigned to 
assist commanders, and even ambassador-ranked personnel are offered to serve as deputy 
civilian commanders at Combatant Commands (Serafino 2014, p.123). Nor is the State 
Department being starved of funding, at least with regards to non-war related areas. From 
Financial Year 2001 to Financial Year 2010, State Department accounts that provided for 
counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, de-mining and some rule-of-law training 
grew by 168 percent compared to 20 percent for similar DOD accounts, and some areas such 
as non-proliferation saw the State account grow significantly while the DOD account actually 
decreased (Serafino 2014, p.131). 
 However, while such growth figures may seem impressive, they are relative, since the 
State Department budget and consequent expenditure is proportionately far smaller than that 
of DOD. The requested budget for State and USAID for Financial Year 2014 was $47.8 
billion, a six percent reduction from that requested in 2012 (U.S. State Department 2013b). 
By comparison, the requested budget for the DOD for the same fiscal year was $526.6 
billion, over ten times the amount as State (U.S. Department of Defence 2013b). Ultimately, 
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while it still retains significant influence, the State Department is no longer the main 
gatekeeper of foreign military assistance and U.S. involvement as it once was, but nor has it 
ceded all responsibility to DOD. 
 Such developments raise legitimate issues going forward as to how future research 
into U.S. foreign policy, and the counter-narcotics policy subset, is to be approached, in the 
sense of where jurisdiction falls and who is responsible for administering and carrying out 
such policy efforts. If U.S. foreign policy and counter-narcotics policy effectively became 
synonymous in Colombia, as an example, and the DOD took a more active role in that 
counter-narcotics policy with Plan Colombia onwards, then was State or Defence effectively 
responsible for Colombia, even if it was through the prism of counter-narcotics? The support 
of the Department of Defence in U.S. border protection is less of an issue, as the Posse 
Comitatus Act still applies to prohibit military involvement in law enforcement (U.S. Code 
1994), even if the strict division has been eroded over time, and operational control and 
authority still lies with Federal law enforcement agencies and state governors. 
 Remaining with foreign policy, based on the case study observations, an argument 
could be made that the level of U.S. military involvement can depend on the American 
national interest, the proximity of a theatre of operations, and relations other than those 
involving security. For instance, while narcotics-related security issues are significant 
considerations in U.S. relations with both Colombia and Mexico, they almost dominate the 
former, while immigration and trade – to name but two issues – are as big if not bigger 
factors in the U.S. relationship with Mexico. Such interests other than security tie in with 
proximity, with Mexico the immediate neighbour to the U.S. and main source of illegal 
immigrants (Preston 2013), as well as being member of North American Free Trade 
Association (Sergie 2014). The essential point is that U.S. foreign relations with Mexico are 
multi-faceted, encompassing economic, cultural, social as well as security issues. Therefore 
there is more scope for the State Department or the US Agency for International 
Development to be involved in areas other than security, such as climate change, human 
rights, and so on (U.S. State Department 2014; USAID 2014). With regards U.S. foreign 
policy towards Colombia by contrast, while it would be simplistic to say it is wholly 
dominated by security concerns, security and military relations have been at the forefront of 
the relationship since the early days of the Cold War, and were only strengthened by the War 
on Drugs and Plan Colombia. U.S foreign policy towards Colombia increasingly came to be 
viewed through the prism of counter-narcotics and, as detailed above, the greater the role the 
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DOD took in counter-narcotics, the more inevitable that U.S. military involvement and 
American foreign policy in Colombia would become conflated. 
 Such a perspective also complements one of the driving factors of militarisation, as 
described above, whereby the strategic situation in a theatre of operations can help determine 
the level of military involvement or support. The relatively complex foreign relations 
between the U.S. and Mexico, coupled with a more law enforcement-based approach to 
tackling counter-narcotics, meant there was only limited scope for U.S. military involvement 
or support. By contrast, the more straightforward, security-centric foreign relations between 
the U.S. and Colombia, coupled with a militarised approach to combatting the narco-
insurgency/civil conflict, meant that U.S. military involvement became a policy option far 
more naturally. 
 
7.6 The Militarisation Framework: The academic contribution laid out 
 
The militarisation framework formulated in Chapter 2 is an analytical tool, which has been 
used to analyse the militarisation of counter-narcotics policy in the case studies. In 
researching the cases through the prisms of the three elements – i.e. making military, 
institutionalisation and criteria of violence – I was able to determine the extent of the 
militarisation of U.S. policy in Colombia and Mexico, and found it to be far more substantial 
in the former than in the latter. Reaching these empirically-based conclusions was the main 
objective, not using them as tests to prove how useful the militarisation framework was or 
was not. Nevertheless, like any useful tool, the framework is intended to be applicable to any 
security situation. By using it with these counter-narcotics case studies, it has allowed me to 
consider how the framework could be improved for future use, and in doing so contribute to 
the overall securitisation debate. 
 When considering the framework, the case studies revealed both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the initial elements I adopted, that of making military, institutionalisation and 
criteria of violence. Ultimately there was sufficient merit with the first two to justify their 
inclusion. In the case studies it was found that either direct U.S. military involvement or 
indirect asset and training support for native counter-narcotics was either present or was not – 
i.e. making military – and had been underway for a long enough period to become entrenched 
policy and practice, or had not – i.e. institutionalisation. 
 However, I began to encounter increased difficulty when it came to the criteria of 
violence element of the framework. As I made clear in the individual case study conclusions, 
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and again above, the U.S. has limited capacity to influence the levels and nature of violence 
associated with the drug conflicts in Colombia and Mexico. The Leahy Amendment and 
diplomatic oversight, combined with increased human rights training of native security 
forces, may allow the U.S. some measure of influence, but compared to the direct 
contribution American policy has with regards the making military and institutionalisation 
elements, criteria of violence is, at best, secondary. This is not to say that it does not merit 
overall inclusion in the militarisation framework, but that the case studies have still exposed 
the structural weakness of my initial framework in awarding criteria of violence equal 
primacy with making military and institutionalisation. 
 The case studies have caused me to re-evaluate and revise the militarisation 
framework for future application. I have included new elements, but by adding nuance by 
identifying primary and secondary types, I have also made the framework more flexible and 
applicable to a range of security scenarios. 
 
7.6.1 The Revised Militarisation Framework 
 
Primary Elements 
 
➢ Making Military: The direct involvement of a nation’s military forces and/or the 
utilisation of assets, resources and training support involving said military in 
cooperation with domestic or foreign civilian and military security forces. 
 
As an example, the direct involvement of U.S. military aircraft or ground-based personnel in 
an operation, regardless of the size of the contingent, would meet the criteria of this element. 
So would the support of the U.S. military in the provision of training, equipment, weaponry, 
funding and intelligence to civilian and other military agencies, whether they were under 
American or foreign jurisdiction. We have seen the real-world application of this element in 
both case studies, especially in Colombia, as well as within U.S. jurisdiction on the southern 
border with Mexico. 
• Institutionalisation: The existence of a strategic environment where the factors 
involved in ‘making military’ have been present for a such sustained period, that they 
are no longer considered as emergency measures and have taken on the character of 
the ‘new normal’ in terms of policy practice. 
 
 200 
Domestically in the U.S. we see this with the sustained growth over the past few decades of 
the use of military equipment, tactics and training by civilian law enforcement. Examples 
include Police Paramilitary Units (PPUs) (Balko 2006, pp.8-9; Kraska and Kappeler 1997, 
p.11), the special BORTAC units of the U.S. Border Protection Agency (U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection 2014), and the utilisation of military surveillance assets – be they drones, 
aircraft or maritime vessels – in drug interdiction efforts (Booth 2011). In foreign operations, 
especially Colombia, the paramilitarised Colombian National Police, as well as specialised 
army brigades, lead counter-narcotics efforts, and the greatly expanded security forces show 
no sign of decreasing in numbers in order to guarantee a relatively stable security situation. 
The ‘democratic security’ thrust launched by President Uribe as an emergency measure 
seems to have become the ‘new normal’ in Colombia, with U.S. support. 
 
Secondary Elements 
 
• Levels of Violence: The amount of violence observed in a security situation that has a 
military dimension can indicate the extent that military forces are directly involved in 
the perpetration of said violence. This can ultimately help to assess where on the 
security spectrum the situation is best placed, i.e. securitised, militarised or violised. 
Because of the potential contradictions this may generate – see below – any violence 
must be measured with reference to the policy intent of the principal security actor 
being studied. 
 
As noted above, this element proved to be the most problematic in the case studies, as the 
question often came down to ‘who’s violence?’ Making military and institutionalisation, 
especially in the context of U.S. policy, were relatively straightforward to demonstrate based 
on empirical evidence, e.g. American equipment, training and weaponry provided to the 
Colombians, and support for the long-term growth and prominence of the Colombian military 
and police, respectively. But, in strategic environments, such as Colombia and Mexico, where 
U.S. policy has great influence but an inability to directly shape events, any violence that was 
either associated with partner security forces or non-state actors muddied the waters. Tens of 
thousands of deaths in Colombia and Mexico, by fault of security forces, guerrillas or cartel 
killers, would justify categorisation as war-like, violised situations, especially in Colombia 
where a true territorial civil conflict was raging. Yet such violence was neither the aim nor 
intention of U.S. counter-narcotics policy. 
 201 
Therefore, situations presented themselves whereby U.S. counter-narcotics policy was 
either militarised (Colombia) or securitised (Mexico) in intent, but was being enacted in 
countries with violence bordering, or even crossing into, war-like violised situations. I 
ultimately resolved this problem by tying the measurement of violence to the policy 
intentions of the principal security actor undergoing study, i.e. because it was U.S. policy I 
was focused on, I measured the levels of violence based on American rather than Colombian 
or Mexico priorities. Minimising loss of life and increasing respect for human rights in 
supported countries are important aspects of U.S. policy based on Congressional conditions 
for counter-narcotics funding. The U.S. can influence its partners as best it can, but it cannot 
be held responsible for abuses perpetrated by partner security forces over which it has no 
direct operational control, and even less so for guerrillas and cartel killers. 
On the other hand, in security situations where the principal actor does have the 
ability to shape the environment, often through direct operational control, then the levels of 
violence observed can be measured directly against the policy intent. For example, the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 had the U.S. as the main security actor and so the violence 
perpetrated by its forces, be it lives lost or property destroyed, could be measured against the 
original policy intent, which was the conquest of the country in a war-like, violised security 
environment. 
 
• Budget Allocation: The amount of money allocated year-on-year towards supporting 
military expenditure on an initiative, whether that expenditure supports direct military 
involvement by the principal security actor, or of partner-state military and security 
forces. A picture gradually emerges over time of the level of priority given to 
militarised policy.  
 
While this element is often analysed anyway in order to verify making military and 
institutionalisation – assets cannot be deployed nor sustained long-term without the finance to 
pay for them, after all – this is an example of a more nuanced element that can alter the 
understanding of a situation based on how it is interpreted. For instance, to analyse only the 
first two years of funding allocation to the Merida Initiative would be to assume that U.S. 
policy was primarily militarised, given that $116.5m was involved in FMF funding in 2008, 
then $299m in 2009 (Seelke and Finklea 2014, p.7). However, continued analysis for 
subsequent years would show that FMF spending for Mexico fell dramatically until it reached 
zero in 2012, only a few years into the Merida Initiative. Meanwhile, INCLE (International 
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Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement) funding and Economic Support Fund (ESF) 
spending remained reasonably constant over time or increased, ultimately suggesting a far 
more securitised U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Mexico (Seelke and Finklea 2014, p.7). 
By contrast, sustained military support through FMF, IMET and so on for Colombia, 
suitably demonstrates a long-running commitment to a military strategy, though admittedly 
the strategic decision to conflate counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics in that country 
made this far more likely than the primarily law enforcement problems faced by Mexico. 
Ultimately, this secondary element is important in helping to tell the whole story regards an 
initiative. For instance, deployment of U.S. Special Forces in Colombia for a year would 
simply but validly classify as making military, but the budget allocation and how it breaks 
down into different kinds of military and security support, and importantly how long for, 
provides more depth and detail than initial surface impressions might imply. 
• Size and type of security forces: The numbers of security personnel and manner of 
equipment at the disposal of a state – either in its own jurisdiction or that of a security 
partner – broken down into the component military services (i.e. Army, Air Force, 
Navy and Marines) and civilian law enforcement forces and agencies (e.g. police, 
special interdiction or enforcement units, criminal investigation agencies). 
 
By analysing the personnel figures and type of forces, we can ascertain where, if any, growth 
has occurred, and therefore what policy emphasis may exist and how it may contribute to 
certain trends. For example, if the principal growth in numbers has occurred in a partner 
country’s military, and especially the army and specialised units within it, then that would 
indicate a greater emphasis on ground-based operations prioritising military tactics and 
assets. 
A prominent example of how this component can contribute to the bigger picture is 
the figures for the Colombian security forces since the launch of Plan Colombia, as detailed 
in Chapter 5, where we see relatively small fluctuations in the number of Air Force and Navy 
personnel, indicating that some, but far from all, attention has been given to them 
(Government of Colombia 2014, p.70-71). Compare this to the generally significant growth 
in the Colombian Army, despite occasional peaks and dips, and especially the sustained and 
steady growth of the Colombian National Police (Government of Colombia 2014, p.70-71). 
This allows us to ascertain that priority was given to military ground forces to combat the 
guerrilla and narco threat during the period of ‘Democratic Security’, and subsequently that 
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CNP numbers increased to aid the pacification and restoration of state control in previously 
contested areas, reflecting the policy of Consolidation. By contrast, despite mixed results, the 
growth in the numbers and efficiency training of the Mexican Federal Police and greater asset 
and training support for civilian agencies (Meyer 2014b, p.19; U.S. Embassy – Mexico 
2013), indicates more of a securitised than militarised approach to U.S. counter-narcotics 
policy in Mexico. 
Another example of the utility of this secondary element is analysing the growth of 
whole, or certain parts of, civilian law enforcement and security agencies, and what trends 
this may indicate. For example, in Chapter 4, I detailed how the Drug Enforcement 
Administration grew to include thousands of agents operating on a multi-billion dollar budget 
compared to its launch, highlighting the increased resources the War on Drugs gradually 
consumed. More importantly, however, was highlighting the growth of PPU personnel 
operating in civilian law enforcement departments, their military-standard equipment and 
training often being put to counter-narcotics uses, as well the growth of entities such as the 
BORTAC units, and UAV and National Guard deployments on the border. In accordance 
with this secondary component, the observably greater numbers of paramilitary-type forces 
helped to further establish making military and institutionalisation when considering U.S. 
domestic counter-narcotics policy, especially on the Southern Border. 
 
• Legacy: The level of direct military involvement or military-related support in a 
theatre of operations once the main security initiative has ended. Such military 
involvement would either be under the control of what was the principal security actor 
in that initiative, or of the partner/formally occupied states. The greater the length of 
time given to observing the aftermath of a militarised initiative, the greater the 
amount of data available for drawing a conclusion. 
 
At the time of writing, the U.S. initiatives involved in the case studies are either ongoing, or 
still in the process of winding down gradually. Therefore it is not yet possible to match an 
example directly from them to this secondary element (though, as indicated in Chapter 5, the 
fact that Colombian security forces have grown to the extent they have, and that GDP 
spending on defence has also permanently risen, would indicate a long-term legacy of 
militarisation). Instead, we can apply this component to various other security situations 
where an adequate amount of time has passed to determine whether a militarised policy 
‘legacy’ endures. 
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If we take The Falklands Conflict of 1982, prior to the British military initiative to 
reclaim the islands from Argentine occupation, there was only a token contingent of Royal 
Marines stationed on the islands. Following the British victory, a significant UK military 
presence was established and has endured for over three decades, with further military 
deployments planned in response to potential Argentine belligerence (Daily Telegraph 2015). 
By conforming to making military and institutionalisation, this represents the continuation of 
militarised policy by the principal security actor in that theatre of operations. By contrast, 
when Coalition forces, with the U.S. at the lead, eventually ended combat operation in Iraq in 
2011, a policy of demilitarisation was adopted by the principal security actor/s with the 
complete withdrawal of all-but-token Western military personnel (Logan 2011, BBC 2011c). 
However, there was a continuation of the provision of resources, training and assets for the 
Iraqi security forces to maintain a militarised stance by the partner/formally occupied 
country, despite difficulties stemming from a less-than-cooperative political climate 
(Cordesman et al. 2013, pp.21-36). In the case of Afghanistan, there could have been a legacy 
of demilitarisation similar to Iraq, as initial indictors suggested eagerness for full Western 
withdrawal. However, that thinking has since altered in light of the collapse of stability in 
Iraq, where a full pull out of Western forces left the country vulnerable to instability and 
partial takeover by organised Islamist extremists (Whitlock 2015; Hanna and Elis 2015). 
 
Ultimately, as a result of reflexivity brought about by the case studies, the confirmed primary 
components and new secondary components of the framework add conceptual depth to 
‘militarisation’. However, they also generate new consideration as to what categories of 
militarisation can be applied to security situations. 
 
7.6.2 Categories of Militarisation 
 
During the initial development of the militarisation framework for this thesis, I viewed 
militarisation as a binary phenomenon. Either a security situation fell under the militarised 
section of the security spectrum, or it did not, in which case it was likely either securitised or 
violised. While this essentially remains the case, just as the observations of the case study 
results caused me to re-evaluate the number and primacy of the elements in the militarisation 
framework, so too did the observations cause me to consider what categories of militarisation 
may apply to certain security situations. This is to say ascertaining not only whether a 
situation is militarised in the first place, but what type of militarisation is involved if so. In 
pursuing this line of thinking, I have generated three categories: 
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• Sovereign Militarisation: Exclusive to a nation state, which sees it either operate 
militarily, or in a militarily-supported civilian capacity, within its borders, or 
participating as the main security actor in foreign deployments, such as military 
occupations or conflicts. The militarisation of internal U.S. border security would be 
one example, as would the deployment and subsequent permanent basing of UK 
military forces on the Falkland Islands. 
 
• Cooperative Militarisation: Where two or more nation states assemble for an 
operation in a country or region. They work together alongside a host government, 
albeit likely a weak or diminished one, or in replacement of a conquered or collapsed 
authority, e.g. Afghanistan after 2001, Iraq after 2003 and Somalia in 1992-93. 
Depending on the size and scale of their operations, they may have the ability to 
directly shape the security environment rather than relying on security partners to do 
it for them, the effectiveness of which is entirely dependent on how professional and 
competent said partner forces are. Operations can also take place in more of a 
geographical region than a specific country, e.g. maritime waters to take on piracy. 
 
• Partnership Militarisation: The principal security actor/s work with the security 
forces and government of a host country to help tackle a security-related issue within 
that country’s borders, e.g. Colombia and Mexico. The main difference is that, though 
a principal actor like the U.S. can play a pivotal role, the host country governments 
are not necessarily subservient partners. Resultant diplomatic or policy restrictions, 
institutional suspicions, etc., may contribute to the already likely situation that the 
main security actor may have influence, but not the means or capacity to directly 
shape the strategic environment as they might ideally wish. With the previous two 
militarisation categories, direct involvement of military forces allows external actors 
to play a leading shaping role, either as occupiers or major security partners along 
with other allies. In this category however, external actors can only support and 
influence host country authorities and hope for the best in achieving the desired policy 
outcomes. In some areas, such as levels of violence, the external actor/s may have 
little direct influence at all over the host security authorities, as demonstrated with the 
U.S. and the conduct of Colombian/Mexican forces. 
 
The Partnership category is the most applicable to U.S. counter-narcotics policy in Colombia 
and Mexico, while the Sovereign category best describes U.S. policy within its own 
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jurisdiction, as mentioned above. Cooperative Militarisation may not have a direct example 
in the case studies, but is still a logical inclusion based on broader analyses, and it 
complements the other two categories. 
 
7.6.3 My contribution in summary 
 
I have determined how the militarisation framework contributes to the securitisation debate 
and I have addressed this by: 
 
• Demonstrating how the framework provided a useful tool for assessing the extent of 
militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics policy based on empirical findings from the 
case studies. 
• Taking on-board the strengths and weaknesses of the initial framework as applied to 
the case studies, and subsequently suggesting improvements by developing a more 
detailed framework with more elements. 
• Using the revised framework and case study observations to suggest that there are 
different categories, or types, of militarisation and not simply a single type that 
encompasses all strategic scenarios. 
 
Taken altogether, these elements have strengthened the case for the inclusion of a 
‘militarised’ segment on the security spectrum, placed in-between 'securitised' and 'violised', 
as suggested in Chapter 2, thus contributing to the securitisation debate. 
As I have demonstrated, if we take into consideration the conclusions reached in a 
case study analysis, together with detailed empirical research of a security situation, in 
combination with cross checking with the new components of the militarisation framework, 
then these factors in combination will suggest whether a situation is securitised, militarised or 
violised. If a situation is militarised, observing the broader geo-political picture and 
interactions of the security actors involved will then determine what category of 
militarisation to assign to it. This is not to say that there exists a standard quantifiable 
‘formula’ that will always provide the correct categorisations, more that the analytical 
process provides a useful overview, which can inform and suggest an overall conclusion. 
 
7.6.4 Militarisation and the future research agenda 
 
In this thesis I have concentrated on Colombia, Mexico and the U.S. border region, yet there 
remains further scope to expand research into the militarisation of U.S. counter-narcotics 
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policy. Future case studies could include other drug producing and transit states that the U.S 
has influence with, whether in Latin America, Central and South East Asia, and increasingly 
Western Africa, but to take into account what the broader security situation is in that country 
or region, regardless of drugs. For instance, in countries which are experiencing internal 
conflict, and/or ones where the military and paramilitary forces play a significant role in the 
security establishment, to what extent is U.S. counter-narcotics support in those countries 
more militarised when compared to countries that prioritise a more law enforcement 
approach? Possible future case studies along these lines could include Afghanistan, Central 
American countries experiencing an upturn in drug violence such as Nicaragua and 
Honduras, and the lower priority cocaine producing countries of Bolivia and Peru. 
 
Through this enhanced militarisation framework and categorisation we can add greater 
nuance and flexibility in analysing security situations, which can in turn help indicate where 
these situations are best placed on the security spectrum. By developing this process, and in 
doing so further developing the security spectrum at the same time, my research has made as 
much of a contribution to the securitisation debate as it has to the empirical study of U.S. 
counter-narcotics policy. 
I do not claim that the development of the militarisation framework stops here. Just as 
the empirical results of the case studies in this thesis informed the reflexivity that developed 
the initial framework, I am sure that future scholars will be able to further refine it once 
results and observations are incorporated from other case studies. For instance, what I have 
proposed so far is developed mainly from the case studies and so naturally leans towards the 
state as the main security actor, and other states and allies as partners. This does not address 
hypothetical situations where Non-State Actors potentially militarise security situations either 
before or absent the decision of a state/s to do so, whether they be heavily-equipped and 
organised outlaw militias, or Private Military Companies operating without national license. 
Additionally, theatres of operations in the framework so far are geographical and 
territorial, where boots can be on the ground, whereas emerging security arenas that could be 
subject to securitisation and militarisation are more abstract, such as cyberspace (Deibert 
2003, pp.517-520) or actual orbital space (Economist 2008). These have not been explored 
for the principal reason that they are beyond the remit of this thesis and the case studies did 
not suggest them for the revised framework, but they are certainly areas of research that 
could be further investigated by scholars in the securitisation and militarisation fields. 
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7.7 War without end? Closing thoughts on U.S. counter-narcotics policy 
 
In April 2016, diplomats, drug policy experts and actors from civil society will gather for a 
UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) to address the world drug problem. The 
session itself is regarded as an important marker on the path towards achieving the goals that 
the UN set out in the 2009 policy document entitled "Political Declaration and Plan of Action 
on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the 
World Drug Problem", goals that aim to be met by 2019 (UNODC 2015b). One of these 
goals is to “minimize and eventually eliminate the availability and use of illicit drugs and 
psychotropic substances in order to ensure the health and welfare of humankind” (UNODC 
2009, P.8). Recent statistics by the UNODC’s World Drug Report, however, have not been 
encouraging, with an estimated 246 million drug users around the world, constituting 5.2 
percent of the global population, though this does actually represent stable figures for the past 
three years (UNODC 2015c, p.1)68. A report by the UN University suggests that “the likely 
outcome of UNGASS 2016 will not differ significantly from the status quo” of law 
enforcement-based orthodoxy regarding counter-narcotics, but that “cracks in the global drug 
policy regime are increasingly clear” (Cockayne and Walker 2015, p.34). It appears that, 
while member states are in broad agreement in aiming to reduce and eliminate the narcotic 
threat, calls for greater flexibility in how that outcome is achieved are growing louder. 
Given that it effectively launched the War on Drugs, and has presided over an 
enforcement-based orthodoxy for the majority of it, it is surprising that the United States is 
actually one of those member states calling for greater flexibility and experimentation, albeit 
within the existing drug regime (Cockayne and Walker 2015, p.i). For example, during the 
58th Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 2015, the U.S. submitted a resolution 
“supporting the collaboration of public health and justice authorities in pursuing alternative 
measures to conviction or punishment for appropriate drug-related offences of a minor 
nature” (UNODC 2015d). This is in contrast to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and its 
introduction of a ‘get tough and lock them up’ approach via mandatory minimum sentences.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 These figures represent the average of the estimated range of users (range: 162 million-329 million) and 
subsequent calculation for estimated global percentage (range: 3.4-7.0 per cent) (UNODC 2015c, p.1). As such, 
the problem could, in reality, be far better or far worse. 
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The gradual decriminalisation of the sale of cannabis across various U.S. states in recent 
years has also demonstrated alternative thinking, with polls indicating that national support 
for regulated cannabis sale has been 
growing and continues to do so, as 
shown in Figure 23. How long will 
it be tenable for the U.S. to 
advocate a prohibitive regime – for 
cannabis at least – at a federal and 
international level when its own 
states are implementing 
decriminalisation and sale? 
 These are signs that 
domestic U.S. counter-narcotics 
policy may be changing, slowly, or 
at least taking a more pragmatic approach, as with its foreign counter-narcotics policy. This is 
evidenced by its Colombian drawdown and change in Mexican strategy, from a military to a 
law enforcement focus. Also, at least in regard to its policies towards Colombia and Mexico, 
the U.S. may have no option than to be flexible, as those countries begin to assert their own 
authority in how best to prosecute the drug war. It was Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia that 
convinced the other member states that UNGASS 2016 needed to take place, three years 
ahead of the 2019 policy review (Cockayne and Walker 2015, p.1). 
 Additional reasons may be the effectiveness of U.S. foreign counter-narcotics policy. 
Although this thesis did not seek to determine the levels of success or failure of American 
drug policy, for every seeming positive there is a negative outlook. For instance, 2013 saw 
the lowest level of coca bush cultivation since the mid-1980s and a continued decline in 
cocaine use in the global adult population (UNODC 2015c, p.xiv), yet the prevalence of 
cannabis use in the United States has increased (UNODC 2015c, p.x). Just as during the 
1970s and 1980s, a fashionable taste for cocaine gave way to heroin and then back to cocaine 
again in the form of crack, the market will often determine the demand for certain kinds of 
drugs. If cocaine seems to be slipping back in recent years, then amphetamine-type stimulants 
are on the rise. According to the DEA, between 2009 and 2013 the amount of 
methamphetamine seized in powder and crystalline form along the southwestern border with 
Mexico increased by 200 percent (Drug Enforcement Administration 2014b, p.19). 
(Crick, Haase and Bewley-Taylor 2013, p. 1) 
Figure 23 
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 Ultimately this thesis has demonstrated that U.S. foreign counter-narcotics policy in 
Colombia has essentially been militarised during the operational lifetime of Plan Colombia 
since 2000, and that it has been securitised in Mexico since the introduction of the Merida 
Initiative in 2008. The Mexican drug conflict has also encouraged the militarisation of 
domestic policy on the U.S. southern border. 
 It is no coincidence that in both foreign case studies it can be observed that, in recent 
years, U.S. support in Colombia and Mexico has gradually shifted towards emphasising a law 
and order approach, supplemented by economic and social development. It was recognised 
that the civil conflict in Colombia – with narcotics mixed in as they were – required a 
militarised strategy. However, in order to win the peace and erode the appeal of the narcotics 
trade, law enforcement and social and economic progress also needed to complement the 
security gains made as a result of the increased scale and entrenched status of militarised 
security. In Mexico, by contrast, the initial favour shown to a militarised solution, seeking to 
replicate the Plan Colombia formula, swiftly gave way to law enforcement and socio-
economic support. Unlike Colombia, Mexico was struggling with a criminal problem and not 
political insurrection, not dissimilar to the gangland wars of American prohibition in the 
1920s, but on a completely different order of violence. While the Mexican government may 
turn to its military as a short-term stop-gap in areas of insecurity, both it and the U.S. 
recognise that the development of effective civil security institutions and socio-economic 
development is the principal long-term solution to Mexico’s drug conflict. 
 UNGASS 2016 will go some way in indicating the future direction of U.S. counter-
narcotics policy, both foreign and domestic. The global policy review it precedes, due in 
2019, may well usher in a completely new approach to international drug control, a 
compromise between advocates of flexibility and complete prohibition, or a continuation of 
the status quo. Whether the United States, the original ‘drug warrior’ chooses to keep fighting 
the drug war in the same fashion, or adapts its approach to new circumstances at home and 
abroad, remains to be seen. Whatever its decision, support for the current orthodox approach 
to drug policy remains strong in Russia, China, India, Japan, and many Middle Eastern and 
Asian states (Cockayne and Walker 2015, p.13). Whether the United States leads from the 
front or not, the War on Drugs in some shape or form, 45-years old and counting at the time 
of writing, does not look set to end anytime soon. 
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